

THESIS. for the Degree of D. Litt.

entitled

"LUDWIG FEUERBACH

and

THE VALIDITY OF RELIGIOUS
EXPERIENCE."

A Modern Study

historical, expository, and critical.

With Outline of Contents,
List of Books consulted,
Summary of Argument,
and Index.

General Aim: To show that Feuerbach's theory of Religion as
illusion is of present interest, and further
that there are not only defects and contra-
dictions in this theory, but also elements
presented with it which justify us in recognis-
ing the validity of religious experience.

Presented by the Rev. A.W. McClymont, M.A.

62 Belgrave Road, Corstorphine,

graduated at Edinburgh University with First Class Hon-
ours in Philosophy, 1901. Vans Dunlop Scholar in Philo-
sophy, 1900, Bruce of Grangehill and Falkland Scholar, 1901
Cunningham Scholar, New College, Edinburgh, 1905.
Studied at various times at German Universities, Marburg,
Berlin, Halle, Minister in Crail and Larkhall.

At present Joint-Secretary for Scotland for The Relig-
ious Tract Society (London).



Degree of D. Litt. conferred, 20th July, 1932

Outline of Contents.

Chapter I. The Interest and Importance of Feuerbach in relation to some Interpretations of Religion To-day. pp. 1-16.

Chapter II. The Political and Philosophical and Theological Movements in the first half of the XIXth century as a necessary background for our subject. pp. 18-45.

Chapter III. The Personal History, Experience and Activity of Feuerbach as interpretative of his theory of Religion. pp. 47- 71.

Chapter IV. Summary and Survey of his principal works dealing with Religion, pp. 72-168.
 1/ Pierre Bayle, p.72-89.
 2/ Das Wesen des Christentums, pp. 90- 131.
 3/ Das Wesen der Religion, pp. 132- 140.
 4/ Vorlesungen über Das Wesen der Religion, pp.141- 154.
 5/ Theogonie, pp 155- 168.

Chapter V. Critical Examination of Feuerbach's Argument.

Section (1.) Introductory; his desire for Reality and Anti-Hegelianism. pp.169- 177.

Section (2.) His Method, analytic and psychological, pp.178- 183.

Section (3). (a) His Psychological Schema of the human powers involving his theory of Man, Nature, and God.
 (b) and the stages by which transition is made from Nature to Man as the Object of Religion. pp.184- 208.

Section (4) His Doctrine of Self-consciousness and of the knowledge of the Infinite: his religious Phenomenalism. pp. 209-230.

Chapter V. (critical)

Section(5.) The Theogonic Wish; its definite but restricted form; the cognate doctrine of Projection; and the argument from Need to the Reality of the Object. pp. 231-272.

Section(6.) Religion anthropocentric because practical: Morality as the Truth and Reality of Religion. pp. 273-302.

Section(7) Society as divine the true Object of Religion with special reference to Durkheim and others. pp 303-327.

Section(8.) The recent Attack on Humanism by Karl Barth and Brunner. pp. 328-361.

Section(9) Feuerbach's Appeal to Luther in support of his own Theory unjustifiable. pp. 362-378.

Section(10.) Religion as an immediate Experience, pp. 379-405.

Section (11.) Conclusions. pp. 406-423.

Notes:

1/ Feuerbach and Leuba, Some common elements. pp.424-427.

2/ Feuerbach and Hegel, pp. 428-435.
their separation and the early appreciation of Hegel by the former.

3/ Feuerbach's relation to the Materialists in defence of the Spiritual. pp.436-443.

Index.

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F.A.D. = Feeling of absolute dependence

1.
Summary of Argument.

CHAPTER I. The Interest and Importance of Feuerbach

in view of the present attitude of many to Religion.

Reviewing the present situation as it is depicted in many books, e.g. "The Nineteen Twenties", by A.C. Ward, the works of Jung, Freud, Julian Huxley etc. we find two causes of the revolt against religion. Through the new study of Psychology and the popularisation of its ideas, religion is not denied but explained away as a function of human nature (Julian Huxley) or regression to infantile ideas of the individual or the race (Freud, Jung). Religious thought and practices, Huxley says, may be retained if transposed into a new key. Religion may now give subjective satisfaction but it has no objective reality. Balmforth points out that this attack from psychology is the third wave of the scientific challenge to religious faith and it is probably the most difficult to meet.

Again, there are special circumstances in the post-war world which favour this subjective view of religion, the success in the development of the medical treatment of nervous troubles, the general disintegration of the conventional sanctions and even the foundations of life, the love of slogans and the human interest of the new psychological terms, the wide-spread emphasis on the material gains of science and civilization. "We are living matter"; "Man is the highest of all concrete realities and there is nothing above him but his own ideals." These ideas are prevalent among the younger as well as among the older races

of/

of the world.

The books of Krutch and Lippmann suggest that all is not so well as is thought and a critical reconsideration is required. There is a distrust of the new freedom, for "the cosmic consciousness has collapsed upon a great void".

Under these circumstances there is gain in looking back to a period and a personality which reflect many of our problems and some of our solutions. Feuerbach, the Father of Illusionism, laid down the principle, "Theology is Anthropology" and so touches the nerve of the great question, 'What is the validity of religious experience?' He anticipates not only the modern problem in general but even anticipates some of the terms current in modern psychology. It is part of his interest also that he is in line with or in reaction against a great philosophic tradition.

Quotations from many notable writers show that they appreciate the importance of Feuerbach... This is to be expected from sympathetic followers such as Bolin, Jodl, Carl Beyr, Kohut, and Leuba, but the more critical Starcke considers he is a 'key-man', while Höffding calls him 'an energetic thinker richly endowed'. Von Hügel, Wobbermin, and Karl Barth each emphasise his striking contribution to the question at issue. Friend and critic agree that his work is marked both by virtuosity and by incompleteness and Merz points out that he has a place with the political and feuilleton writers who appealed to the people and set the problems which the professors in the universities had to answer.

A short account of the political and intellectual conditions of his time is therefore necessary.

Chapter II.

The political and philosophical movements in the first half of the XIXth century as a necessary background for our subject.

These movements throw light upon and sharply define the problem and character of Feuerbach. I/ It was a 'Post-War Epoch', but was not attended by a 'bloodless revolution'. After the downfall of Napoleon came the offer and withdrawal of constitutions for the various German states, accompanied by repression and police-supervision. Two events marked the dissatisfaction and unrest, the students' bonfire at the Wartburg/^{Festival in Jena} on the 18th Oct, 1817, and the assassination of Kotzebue by a student at Mannheim, March 23rd, 1819. Commissioners appointed to visit the universities and supervise the instruction given. Hegel, though called the 'official philosopher', also suspect.

Two upheavals revealed the mood of the age, 1st, the French Revolution of July 1830, and again in 1848, leading to wider movements of revolt against Absolutism in Germany and Austria. The Convocation of a great National Congress of representatives of the German people led only to disappointment. Feuerbach's abstention is defended by him on the ground that the movement had no reality, but trusted in words only. The time of the worst reaction lay between 1850 - 60 and was mitigated by efficient administration on the part of the government and by an industrial and scientific advance which itself gave material to Feuerbach's argument that Christianity with its supernatural ideas had long vanished not only from the reason but from the life of mankind.

II / The philosophical and theological situation was one of intellectual ^{activity} ~~XXXX~~, as strong as the political was weak, and Feuerbach's reaction to it is naturally most conspicuous in his writings. Romanticism succeeds Rationalism and carries us forward into the midst of the great system-makers of the XIXth century. Kant's three Kritiques, especially the first, provide both a quarry and a battleground. How is the dualism of Sense and Understanding to be overcome is the question among others which Fichte, Schelling and Hegel endeavour to answer. Feuerbach's own references to and criticism of this idealistic development are of much value.

In his criticism of current theology Feuerbach is much less sympathetic, showing toward it scorn and contempt while professing respect for the 'chaste monastic cell' which he considers is the true representative of Christianity. Yet the age was not so barren as he alleged. Pietism had a good and a wide influence. Professor Hastie gives a more favourable judgment in his Introduction to Lichtenberg^{er}'s book on German Theology in the XIXth century.

Yet there was unrest in Church circles. Rationalism persisted and Feuerbach though critical of it is yet himself under its spell. But the two commanding influences were Hegel and Schleiermacher.

Viewed as a whole, it was an age strained and dissatisfied, resentful of the Absolutism which pressed heavily in State and University and Church upon its desire for ampler life.

Chapter III.

The personal history, experience and activity of Feuerbach as interpretative of his theory of Religion.

It will be found that there is a development through a sharp antagonism to an effort at a positive statement.

His father and the family of eight children all display marked ability; in the father romantic tendencies are curbed by practical necessities: 'My will and my reason curb the passions Ludwig born 28th July 1804 at Landshut in Bavaria died on the 13th September 1872 at Reckenberg. His character has been called mysterious, and it is possible to discuss the influence of these personal disappointments upon his doctrine of religion as a dream and the vanity of human wishes. He was certainly an 'introvert', and the 'resignation' to which Starcke refers was not only philosophical but practical. The question is interesting but speculative and the result inconclusive.

His early interest in religion as schoolboy and student is unquestioned and his reading shows a wide variety in theological as well as general literature. All through he was interested in the practical side of theology. In 1823 he went to Heidelberg and showed himself a very diligent theological student. Critical of Paulus, the leader of theological rationalism, he is more pleased for a time with Daub who pointed beyond himself to the genius of Hegel. But his desire to go to Berlin grew very ~~strong~~ strong (where he might study philosophy). "Palestine is too narrow for me". He seeks Nature and the complete man. Reluctantly his father agrees, and Berlin fascinates him despite his abstemious/

abstemious life as a student. Schleiermacher and Neander fail to please him as he had anticipated, but the name of the former is bound up with the happy recollections of the capital of Prussia, 'my second, my spiritual, my true fatherland.'

Dissatisfaction with the teaching of Hegel appears already in 1827-8, for he began to ask what was the relation of Denken and Sein, of Logic and Nature; 'Were there no Nature, never would the immaculate virgin Logic produce one from herself.'

In 1828 he presented his Doctor-dissertation to Erlangen University under the title, "De ratione, una, universali, infinita." There is to be observed an enthusiasm for Reason, a sphere where individuality does not count, while Christianity is criticised as neither the perfect nor the absolute religion in so far as it is the religion of the pure self, of the person as exalted spirit; Nature is left out and Reason is not yet free.

The pleasure of his father with the dissertation was destroyed by the publication of "Gedanken eines Denker über Tod und Unsterblichkeit" in 1830 which though published anonymously was generally attributed to Feuerbach. The Bavarian police laid hold upon it and it exercised a fatal power upon all his scholastic aspirations. In its psychological explanation of the belief in immortality it anticipates his later treatment of religion as founded in the desire of the individual, and the theme appears constantly in his other works.

He continues his literary work, counting 'his failure his freedom.' In 1833 appeared his History of Modern Philosophy and in 1834 "~~Die~~ Abaelard and Heloise, or The Writer and the Man."

He desires to go to Paris, or to Zurich, or to America but fails to get encouragement for his plans. In 1833 his father died and in 1835 he became engaged to Bertha Löwe whom he married in 1837, settling down at Schloss Bruckberg.

His 'Leibnitz' appeared in 1836 and was intended to be an extension of his History of Modern Philosophy which had been well received by the public. 'Pierre Bayle', a contribution to the History of Philosophy and Modern Culture, but more a study in the relation of reason and faith was written in 1838, 'to instruct and shame an infatuated and exasperated people', the reference being to a recent outbreak of religious strife in Bavaria between Protestants and Roman Catholics.

Spärcke mentions three stages in the development of our author, 1. to 'Leibnitz', 1836, 2nd, from Bayle, 1838 to 1843 when the 'Grundsätze' appeared, and 3rd. from 1844 on, from the publication of 'Luther', where the philosopher passes completely into the man and reason is bound close to the sensible reality.

Our chief interest lies in the four works on Religion, 'Das Wesen des Christentums', 1841, 3rd edition, 1848-9; 'Das Wesen der Religion', 1845; 'Vorlesungen über das Wesen der Religion', 1851; 'Theogonie', the most prized by Feuerbach, 1857; (details later).

The collected edition which runs to ten volumes was begun in 1846.

Trials and hardships marked his later days, due partly to the bankruptcy of the porcelain-factory at Schloss Bruckberg. To leave this home was like the parting of soul and body, he says. Friendly assistance was given him in 1862 and again in 1871.

Summary of Argument

Chapter IV.

A great concourse assembled at his funeral, arranged by the Social Democrat Labour Party with which he had been associated as a member since 1870. This in part explains the use made of his name and teaching by the school of economic materialism. Some quotations are given from speeches at the funeral and from other tributes. It is difficult to say how wide his influence really was, but a Gesellschaft bearing his name was founded by William Bolin of Helsingfors, and a revised edition of his works has appeared edited by Bolin and Friedrich Jodl. Certainly his name ~~KARL MARX~~ is recurring with strange persistence for one who has suffered much neglect.

Chapter IV.

Summary and Survey of the principal works of Feuerbach dealing with Religion.

Feuerbach never compiled an autobiography, but reveals himself in many of his writings, especially V W R ch.1&2. and Preface to S.W. where he humourously admits the dust of the past may act as fertiliser for the future.

Pierre Bayle: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Philosophie und / ~~XXXIX~~ " 1838, is of importance as a revelation of the rationalism which coloured more of his later writing than he would admit. We notice the bias against ~~XXXXXXXX~~ miracle, and the emphasis upon the crimes of religion. A strong plea is made for the independence of Science, Art, Morality, and the question is raised whether Nature and Reason can be equated. It is not so much an exposition of Bayle as a medium for the expression of his own views, for the conflict between Faith and Reason, Religion and Morality still continued.

The root of the trouble lies in the exaggerated dualism of the religious interpretation of life, which finds scope in Protestantism as well as in Catholicism, though in the case of the former the ascetic otherworldliness is the^retical and not practical.

The conflict between Theology and Science, or Philosophy, which alone represents the idea of science absolutely, is one between particularity and universality. The mere ~~XXXXX~~ 'Dass' or statement suffices for religious consideration, but the 'Wie' or 'Wodurch' is the kernel of the study of Nature, an interesting statement of scientific method. He criticises the argument from adaptation and declares that no direct view of Nature can be/

be obtained since the idea of an external God acts as intervening barrier. Theology has succumbed completely to the marvellous, its metaphysical principle is 'Creation out of nothing'.

Christianity has a natural beginning and religion is an essential form of the human spirit as Volksgeist. Miracle is a form of representation in popular religion and not in Christianity alone. Belief in Miracle depreciates Nature and the belief is itself the essence of ~~XXX~~ miracle. He defines a fact as that which in the moment it happens shuts out the possibility of being otherwise.

In chap 4 he argues for the independence of Morality from Religion, defending Atheism as compatible with morality, and criticising religion on three grounds, 1/ Holiness is not an original conception, for only the true is holy; 2/ Religion becomes of necessity positive, an affair of the state; 3/ Religion tears up Ethics by the roots, setting the Good beyond Man.

Reason in chap 5 is defined as a clear and lively light, self-evidencing in character, and the test of truth is not to be found in the witness of the senses. Reason not revelation decides between different lawgivers. In the Categorical Imperative Kant was the first to write a Grammar of Ethics in contrast to what had previously been only doctrines of happiness.

Ethics is the rational religion, the self-evidenced, over against the phantasy and symbols of the orthodox. It may be abstract but it is not a glorified self-seeking as the other is.

Chap 6 and 7 continue the description of Reason as found in Bayle and in the theologians, in the course of which he emphas-

ises the necessity of philosophy. Over against mediated facts i.e. facts which have been coloured by ideas or imagination he sets the immediate fact which is just, e.g. a historical fact and not a divine truth.

It is admitted that mystery remains, there is a necessity which belongs to the passions, serving the race more than the individual, yet science means freedom from oneself, objectivity. In the concluding chapters Feuerbach shows his skill as a por-
trayer of character, declaring that Bayle excites the appetite for philosophy but does not satisfy it, he gives us salt rather than food. He sways between Empiricism and Metaphysics.

We note that the 'theogonic wish' has not yet appeared in definite form, but that the fatal thing in religion is that it is personal subjective utilitarian, whereas philosophy and science are unbiassed impartial. Nature is not a dead machine and Reason is a clear and lively light.

Chap. 1V,(continued) The Principal Works of Feuerbach...

2/ 'Das Wesen des Christentums.' 1841, 3rd edit. 1848-9.

It made a great sensation when published, the reception being partly appreciative and partly hostile, the 'foundation of the only possible religious philosophy' and the total demolition of religion. The English Translation, 1854, by George Eliot.

A summarising of the author's previous occasional thoughts concerning religion and Christianity, theology and speculative philosophy, it contained the elements and only the critical elements of a philosophy of positive religion. Religion is essentially dramatic. Religion and Philosophy are not to be identified. His method is objective, analytical, historical. The history of Dogma is a criticism of Dogma and proves that theology is anthropology.

The Preface to the second Edition gives a succinct and trenchant account of his opponents and declares that the whole being of the time is 'Schein', appearance. Criticising the philosophers and theologians 'who pluck out their eyes that they may see better', he defines the principle of his philosophy to be no merely conceptual being, but the true 'Ens realissimum', Man. The two parts of his book, the positive and the negative, are complementary and both are necessary, for he claims that he exalts anthropology to theology instead of the reverse and declares that the anthropomorphism of the Incarnation is a worthy idea. "I change the object as it is in the imagination into the object as it is in reality.

Summary of Argument.

In addition to the two main sections, there is a very important chapter, dealing 1/ with the Essential Nature of Man, and 2/ with the essential nature of Religion, and the appendix is important.

Three propositions dealing with man are noted and also the threefold description of man as Reason, Will, and Love. The proposition that "Consciousness of the infinite is nothing else than the consciousness of the infinity of consciousness" may be said to strike the key-note of Feuerbach's philosophy. Schleiermacher's theory of religion as feeling is criticised and he is condemned for being 'too cowardly to confess a theology without a God.'

'The essence of Religion considered generally' is treated in the same abstract fashion. "It is our task to show that the antithesis of divine and human is altogether illusory", for the measure of the Race or Species is the absolute measure law and criterion of man. The development of religion shows the identity of subject and predicate, for man abstracts more and more from God and attributes more and more to himself. Religion has no material exclusively its own. Apart from man the infinite fullness of various predicates is a concept without reality, for in religion the predicate is the true subject. Man's self-abasement is really the assertion of his ideal under the safer custody of the divine, and occurs through the process of projection by which he projects his being into objectivity and then again makes himself an object to this projected image of himself thus converted into a subject. Projection is the mystery of Re-

ligion and is as involuntary and necessary as Art or speech.

Parts I & II show the application of the first principles of his philosophy of religion to the various doctrines of the Church. The God of the schoolmen, Rationalism (and Kant) is ^{partly} nothing but the objective nature of the understanding. The object of religion should be distinct from man yet must also have human attributes, Luther being quoted here as frequently elsewhere to support the second statement.

The Incarnation is not a purely empirical fact, but a conclusion which rests on a very comprehensible premiss. It is not altogether different from the incarnations of heathen deities, though there are differences admitted, specified in S.W.I, article, 1844.

Christianity is the religion of suffering, to suffer for others is divine. The mystery of the suffering God is therefore the mystery of feeling. The cosmological thought in God is nothing else than the act of thought in its simplest form made objective, the mystic paraphrase of a psychological process.

The need of a personal God rests on the fact that only in the attribute of personality does the personal man meet with himself, and it is linked with the doctrine of Creation out of nothing and man's attempt to dominate the world of Nature.

Prayer the simplest act of religion reveals the ultimate essence of religion, the omnipotence of feeling, the confidence that its wishes will be fulfilled; while faith is the infinite self-certainty of man that his own subjective being is the objective absolute being. The miraculous Redeemer is nothing else/

Summary of Argument

else the realised wish of feeling to be free from the laws of morality. Christianity may be justly called the absolute religion for in it the heart is joined to and restrains the imagination. Belief in Christ satisfies the longing for unity and for reality, seeing that touch is the last criterion of reality.

Celibacy and monachism are necessary consequents of the belief in heaven promised by Christianity, and personal immortality is the final doctrine of religion, for God is the guarantee of my future. But seeing that existence without quality is a chimera, and no one knows the qualities of the future life, faith in it is only faith in the true life of the ^{present} ~~XXXXXX~~.

Earlier he had written, "Our task is to show that theology is nothing else than an unconscious esoteric pathology, anthropology, psychology", and at the close of the first Part he concludes, "We have reduced the supermundane, supernatural and superhuman nature of God to the elements of human nature as its fundamental elements... The beginning, middle, and end of religion is Man."

The 2nd Part is negative and destructive with little new in it. We have a contradiction between Religion or God and Nature which runs through the whole history of Christianity, and with regard to the existence of God, religion separates God from man and yet unites him to man, God is a matter of experience and yet in reality no object of experience, i.e. of the senses. Proofs of the existence of God aim at making the internal external, though the Ontological proof is the most interesting as it proceeds from within. The idea of God is linked up with that of revelation/

revelation and through it with that of personality which as
since ethical definitions are accidents to it.
usual is attacked, / Hegel's speculative doctrine of God as
well as that of Böhme is criticised, because in them God and man
are separated with inevitable contradictions.

It is characteristic of religion that it turns what is naturally active into the passive. Christ is nothing but an image under which the unity of the species has impressed itself on the popular consciousness.

The concluding Application in ch 27 makes an appeal to rise above the standpoint of Christianity and religion, and if one asks, To what? the answer seems to be, To see that life as a whole is divine. Unite Man with Nature, and yet Man as separate is to be grateful to 'Holy Nature'. This separation shows itself in the two sacraments, the human bread and wine, and the divine water. The reference to Nature suggests a point of contact with his next work, "Das Wesen der Religion".

Feuerbach's plan is (simply) stated to be the destruction of an illusion and the inversion of the religious relation, exalting that into the primary which is subordinate in religion. But this inversion is itself the substitution of theories for facts and is so far itself an illusion.

He emphasises the individuality of things.

Man is both humiliated and depreciated, for Nature is the ground of religion but Man is its aim. The feeling of absolute dependence expresses itself in sacrifice, the essential act of natural religion, but sacrifice itself paves the way to self-assertion, to 'Egöismus'.

Chap. IV. (continued) The Principal Works of Feuerbach...

3/

'Das Wesen der Religion', 1845, had as its aim the presentation of Religion so far as Nature is her object, thus supplementing W.C. where God was considered as in Man and not in Nature, but there is no real endeavour to reconcile the two works. It is preceded in G.W. vol I, at p361, by valuable Supplements and Explanations which emphasise Necessity, Phantasy, and Egoism.

The feeling of absolute dependence in man is the ground of religion and the object of religion is originally nothing more than Nature. Three explanations of varieties of religion are given. Nature is only a general word and is not the result of the activity of a spiritual being. She is defined as 'the unconscious God', not purposeful, but with her own way like to instinct, not blind not dead not casual. Necessity seems to be greater than Nature but while it has both natural and human references it is not clearly defined.

We notice all through his opposition to Hegelianism and to Theism, and he will have nothing to do with the deduction or the derivation of the world from God by creation out of nothing.

God is not the First Cause, and disregarding a sense of unity he emphasises the individuality of things.

Man is both honoured and depreciated, for Nature is the ground of religion but Man is its aim. The feeling of absolute dependence expresses itself in sacrifice, the essential act of natural religion, but sacrifice itself paves the way to Self-assertion, to 'Egoismus'.

Summary of Argument

The Wish is the origin and essence of Religion, and as wishes vary so do religions, for the gods are realised wishes. "God is a religious word" ~~defined~~ but Feuerbach gives us fluctuating conceptions of God.. Nature, Necessity, the living Ideals of man, and his fanciful ideas. Man can be moral but not blessed without God.

Two smaller points with regard to what Feuerbach says of 'utility' are of interest.

Summary; in seeking to secure a place for Religion apart from Philosophy he follows the teaching of Schleiermacher in asserting the natural implanted and inevitable feeling of absolute dependence, but he does not give it the place it ought to have in any larger consideration of religion and its significance for the universe as well as for man. Detailed criticism is to be
//found later.

Chap. IV.(continued)

The Principal Works of Feuerbach.

4/

'Vorlesungen über das Wesen der Religion', delivered in the town of Heidelberg in the winter of 1848-9, and published in 1851, have a three-fold interest, political, literary, and expository, and declare that a new religion is required for a new age. This religion is founded on Nature and Man, and is different from Culture, though religion is the oldest Culture and Culture ought to be perfected religion.

His declared aim is a positive one, 'To change men from friends of God to friends of men.. from candidates of the future life to students of this, from Christians who in consequence of their own creed are half animal, half angel, into complete men.'

He has discovered the principle of 'Sinnlichkeit' in religion which later seems to become 'Man', 'Egoismus', and 'Nature' as organism. His doctrine may be named Religion or Philosophy as you please.

Basing his lectures on his W.R. he seeks to show that God is not only as in Christianity the Good, the Cause of moral beings, but the deified and personified being of Nature. Lecture 10 and lecture 20 are transition passages. The main positions have already been indicated but there are interesting and useful expansions and additions.

The feeling of absolute dependence includes both the positive and the negative ground of the explanation of the origin of religion, 'thanks for dependence on that object through which I am something as well as fear because dependent upon that through which/

which I am nothing.' The feeling of need is practical, teleological, the feeling of gratitude is poetic, aesthetic.

Working toward his further development of religion as Egoismus he declares the feeling of absolute dependence is not the whole of religion, only its origin and basis, and is itself only an indirect or negative feeling of self mediated by the object upon which I am dependent. We notice the admission of the reality of the object in religion, though its power is passive, a consequence of the power of my need.

Both self-sacrifice and self-realisation, whose co-existence constitutes the paradox of religion are both subject to the fundamental Wish for Blessedness, the heavenly life with God. This Egoismus which we have reached as the last subjective ground of religion is not selfish, but is moral as well as metaphysical, the impulse of self-preservation and the instinct of reason.

Nature is defined as the unconscious, underived, eternal, first in time though not in rank, self-subsistent, not God, but the essence of all sensible powers, but what Feuerbach never decides is whether Man is in or out of Nature. Nature is a republic and so the monarchical God of Deism must be set aside.

Jesus as presented in the Bible is a religious but not a historical figure, for religion is the realm of wishes, which are marked as religious because unlike ordinary wishes they do not accept the limits of Nature and Reason. We should concentrate on real and rational wishes, not on the longing for eternal life guaranteed by God who is an object of love and admiration but is not a world-cause or a natural power. "Apart from earth I am a phantom. I am essentially a being of earth."

Chap. IV. (continued) The Principal Works of Feuerbach.

5 / "Theogonie", nach den Quellen des classischen, hebraischen und christlichen Altertums." 1857.

This was intended to be Feuerbach's swan-song and recapitulation of his whole spiritual life, and is praised by Bolin as the simplest completest and most mature of all his writings. Though especially to Homer, the references to literature are many, the interest is theological or philosophical.

Nature plays a conspicuous part in his theorisings and is equated with deity in one place but so also are God and Man.

The gods are the representatives of human wishes, but the question arises how are there not only wish-denying and wish-affirming deities but also some which are absolutely wish-denying. The answer lies not only in the wavering nature of man's wishes, but in the fact that the gods are not only gods, i.e., wishes, but also Nature-beings. This shows the difficulty of detaching man and his wishes from the objective world to which he refers them. The object of desire is prior to the wish and is active as well as passive.

Various explanations are given of the origin of Monotheism but they are not reconciled.

Rightly asserting that religion is a warm personal relationship, he objects to the proofs of the existence of God which treat the deities as external things, but he affirms that the idea of God is really derived from the senses seeing that the wishes spring from the senses. The theogonic Wish is discussed

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and the wish is defined as the expression of a want, a slave with the will of freedom and the desire for happiness. From this point of view intellectualism in religion and rigorism in morals are to be attacked. Religion would appear to be innate in man as the feeling of absolute dependence and as the desire for happiness, for these are inevitable and self-evidencing. ~~Sufficient~~

Happiness is discussed at length, and it seems that religion has a universal reference since happiness is cosmic in its claim and requires God the Creator as the ground of its satisfaction.

Conscience and Right are also discussed generally from the empirical standpoint. Conscience does not require a God for man wills that there be amoral order. The idea of a Social Contract is rejected, for religion and social history goes back to Nature and the family.

Seeking to discredit anthropomorphism he asserts that the Symbol is also the thing, and in any case it is pantheistic and not theistic. Religion is distinguished from morality by the difference of prayer from action and of wish from work.

In conclusion we may say the book shows a sharpening of definitions without much real progress. The feeling of absolute dependence has almost disappeared, the Glückseligkeitstreibe takes its place, but Nature remains still inexorable.

Feuerbach's confession that his works are fragmentary reminds us that we may discover in them valuable truths for religion.

Summary of Argument

Chap. V.

Critical Examination of Feuerbach's Argument.

Section 1/

Introductory; the influence of his personality and of contemporary politics and thought; his desire for reality and his anti-Hegelianism.

Many elements are involved in Feuerbach's argument and require separate consideration so that an outline of topics to be dealt with is given. We notice here (1) his personal desire for reality and his interest in religion and religious literature. He denies that he is an atheist, and while refuting Stirner's charge of giving us only a theological deliverance from religion seems not averse to the designation 'pious'. The positive part of W.C. is for him the most important part, for he desires to retain the ethical elements in religion. His search for reality threw him back to Nature and Sensibility and to Man as a creature of earth, but in abandoning the reference to a transcendental object he no longer deals with religion.

(2) His reaction from Hegel is mentioned by him as the clue to his theory, for he battles against the abstract inhumanity of philosophy, but his Realism which had a religious as well as a philosophical motive at the beginning passes into Naturalism. 'Sinnlichkeit' represents reality against thought, but is not to be taken abstractly so as to form a dualism over against Spirit. Although it passes over into the larger conception of Man, and man is separate from the animals by reason of his self-consciousness, the emphasis continues to lie on sense-experience.

He puzzles his friends as much as his enemies by his assertion that he is not a materialist, for he is pledged to self-consciousness and morality, but his review of Moleschott's book is friendly and he criticises the 'spiritualist' position. It is claimed that he anticipated 'psycho-physical parallelism' in his theory of 'Organismus'. The problem is left unsolved but in favour of sensibility.

Section 2/.

empirical, inductive,
His Method psychological and analytical.

His method is dictated by his realistic impulse, the desire to get away from the oriental language of imagery and self-sufficient speculation. Consequently he is somewhat apologetic about the philosophic material and the theological atmosphere in his book, W.C. Over against Bauer and Strauss he deals with Christianity as it appears in Christian men, not as dogma or doctrine. Hence his quotations from Luther and Augustine.

But can history and analysis give us the essence of Christianity? Leese, p5, quotes Troeltsch and Hegel to the contrary. A personal decision is necessary, yet history has its own witness for the open mind. Further, Feuerbach claiming to be historical is not so. His enquiry is more psychological than historical, determined by an analysis of human activities, of which a Schema is given in Section 3/. We have really an a priori construction, not an induction. His task, he says, is to solve a psychological riddle, unnecessary because history has already/

already solved it. Jodl explains the new thing in Feuerbach to be his understanding of the practical, passive, not to say pathological character of religion, but the emphasis is more on the latter than on the former.

Leuba as the modern Feuerbach quoted by Wobbermin proves the religious belief in God to be an indefensible illusion, since empirical psychology is the appropriate scientific discipline in the case.

Section 3/

(A) Feuerbach's Psychological Schema of the human powers, involving his theory of Man, Nature, and God.:

and (B) the Stages by which the transition is made from Nature to Man as the object of religion.

(A) Man consisting of mind affection and will, a well-balanced Schema shows Reason with Science, Nature, Law, Morality, and the Race over against Feeling, Imagination, the Heart, God, Faith, and individual Immortality. The decisive contrast is between Reason and Feeling, Nature and God.

Reason is not distinguished from Understanding and is the scientific and unbribable part of our nature, linked to Nature which is not so easily defined and haunts Feuerbach to the end. Challenged as to his interpretation of Nature, he declares she ^{the divinity of Nature} is not God, yet ~~xxx~~ is the basis of all religion as man is the aim. The relation between basis and aim is never satisfactorily dealt with. There appear to be three meanings given to Nature/

ure, 1. sense-material or ^{sense} objects : 2. the realm of science:
3. the eternal uncomprehended unconscious Power behind all.

The other side of the Schema presents us with a view of Feeling and Imagination joined to the idea of God and developed through a criticism of Jacobi and Schleiermacher. With regard to the latter the criticism touches the 'Reden' more than the larger "Der Christliche Glaube" and is unfair to the wider doctrine of feeling which the latter book develops. The feeling of absolute dependence does refer beyond itself, though the relation indicated is only of the slightest fashion. There are for Schleiermacher three grades of consciousness, of which the feeling of absolute dependence is the highest, no longer the psychological 'feeling' co-ordinate with 'knowing' and 'willing' but the form of rationality in man corresponding to the objective rational principle, God, the supreme causality and unity. It is to be admitted that the richness of Schleiermacher's thought, a speculative and romantic monism combined with a historical teleology, leads to difficulties for himself and for his commentators. There are damaging suggestions of subjectivity but he means us to see in religious experience an objective reference and a genuine validity.

It is important to notice that Feuerbach recognises an objective reference in the feeling of absolute dependence, but as Nature is both despised and exalted and as the relation between Nature and Man is never satisfactorily decided, absolute dependence giving place to original dependence, we are left with

three theories of religion not related finally to one another,
 1. where Nature is the object of this feeling of absolute dependence : 2. where God is a phantasy, a creature of the theogonic wish: 3. where the Race is the true divine reality.

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(B)

The transition from Nature to Man as the object of Religion is marked by three stages:

1. by the distinction between the basis and aim of religion, Nature and Man respectively, though it is alleged that Christianity ignores Nature; and in religion the above distinction aim falls away in so far as man's higher aims constitute the basis of his life as man.

2. by a change in the interpretation of the feeling of absolute dependence so that it becomes 'Egoismus'. The change is effected through his doctrine of Need, not Wish only. Man seeks an instrument against that upon which he is dependent. Against the earlier atheists and pantheists he says that not fear only but joy gratitude reverence are the grounds of religion. The primitive feeling of dependence is enlarged so that man's desires are brought actively and not merely passively into relation with Nature. He thus isolates Man from Nature, which he censures Theism for doing, without recognising that he has changed his idea of Nature. This Egoismus is unselfish, social and has even cosmic relations.

3. by an ^{earlier} explanation ^{in W.C.} of the origin of religion in the self-conscious nature of Man which constitutes an essential difference/

ence between man and the brute, by which a man separates himself from himself, and also from his species. Religion is and can be nothing else than the consciousness of the infinite which man has of his own not limited and finite but infinite nature. This consciousness of the infinite is nothing else than the consciousness of the infinity of consciousness.

By definition therefore man is shut up within the circle of his own nature, regarded not as individual but as social, for the individual may not transfer his limitations to the Race. He can rise above himself as an individual but not above the Race which constitutes his infinite because he cannot be aware of its limitations as he can of his own.

The antithesis of divine and human is therefore illusory, nothing else than the antithesis between human nature in general and the human individual. Theology is therefore anthropology.

But this account of the knowledge of the infinite requires further consideration.

Chap V. continued. (criticism)

Section 4.

Consciousness of the infinite as infinity of consciousness, and the Religious Phenomenalism of Feuerbach.

Summary of previous argument. The aim of Feuerbach is to keep the infinite of which man is undoubtedly conscious within the limits of the Race, by the limitation of knowledge to human or sense-perceived objects, by a statement of the relation of predicate to subject which denies the existence of the subject when reference is made to God, and by emphasis upon the varieties of religion. The result is Phenomenalism in all our knowledge.

We may admit that the idea of God varies with changes in human conditions and ideas, but hold that an objective reference is always implied and that the idea of God is never exhausted by such experiences, while theological or religious ideas have influenced social ideas as well as vice versa.

The relation of subject to predicate and of knowledge to reality takes us into the history of the discussion carried on by Locke Berkeley and Hume, to the dualism of Cartesianism, Hume's sceptical distinction between 'impressions' and 'ideas', and Kant's enquiry as to the a priori elements in experience. Kant's doctrine of the 'thing-in-itself' and Phenomenalism was a bad legacy. He attacks the Ontological argument for the existence of God especially and with his doctrine of 'Ideas' he destroys the 'illusion' of previous theology. Being is not a real predicate. The test of reality belongs entirely to the field of experience.

We must however remember Kant's important qualifications, room is left for experience other than sensible, he wishes to abolish knowledge to make room for belief. The 'Ideas' of God, freedom and immortality are retained and reinstated in the Critique of Practical Reason. He looks beyond the division of Theoretical and Practical Reason to a systematic unity of ends.

But Feuerbach will not accept this extension of Reason to the noumenal world. God is not unknown, but known as the Race.

Nor will he accept Hegel's critical restatement of the Ontological argument and the leap of thought into the supersensible. He is a nominalist, for whom Reason is analytic not synthetic, and thus dissolves the subject into the predicate, leaving us with a Phenomenalism which extends to all knowledge and overthrows his original naive Realism. Human agreement becomes the first criterion of truth.

But Hegel is right when he points out that thinking is not a barrier but a bridge to reality and that self-consciousness is not self-contained. Feuerbach's references to 'objectivity' really take us to Sensibility and to 'sense-objects' and do not really save him from Phenomenalism. Both subject and accident fall within the sphere of sensibility (v Grundsätze).

Sensibility is understood in a larger sense than usual in what he calls the new philosophy, as the mother of all knowledge the true and divine, being certain immediately through itself.

Bolin and Jodl defend Feuerbach from the charge of being a vulgar sensualist of the pre-Kantian school, referring to paragraph 48 Grundsätze for a fresh and significant account of the relation/

relation of perception to thought. Apart from sensibility we have only the criterion of truth of the speculative philosophy, non-contradiction which does not give any decision whether the truth conceived is also truth in reality. In consequence also it is impossible to rationalise reality wholly ^{by thinking} because reality is broken into individuals by perception.

But Feuerbach admits that self-consciousness is real, does not decide the relation of thought to sense, while it has to be pointed out that sense-^{perception}~~EXPERIENCE~~ is only one part of experience, that immediacy of feeling is claimed for religion, that a completed system is made difficult not by sense-experience only but by moral and religious experience also and that despite this difficulty we may find and employ ruling principles to give the coherence which philosophy and religion both seek.

Summary: because of his narrow empiricism, self-consciousness in his theory is out of touch with the transcendental, God the divine subject is exhausted in his predicates, is simply human nature universalised, or the realised wish of the heart, and belief in his existence is an illusion. But like Bayle Feuerbach is deficient in metaphysical persistence and prefers the valleys of empiricism.

Chap. V, continued; (Criticism)

Section 5/

The Theogonic Wish: its definite but restricted form: the cognate doctrine of Projection: and the argument from Need to the reality of the object.

The Theogonic Wish is closely associated with other elements in Feuerbach's subjective theory.

Four points will be emphasised in the argument, his restricted views of Wish in religion and of Projection: there is an argument from need to reality justifiable under certain circumstances, but metaphysics and not psychology must decide.

(I) Contact with modern psychology is evident, for the so-called Wish, says Holt (The Freudian Wish) is now the unit of psychology replacing the older unit, sensation, and Feuerbach would agree, with rationalistic reservations, that life as a whole is dynamic, but he would reject Holt's view of Wish as cognitive.

His restricted use of Wish in religion is due to his distinction between necessary and unnecessary wishes determined by Nature and Reason, the foes of religion. His argument therefore a 'petitio principii'. Examples of his application of the principle of the Theogonic Wish show that he himself is the victim of phantasy. He does not do justice to its admitted force and inevitability, though he recognises that if religion be abolished something must be substituted. Culture and Science will supply all necessary means to happiness in the end. Mill follows the same line, but this solution is unsatisfactory.

He is also unjust to Affection or Feeling which though an essential/

essential is not a co-ordinate principle of man's nature. Yet the imagination is not so wild but that it is controlled by the Heart and by Christ; of this an eloquent illustration is given. The heart with its necessity and power is not clearly defined nor is a satisfactory answer given to the question why Jesus should be the norm for the imagination... only that religion tends to unity and Jesus is or was seen and touched, thus satisfying 'the last criterion of reality.' Doubtless the moral qualities of Christ are in the background, but he accepts the myth theory of his person and decides the question by his first principles. We are further entitled to ask whether this necessity of feeling is a part of Nature and so entitled to its say. Hence a larger theory is needed than the one which Feuerbach offers.

(II) The Mechanism by which the Theogonic Wish operates is Projection, 'the mystery of religion', which is variously described.

Six characteristics of Projection are mentioned, but these represent views too narrow in the light of modern Psychology, which exhibits points of agreement and difference with Feuerbach. It is no great mystery and its extended use is illustrated by quotations from Hadfield and Tansley, while Leuba says it creates an unreal personal order whose existence has a survival value for us. Feuerbach is uncertain in his statements whether any object is really there to be idealised.

Further Psychology cannot decide upon the validity or truth of the projection, nor does the claim that psycho-analysis re-

veals facts as well as processes justify itself in view of the personal experience of W. Brown that the purifying work of analysis leaves religion stronger. Also its arguments in explanation of religion are too much pre-occupied with the pathological and for this Wobbermin and Brown criticise Freud.

Yet it is granted that wishes and imagination have played a large part in religion though not the essence of it, and herein a danger exists as H.N. Wieman shows. But three things qualify this admission: other forces in society also provide illusions, religion craves reality and condemns falseness, and religion is not to be traced to the pleasure-principle. R.H. Hutton in an essay on the influence of the wish declares it affects the sanguine but not the pessimistic nor the man who has forced his mind to weigh all contrary evidence. Also Christianity sets forth Christ as the truth, religion according to Whitehead is adaptation to facts, and the religious feeling does not always express itself in anthropomorphisms, (with Otto as Otherness, or the Numinous, with Pratt as 'Mana') but emphasises the unlikeness as well as the likeness between God and man.

(III)

Art and Science as well as religion employ Projection. That the truth of Science is pictorial and human is shown by quotations from Needham, Eddington etc. ' by its selection of values the mind may be said to have created its physical environment.' Science is also Anthropology.

In religion as in science the use of human experience does not prevent us from being in touch with reality and there are tests/

tests within human experience to save us from error.

The 'complex' of the scientist leads him to seek harmony in a simplified scheme and project a unity upon the details of existence illuminative of himself as well as of reality. But Psychology is not to be confused with Epistemology.

(IV)

Feuerbach gives no satisfactory examination of the Wishes, Desires, and Needs of men, but the Rev W.L. Davidson's Burnett Lectures take up this question and argue from the existence of a need to the existence of God. Want for the latter is desire as an index of reality because organic to a system of satisfactions. The Theogonic Wish would seem to have its place among the permanent personal and insatiable longings he describes, giving a kind of Ontological Argument. Feuerbach would say this gives no more than a God by hypothesis or a means to satisfaction.

Using the term 'Instinct' current today, we may place his theory in relation to the four fundamental Instincts described by Professor Paterson in his Gifford Lectures, self-affirmation self-abnegation, the tender emotion, and curiosity; and in the last we discover a deficiency in Feuerbach, for it would make religion cosmic and universal.

According to modern scholars these instincts refer beyond themselves and survive because successful in obtaining satisfaction. Emphasis is given to this conclusion by the saying of Kant that the world is not providentially fitted for man. Yet man discovers new needs to be satisfied in Art and Religion.

These/

These instincts, being in man, are of more than biological significance and three points of criticism are made against a 'Psychology of Instincts', but this biological treatment is suggestive and helpful.

Our interest is specially in man's longing for Unity and in its religious origin (Ritschl & Oman), which Feuerbach would not deny though his idealism ~~SUBJECTS~~ is subordinated to his doctrine of Feeling. Reason is conative as well as cognitive.

Psychoanalysis as well as philosophy and religion is interested in this urge to unity harmony and health. Prof. Alexander declares the passion for God is a real appetite; but the guarantee of the validity of these satisfactions is a matter for Philosophy.

Summary; Feuerbach's treatment is limited but opens up large problems of the reality of experience generally, the discussion of which indicates that there is a longing after God which is cognitive of an actual existence.

Chap. V.continued. (Criticism)
Section 6/

Religion as anthropocentric because ~~p~~ractical: Morality
as the truth and reality of Religion.

By a negative criticism Feuerbach seeks to prove the above statement, and our problem is to consider if this criticism applies only to an external relationship of the two or whether an organic relationship can be found to preserve both Religion and Morality.

'Bayle' opens the attack: 'Theology tears up Ethics by the roots'. But the strife of religion can be explained if not defended and it suggests that Religion and Morality are really different, though Feuerbach has his explanation of the difference by means of imagination etc. Three things give plausibility to the position of Feuerbach.

To the 'Reward-Theology' as stated by Paley Spinoza's dictum is justified, 'Blessedness is virtue itself', though historically something can be said for a 'Reward-Theology'. Fichte also makes protest against this doctrine and the story of Heine's conversation with Hegel illustrates the same.

The 'Postulate-Theology' of Kant is mentioned with reference to 'Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason', K.R.V., K.P.V. the analysis of a rational will and the three forms of the Categorical Imperative. The synthetic connection between Virtue and Happiness requires a further ground to render the connection intelligible. Does Kant therefore justify Feuerbach? Some considerations/

siderations to the contrary are given. Kant's discussion of an ethical 'Want'. Is it subjective? The problem of the righteous but non-believing man is illustrated from 'The Critique of Judgment'. Kierkegaard's three stages from worldliness to religion are mentioned, and Kant's three suggestions for an escape from subjectivity, especially through a 'Kingdom of Ends'.

The theological successors of Kant are criticised by Leese, because their doctrine of the value-judgment shows them to be infected with the virus of Feuerbach, and the demand is made for a Christian world-view dealing with the fundamental traits of all reality. Four points are mentioned where the Ritschlian Theology gives hostages to Feuerbach, and Garvie's "Ritschlian Theology" is quoted for and against. Ritschl himself has a reference to Feuerbach (vol.III, 206 J & R).

Criticism of an external association of Religion with Morality is justified, and a 'Postulate-Theology' is contrary to the spirit of Christian humility.

The appeal to Revelation may be said to leave us in the circle of human valuations only if we regard human experience as phenomenal and all our values to be invented not discovered.

There must be an organic relation between Religion and Morality for it is so unsatisfactory to isolate the Categorical Imperative. Feuerbach himself slips back into 'psychological utilitarianism', and there is ambiguity in the use of the word 'desire'. Hegel's criticism of 'Moralism' is given (Phenomen. I, 369).

Though organically related, Religion and Morality are not identical/

Summary of Argument. Chap.V Sect.6/

R. as pract.

identical. The 'Holy' has also ethical characters. Jodl's remarks on Fichte's doctrine of the harmony between the individual and the universal self show us the need of some unity, and Fichte's statement of religion as rooted in the one fundamental life is quoted.

Religion is practical, but as the Practice of the Presence of God alike in duty and in faith.

Chap. V, continued; (Criticism)

Section 7.

Society as divine the true object of Religion
with reference to Durkheim and others.

Feuerbach's social theory of religion is related to other parts of his teaching and the principle that Theology is Anthropology involves emphasis on the social nature of man and the importance of society. The individual shares with others the infinite consciousness and practically also Feuerbach claims to be 'Gemein-Mensch', Communist. In his doctrine of 'Tu-ism', (VWR) he declares "my fellow-man is my objective conscience," but he is too contemptuous of common opinion and too great an individualist to be consistent. Also, anxious to retain the Categorical Imperative he rests it, with 'das natürliche Über', on the cosmic powers of Nature and of the Ideal, contrasting his position favourably with that of Theism. Stirner says he splits the individual into two parts, essential and non-essential, and Feuerbach certainly leaves the sense of obligation like self-consciousness in the air.

He uses great licence in stating the theological implications of his theory. "Man with man, the unity of I and Thou, is God." In this unity is the mystery of the Trinity and the highest and last principle of philosophy. "God is nothing else than the species invested with a mystical form."

Distasteful to many, this view has attracted others, like Mill and Comte. Mill's Three Essays on Religion give a qualified recommendation and Comte elaborates his theory of the three stages/

stages of human development (both independent of Feuerbach). Lange mentions two points in which Feuerbach differs from Comte. The Marxian economists, as well as Leuba, accept the theory, Engels denying religion because associated with servitude and Lenin because it is the opium of the people, Gruppe's theory on similar lines is quoted as stated and criticised by Wobbermin.

Feuerbach seems to have most affinity with Durkheim, whose work, "The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life", is dealt with more closely. Religion is presented as real, with its roots

in man's dual nature, as practical, the expression of a need, and with cosmological aspects, yet merely human. But the survival of an institution implies that it is founded in the nature of things, an argument directed against Comte and Tyler. Also if the origin of religion be popular, it cannot be mere illusion. Like every human institution religion did not commence

anywhere, yet a two-fold origin of religion is stated without being harmonised, Man's dual nature and the need for support. and shelter

Society can both discipline/the individual. Yet there is a larger setting, for while Society has all that is necessary to arouse the sensation of the divine and its authority is due to 'venerable respect', are there not additional non-social elements here? And it is surely incongruous to assert as Durkheim does that religion, a pupil and creature of Society, is also the mother of social institutions, or that the moral conscience always uses religious symbols: nor can the French Revolution with its deification of Society be considered a normal time.

Like Feuerbach he uses imagination and projection to explain/

plain the objectivity of religion, the sacred qualities being added to the object, any object. This may suit his theory of Totemism, but why is the projection so inevitable, continuous, and selective? If, as explained, social action is circuitous and obscure, will enlightenment end religion, or will new grounds for belief be sought?

According to Durkheim, logical concepts as well as religious ideas have a social origin. The empiricism of Hume deprives them of their characteristic properties of universality and necessity. Reason has a supreme and irremovable authority. The categories because social are not only social, i.e., are not without foundation in the nature of things.

Like Feuerbach but with less confidence he confuses social agreement with the ideal of truth. But the relation of truth to reality is primary and to society secondarily. Hence in truth and in religion there is a reference to something objective. His method of naturalism is at fault. Resentful of the dogmatic claims of religion to knowledge, he reminds us like Leuba that religion itself is the subject of science. The emphasis upon the practical side of religion in this theory is so great that the intellectual contribution it makes is neglected. To sum up, religion is something superimposed on reality, yet it has an authority of its own although the reality it expresses may be different from our ideas.

Two questions emerge from the discussion, (A) Will religion survive? or, Is it only a primitive and passing phase of Culture? According to Feuerbach, it is possessed of personal interest/

Interest and a personal relation to Nature as a whole, hence it may co-exist with other states of mind and the changes of Society which take place within the larger circle of Nature. But Nature may end both religion and man. Feuerbach is ambiguous as to man's dependence on or superiority to Nature. He speaks of Necessity in human life meaning human nature and its laws, but his 'natürliche Über' resting on cosmic powers constitutes another Necessity. Man cannot be our last thought, therefore religion constitutes a permanent element in life distinct from the social.

(B) Is the religion of divine Society sufficient ?

No doubt ~~XXXXX~~ religious and social development interact, yet religion with independent authority helps to form and to destroy social judgments, surviving the hate and the help of states. Also, Society has limitations intellectual and practical which refute its claims here. It is an imperfect infinite. Nature heeds not our cries. The desire for unity remains unsatisfied. Religion, Feuerbach admits, is not just morality.

If theology is to become anthropology, there are limitations and losses to be accepted, and this is not so easy as some think. Man wants the 'absolute' in religion, some final dealing in relation to forgiveness and immortality. The failure of Society as divine to satisfy men is at least a negative argument against the illusoriness of religion.

Chap. V, continued.

(Criticism)

Section 8.

The recent attack on Humanism by Karl Barth
and Brunner.

The powerful criticisms of Barth and Brunner in their two books, 'The Word of God' and 'The Word and the World' respectively, are in purpose constructive, asserting the reality of God, and to consider them over against the doctrine of Feuerbach is instructive. They are engaged largely with similar problems and even employ similar terms.

Though professedly only a view-point Barth's theory is very comprehensive and he is influenced by the many movements of the day to which he says our final word should not be surprise or opposition. His varied qualifications are mentioned and the picture of contemporary life, with the four corner-stones of the prison in which we all live, is described.

Brunner's greater lucidity is welcome. Even in his religion, he says, man wants autonomy, and he castigates 'Scientism', not Science but the idea that Science has spoken the ultimate truth, and behind it the 'Titanism' or self-sufficiency of man. But it is difficult to grasp the relation in his theory of Faith or revelation to Reason or metaphysics. His reference to Schleiermacher, 'whose combination of idealism and humanism runs out into a colossal self-deception' is unsympathetic. More accurate is his criticism of the religious subjectivism where truth is experience and revelation religious thought.

To escape from immanental theories Revelation is absolutely
necessary/

necessary. Luther is quoted with approval though Lutheranism is rebuked for misrepresenting Christian truth, but it is admitted that changes are taking place. Lutheranism is however 'sib' to the German soul. Even Zwingli and Calvin are challenged by Barth, and a quotation is given summarising the difference between the Reformed and the Lutheran schools. The discussion is more than a provincial quarrel.

Brunner denies the similarity between Christian and non-Christian Revelation. The latter is only the natural fruitage of man and genius is a quantitative not a qualitative conception. If Christianity is only a modification of general religious^{and}/metaphysical knowledge, it is an illusion. The truths of reason which he analyses have their source and content in man and stand over against the action of God.

He seems to consider all modern theologians as 'Humanists'. Two definitions of Humanism, by Lippmanⁿ and Potter, show how it is commonly understood. The truths of reason, he says, are a monologue, but God interrupts this monologue as Subject not as experienced Object. But to-day revelation becomes the discovery of a new depth in my world. On the contrary, before God speaks, he as personality is absolute mystery.

Any natural revelation of God is denied and man's way to God is barred. If asked, How do we receive revelation?, these writers reply that it comes indirectly, in an antithetical and dialectical manner, by contradiction between two sets of ideas, God and Man, grace and responsibility etc. Barth declares this method unique practical and realistic. But no direct information/

ation can be given of the Centre. A good deal of ingenious subtilty is ~~XXXX~~ used to show that the method is through paradoxes and not harmonious balancing. The synthesis is in God alone.

By a criticism of Kant's Ethics Barth shows the great need of man to possess the true word. How in the theory of Kant is the moral man connected with the actual world and whence his power? He is wholly unable to realise the demand upon his natural will except by a still more amazing act of faith. The question of the good implies the question how it is to be realised.

Like Feuerbach Barth seeks reality and to present man as he really is, and both hold to this present world, but their conception of Man and of God differ. Summary of the teaching of the Barthian School here. Brunner asserts that God is the complete and true personality while man acquires a truly personal existence only as he receives it from the hand of God. God is not to be described by the abstract terms of metaphysics, such as, 'the World-ground'. He is the Creator, and alone has the initiative, yet the secret of the Lord is that he wills to have communion with sinful men. At the same time he is not the servant of man and he has greater work to do than saving souls, and the Son is not only my mediator but the mediator for the whole world.

Does this theory solve Feuerbach's problem of man's ~~bondage~~ imprisonment within himself? Some suggested criticisms as from Feuerbach are, that he would have welcomed this frank statement of Biblical Neo-Supernaturalism as ^{a more} ~~an~~ accurate statement/

statement than usual, but the doctrine of God takes us back to Scholasticism with its 'aseity' and theological ethics. Sin, repentance etc can have no moral but only a theological content. Like Hegelianism it is Absolutism, though of will and not of thought. Further, religion here as elsewhere has its origin in ~~XX~~ a need and its nature is practical and even pathological. Finally the doctrine of Revelation, here so prominent, is the characteristic illusion of religion.

The reply of the school would probably be. The Transcendence of God is not unrelated to man, and the separation between God and man is not meant to be ultimate, but restoration comes through the divine initiative only, bringing with it not only reunion but revival of life.

The situation is clarified by Brunner's reference to God as the pure Subject, as Action, as Personality. Against Feuerbach's phenomenalism he asserts personality to be both exclusive and inclusive and to have its secrets and reserve. Can we deny to God what we allow to man, a right to his own life? Because of this reserve there is a way ~~from~~ 'there' to 'here'. Besides countless ^{people} assert that this revelation has actually taken place.

Religion is not the creation of a need, for the quality of the need is such that it could not create it. The fundamental difference with regard to sin is what separates Feuerbach and this school. Feuerbach's is an intellectual ~~exem~~ mathematical interpretation, whereas sin is theological first and social only second. Also, psychology and autosuggestion do not carry us down into the real consciousness of sin.

The proof of God's existence is admitted by Brunner to be difficult, for faith is a personal decision carrying its own certainty, and if this seems dangerously subjective he appeals to the witness of the Spirit, where men are taken beyond the common distinction of authoritative or heteronomous and individual or autonomous. The Word of the Spirit never becomes our word and so it is not revealed by psychological analysis. He defends himself further ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ by attacking the psychological method and its claims, for it dissolves all norms of truth and validity even scientific ones.

Summary; The Theology of Crisis offers a real and useful contribution, endeavours to give us a 'sure word', and rids us of Feuerbach's sentimental phrases. Religion is practical for God as for man. It is his affair as well as ours.

There are defects and limitations, the excessive dualism, the treatment of our experience as subjective because ours, a return to phenomenalism. The reserve of God may endanger moral issues and the appeal of the Saviour be lost in the louder tones of the Judge and Creator. There is ambiguity as to the content of revelation, the 'Word of God'. By the emphasis upon the supernatural there is a danger of extolling the irrational in religion, contrary to the better intention of the school.

A corrective of Humanism, it is ~~XXXXXX~~ itself in need of correction but the principle of the objectivity as against the illusion of religion is at the heart of it and profoundly true.

Chap. V. continued; (Criticism)

Section 9.

Feuerbach's appeal to Luther unjustifiable.

In his writings Feuerbach makes frequent appeal to Luther for support for his subjective theory of religion. Of an Article, entitled 'Das Wesen des Glaubens im Sinne Luther's', 1844 S.W. I. p259, he says it constituted a turning point in his thinking, for the philosopher becomes the man. Like Luther he enjoyed a transforming experience and plays a reformer's part. Greedily he utilises what Luther has to say of personal religion, and the close relation between human need and the divine response, so that 'it was Protestantism which first drew from this relativity of God its true result the absoluteness of man.'

We note his view of the Reformation that it marked the abandonment of the otherworldliness of the Church and the entrance of secular existence upon its rights, as well as the separation of supernatural religion from supernatural morality. Here indeed is the source of modern Materialism.

But in reply it must be pointed out that Luther did not leave the 'natural man' to be ruled by his own desires. 'The Liberty of the Christian man' implies a sacred vocation from God, and the same is true in his address to the Nobility of the German Nation. In the 'Smaller Catechism' we read, 'The Commandments imply that we should fear and love God', while the Augsburg Confession, Art.XX, enjoins the performance of good works but says that man is too weak to do good works without faith and out of Christ.

Of/

Of greater interest is the question whether Luther's theology is humanistic as Feuerbach affirms. It is true that Luther emphasises our need and our personal appropriation, using homely illustrations. But Feuerbach admits Luther retains the idea of God for and in himself and that his doctrine seems contrary to his own. This however is only at the beginning, and by the application of the 'theogonic wish' he draws the conclusion that faith and God are correlatives and God the satisfied self-love of the Christian man.

As for Luther's belief in Revelation, revelation depends on human capacity, it appeals to objective fact, i.e. sense-experience, and not argument, and it exhibits the characteristic illusion of the religious consciousness.

Reconciliation is only with the anger of God not with his being and it is through Jesus, the real force. The Incarnation is at the root of theological ideas and contradictions.

In reply, Luther emphasises the personal aspect of religion but not as Feuerbach understands it, and in this he is not apart from the Church Catholic; also, for Luther Revelation is the Word of God and as professor he expounds it, his conservatism and even literalism are evident at the Marburg Colloquy and in his attitude to the Enthusiasts; in reference to miracles he is content to say, 'God has said it'.

It is true that Luther is not content with an external authority, but he found peace in the verse, 'The just shall live by faith' and declared that amid freedom of interpretation of Scripture the Spirit is the guide, and Christ is the touchstone
of/

of divine truth.

For Luther Christ is no mere man, though he had a new understanding of the human side of our Lord and seems to ascribe to the Christian man unique and divine qualities. But it is fundamental to his theology that Christ became man. There is no deification of Christ for he is already divine. In Jesus the unique Son of God we lay hold of God who is able and willing to make himself known.

The two men differ fundamentally in their idea of God and their view of the practical nature of religion. The satisfaction which came to Luther was a religious and not a moral one. He had tried human machinery.

There are not only Christian but mystical and mediaeval elements in Luther's idea of God and he did not mean that God is lost in the revelation Christ brings as his representative. Yet God does not contradict himself, as no Scripture can contradict the doctrine of justifying faith.

Feuerbach simply denies that Revelation is possible but admits that Christians worship the human individual as God unconsciously, for this quality constitutes the illusion of the religious principle.

To sum up, for Luther faith is receiving and man is reconciled to God only so far as he does not achieve it by himself or by man; Feuerbach's interpretation is governed by his own subjective views. Strauss in hesitating to write a biography of Luther for lack of sympathetic understanding of his consciousness of sin and salvation is wiser than his contemporary

Religion as immediate Experience.

Feuerbach claims that reality must be made the test of religion and today there is a special desire for this. But by reality Feuerbach means 'Sinnlichkeit' or 'Man'. The criticism of R.H. Hutton is therefore justified, and corporeality is not of the essence of personality. A larger criterion of independent existence is required.

Some declare that they have an experience of the Divine as real as any sensation. Hume's Dialogues quoted in support of this and also Farmer's 'Experience of God' where he dwells on the 'coercive' element in religion.

Leuba severely criticises this 'Mystic claim'. He takes three types, the Quaker's proclamation of an experience, (but does immediacy carry with it objectivity?): the value-judgments of the Ritschlians, which require the services of psychology: Professor Henri Bois, who makes discriminating reference to the 'mystic claim', but with whom the metaphysical induction from the facts of religious experience becomes a perception.

Leuba attempts to overwhelm the theologians with his criticism: the characteristic qualities of religious experience can be produced by drugs etc.: the neglect of Psychology by theologians is a scandal: and they do not see that in appealing to inner experience they have surrendered their case.

In more philosophic fashion Leuba criticises the theories of James and Hocking. They leave us a mere 'That' or a theory elaborated by the intellect and the imagination. Thouless also though friendly to religion disparages great emphasis being laid upon/

R. as immed. Exper.

upon 'givenness' in religious experience, for it is possible to say with Delacroix, 'Where the mystic postulates God, the psychologist need only postulate the subconscious'. Prof. Knudson also warns us against the claim of an empirical intuition of God.

With these warnings and criticisms in mind we consider Prof. Hocking's theory as given in his book 'The Meaning of God in Human Experience'. Religion, he says, is more primitive than knowledge. Religion is immediate while Art is long. He seems in danger of the criticisms of Leuba and Feuerbach, for he admits that religion is the product of desire and projection and is most suitably expressed in 'Feeling'. But on the other hand he declares that religion is not subjective and has always concerned itself with metaphysical objects. There is a dilemma in religious knowledge, but 'feeling' is itself still idea. Religious feeling deals with some conception of the 'whole' of things which is crammed with fulness and may be called a 'sensation', marking the line of our limitations but containing the soil of the future. In 'sensation' or 'experience' God is found, for experience is essentially metaphysical. Nature points beyond herself, and we have also a sense of the reality of other selves, which is found to involve the conception of 'Other Mind'.

Hocking's reply to Leuba would be, 1/ that reality is known from the beginning as living Subject, and God is not an attribute. As Bagehot said there is a time when it is more important that there should be law than that there should be good law, so of the idea of God. We can wait for details and the correction of experience/

R. as Immed. Exper.

experience in the usual objective processes of the mind. Religion is the parent of the Arts but always younger than the youngest. 2/ As for man's constructive activity here, (a) Man is first passive before he is active, (b) the will-to-believe is not the same as the will-to-make-believe, and religion is ineffective unless dealing with reality, (c) some regions of reality are unfinished and there is room for activity.

If it is said there is a circle in using knowledge of the value and works of religion as guide to knowledge of its nature, science uses the same method and knowledge here as elsewhere corrects itself. Hocking approves Schleiermacher's Feeling of absolute dependence but says that beyond this is the impulse to worship and a sense of reality and worth.

Professor Kemp Smith's argument in his British Academy Lecture is now considered. Setting aside misunderstandings about religion and certain arguments for it he concludes that the Divine Existence is immediately experienced and increasingly so through the discipline of the religions. The non-creatureliness of God is fundamental. Inference or analogy from the creaturely in Nature or Man is insufficient, and so far the negative criticism of Hume and Kant against the argument to design is unanswerable. Yet both these confess to an overwhelming impression of design. Sir Arthur Keith also admits this.

We have therefore an obstinate 'awareness' of God in which mystery from the first is a chief element, though only later explicated by ~~reflection~~ reflection. This awareness is not so much in/

R. as Immed. Exper.

in feeling as in emotion (i.e. a definite situation).

We note this awareness is not subjective but cognitive, and the divine attributes are theomorphic, not anthropomorphic, because no mere enlargement of human powers. This presupposes the independently established existence of a Divine Being, not as a hypothesis but as an original metaphysical intuition, an a priori or ultimate.

This experience is illustrated by our experience of other selves, not based on inference but direct. This Otherness of God is not isolated from what is other to itself and indeed requires this to a certain extent. Religion and Morality are distinct in origin and content. Only in connection with the cosmic setting of our human life do we experience the Divine.

Hocking and Smith thus arrive at similar conclusions, but it may be asked if Smith allows, as he ought to do, that man is more than creaturely. He allows that the Divine must possess other attributes but even these are divine as belonging to the Divine Being.

We can now briefly give a reply to Leuba. He is a psychologist and not a metaphysician, and does not go deep enough. He works with an out-of-date theory of knowledge and in religion makes the Non-Ego passive only. Amid necessary interpretation of experience in religion the original quality remains, as a sense of the 'Whole' or 'Otherness'. Hume is ready to support 'the adorable mysteriousness of the Divine Nature'.

Feuerbach also receives his answer, for this 'feeling' is cognitive/

R. as Immed. Exper.

nitive and in touch with reality.

Intuition is not opposed to Faith, as Leuba said. A will-attitude is necessary but is presented to us by the situation itself. Immediacy does not carry with it objectivity but there are criteria to be found to test objectivity, as Thouless points out. But our aim has been not to deal with the criteria, but with the Fact revealed in religious experience, which is no mere 'Urgrund' or neurosis.

Feuerbach's own test is applicable here. What has the character of Necessity has for me the character of objectivity.

In addition to these contradictions there are positive elements in his theory which are contrary to his thesis and support the reality of religion, e.g.

- 1/ The urge to Unity, which is not a merely intellectual argument
- 2/ The feeling of absolute dependence, which has an objective reference, is no mere subjective feeling satisfied with its own certainty, while man's freedom is in Christianity a gracious privilege within not against the larger sphere of dependence
- 3/ The Categorical Imperative, if dissociated from the larger moral world, does not gain but loses in authority.
- 4/ The quasi-biological argument is helpful if not perfect
- 5/ A appetite for religion is a poor thing, and should

Conclusions.

Feuerbach has been shown to be a 'key-man', representative of many contemporary influences and also anticipating the psychological interpretation of religion.

He presents us with a Metaphysic of Naturalism, a Mechanism of Projection, and a Method genetic and psychological. But there are many loose threads and contradictions in his theory. Self-consciousness is not reconciled with itself or with Nature, nor the moral imperative with natural desire. The genetic Method is insufficient even for Feuerbach, for he is teleological and dogmatic when it suits him. Hence he gives no satisfactory account of religion or Christianity. The recurrence of the phrase 'nothing else than' is suspicious. If Christianity be not an illusion, the remarkable qualities it is admitted to possess go far to prove its reality.

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Culture as a substitute for religion is a poor thing, and Strauss is/

Conclusions.

is quoted. Critics of religion do not wish to abandon the name 'religion'.

The dilemma of religious knowledge and conduct is not solved by Feuerbach because of his phenomenalism and his one-sided criticism of Hegel. Man though sensible and finite and evil is yet in touch with the infinite both intellectually and spiritually.

Revelation is not to be set aside, for God is the Living Subject, and it is necessary because of the folly and sin of the human heart. Hume's appeal to revelation was not insincere, but revelation should not be based on scepticism or irrationalism.

Religion is synthetic integrating wholesome, as is seen in the contrasted experiences of George Eliot and of Livingstone. Psychology is limited in its explanations and usefulness, and the religious 'feeling' is not merely one of 'pleasure-pain'.

Feuerbach's service to Theology is notable as well as negative. In religion as in all moral questions the intellect is not enough, but a personal decision is necessary, yet this should not be considered as a 'bolt from the blue'.

Like his 'theogonic wish', Feuerbach's career was that of a slave with the will of a free-man. But there is a religious faith which finds rest in a Power which is other than a projection.

Chapter 1.

CHAPTER : I .

The Interest and Importance of Feuerbach in relation
to some Interpretations of Religion To-day.

" It is come, I know not how to be taken for granted by many persons, that Christianity is not so much a subject of enquiry; but that it is now at length discovered to be fictitious. And accordingly they treat it, as if, in the present age, this were an agreed point among all people of discernment; and nothing remained, but to set it up as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were by way of reprisals, for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the world."

Butler: Adv^t. to Analogy, May, 1736

(against the sufficiency of Natural Religion)

"Human nature, not much to its credit, is more ready to believe that a system denies God than that it denies the world. A denial of God seems so much more intelligible than a denial of the world. "

Hegel, Logic.

(of Spinoza's doctrine as acosmism and not atheism.)

Chapter 1.

The Interest and Importance of Feuerbach in relation to some interpretations of Religion today.

If anyone doubted of the importance of Religion in human life and thought, it might be a profitable though preliminary argument to point out to him the never-ceasing and everchanging discussion which it has provoked. Surely a matter which thrusts itself so inevitably and so continuously before the attention of men cannot be either unsubstantial or without advantage. The quality of persistence it displays carries with it at least some claim to reality.

Yet the doubt is as great today as it has ever been. Mr A.C. Ward in his concise and p~~u~~gent review of English Literature "The Nineteen Twenties" writes, "At no time has Christianity been so seriously shaken as in the years since the War", and his account of the various books that have been published and the mood which they express and apparently satisfy is an impressive document in his case. The circumstances, even viewed more favourably than he feels himself compelled to do, warrant us in going back to one whose arguments and attitude are representative of much in our world today. The writings of Ludwig Feuerbach have indeed a present interest, recognised as we shall see by many who do not in any way share his views.

The attack on Religion is due partly to the special conditions of our time, the Post-war Disillusionment, "The Bloodless War between the Contents and the Non-Contents", "The Silent Revolution".

Chapter 1.

as they have been variously described, partly to the new study of Psychology and the popularisation of its ideas.

To consider the last first. Jung, Freud and others have given a new explanation to and interpretation of Religion, which is at once a very ingenious and a most insidious attack upon it.

The fact of Religion is not denied. Historically it has its roots in the most primitive peoples. No longer is it so widely and confidently declared, with the approval of expert investigators, that races are to be found without any trace of religious experience, ritual or belief. On the contrary the early experience of mankind persists and manifests itself in curious survivals, taboos fears restraints illustrative of the resurgence of the childlike and primitive in the most modern age. The fraud of priest and their desire for power have contributed to the continuence of religion, but do not explain its origin or its nature. Myth and legend, again, are not so much causes as effects, the fruit of imagination in the deep soil of the human heart.

Religion has only to be understood and explained in the light of its origins, and at once it falls into its proper place as the product of our human faculties. As Julian Huxley says in his Conway Memorial Lecture, Oct, 1930, "Religion in the light of psychological and anthropological science, is seen not as a divine revelation, but as a function of human nature. It is a very peculiar and a very complicated function of human nature/

nature, sometimes noble, sometimes valuable, sometimes a bar to individual or social progress. But it is no more and no less a function of human nature than fighting or falling in love, than law or literature".

Huxley who is more serious in his views of religion than many another and has taken the trouble to work out in detail how the new faith may employ the phrases and images of the old tells us in the same lecture, p.64. "Almost without exception the elements and practices of the existing world-religions could be utilised by a religion which, abandoning the interpretation in term of God, had adopted the scientific outlook as basis for its theology. But they would, of course, have to be transposed, as it were, into a new key, translated into new terms, in accordance with the new outlook. Vicarious sacrifice, atonement, selfdenial, and asceticism, the sense of inspiration or possession, the ecstatic or even orgiastic liberation from the bondage of sin of self or of convention, temporary or permanent retreat from the world, participation in inspiring ritual-- these and many other things have their place in life, but will not find their right place unless they are helped to it by an organised religious system."

Religion accordingly may give a subjective satisfaction and for Huxley should do so, but it touches no objective reality. Religion is religious experience with the emphasis on experience and an interpretation of that experience which boldly asserts it is without value as a proof of the existence of God or the unseen/

unseen world which lies beyond our senses.

The position is well summed up in the excellent book published in 1923 by Henry Balmforth, entitled, "Is Christian Experience an Illusion?". In Chapter 4 he writes, "Modern Psychology finds everywhere in Religion the phantasy, a subconscious or unconscious withdrawal into the easy satisfaction of unfulfilled desires or impulses by means of image-making uncontrolled by fact or reality."

And this he points out is the third wave of the scientific challenge to religious faith and it is probably the most difficult to meet. Physics and geology have spent their strength, biology is not yet entirely overcome or reconciled, but psychology is the most searching and is still gathering strength among the multitude. (cf. Ruth Rouse and H. Crichton Miller, M.D., "Christian Experience and Psychological Processes, p.3. 1917 S.C.M., * P.S.R. : between and & Leuba. p.211.— "The conflict/~~bet~~ religion, science which broke out first in the field of cosmology, then of biology and the historical sciences is now carried into the field of psychology.")

Further, as we have mentioned, there were outward and special conditions of the War and Post-War years which favoured this presentation of religion and gave it a wide appeal. Surprising developments took place during that period in the technique for the treatment of shell-shock, neurosis, hysteria and similar complaints. Prior to that William James and others had centred attention upon varied types of religious experience, more especially/

especially the extreme types or the unstable conditions of temperament or character.

The general movement of disintegration in religious and moral standards and sanctions which had been proceeding for many years was undoubtedly hastened by the war which shook as with an earthquake the foundations of the home especially and sent out sheltered lives into the riot of a world where primitive passion was called into the service of moral principle and sometimes destroyed its master.

An age eager for slogans, for phrases which explain everything and themselves require no explanation found in the New Psychology a friend and counsellor after its own heart. The language employed had just sufficient of technical terms to give vividness and colour to it, but its strength lay in the fact that it was not so much theological or philosophical as personal and human. Who does not know the meaning of sex or instinct or dreams, who has not felt the urge of the crowd or the spell of the Mass-Mind?

This is not set down by way of depreciation of those investigators whose names are so familiar, but rather to make clear the way in which their work has corresponded with the mood of the age. The study of the human spirit need not have destroyed the worth of that spirit or the reality of the object of its trust. But as a matter of fact the tendency has been along these lines.

Our interest has been too much absorbed in the material gains that civilisation has brought. Invention and machinery have harnessed/

harnessed the wonderful powers in the universe. Man is the great High-priest of Nature, and Science is the rod of power which brings a living water from the Rock. If some draw attention to the spiritual side of man's life, they are told, as we have seen, that it is a product, in some cases, a by-product of the material. "We are living matter," says Julian Huxley, (p.74). Religion is an infantile survival or an illusion, a mistaken interpretation of our own desires and thoughts. Should the old reproach of materialism be cast up and even atheism be mentioned, it is pointed out that we have also with us a benevolent and cultured and progressive Humanism, and what more do we want. "Man is the highest of all concrete realities and there is nothing above him but his own ideals" (Horton, Theism and the Modern Mood. S.C.M.) "It is we who create value, and our desires which confer value. In this realm we are kings and we debase our kinship if we bow down to Nature." (Bertrand Russell.)

From what is told us by those who know well the recently awakened countries or citizens of China India or Japan, this Humanistic outlook has been widely adopted there and is considered the inevitable outcome of the latest scientific thought.

Voices indeed come to us, especially from America where the malady has spread far, bidding us pause and consider the "Paradox of Humanism" and "The Disillusion of the Laboratory". I refer to the book by Joseph Wood Krutch entitled "The Modern Temper" 1930, and also "A Preface to Morals" by Walter Lippmann, 1929./

1929. The former is more pessimistic, the latter more constructive. Both are candid in the acknowledgement that something is seriously wrong with the world in theory as well as in practice.

Not only the supernatural in religion is gone, but the higher elements of morality, also. We have witnessed 'the Life and Death of a Value' in the reduction of Love to a physiological process. "All cultures," says Krutch, "have inevitably collapsed and human life has always persisted because of the rude barbarians who have entered into the place of power." Despair must inevitably ripen again. An irresolvable discord is the fundamental fact of the world.

And Lippmann braver in his theory than the other is constrained to admit, "What most distinguishes the generation which has approached maturity since the debacle of idealism at the end of the war is not their rebellion against the religious and moral code of their parents, but their disillusion with their own rebellion. It is common for young men and women to rebel, but that they should rebel sadly and without faith in their own rebellion, that they should distrust the new freedom no less than the old certainties -- this is something of a novelty."

When the philosophers are moved to such notes of despondency, we need not be surprised that a man of literature and art like D. H. Lawrence is constrained to say, "The love of humanity is gone leaving a great gap. The cosmic consciousness has collapsed upon a great void. The egoist sits grinning furtively in

in the triumph of his own emptiness, "(quoted in A.C. Ward, the Nineteen Twenties). Exaggerated and overstrained as these utterances may be, forgetful of the seven thousand who have not bowed the knee to Baal, 'die Stille im Lande', they represent a situation of grave urgency. If in any way, directly or indirectly, we can lighten the strain and point toward the shining light, it will be a task worth while.

There is at least a gain in composure and a sense of disinterestedness in looking back to a period and a personality which reflect many of our problems and some of our solutions. In a measure these, we may say, have been anticipated by the experience and theories of the subject of this sketch.

Lange, (vol 2, p.246, Eng. Trans.) in his 'History of Materialism' discusses the title 'The Father of Materialism' and decides that Ludwig Anselm Feuerbach rather than David Frederich Strauss has the right to claim it. In view, however, of Feuerbach's denial that he was a materialist and in the light of present-day thinking, it is better to call him "The Father of Illusionism in Religion", or "A pioneer of Humanism".

It was he who laid down definitely the principle, 'Theology is Anthropology' and in this saying we touch the nerve of the great question, What is the validity of religious experience? Does this experience bring us into touch with anything more than our own human aspirations, a convenient even necessary help to a worthier life, as Huxley would allow, but only the product of social custom or individual longing?

While/

While it is not to be expected that Feuerbach would be found using the technical terms of present-day psychology, it is remarkable that 'imagination', Phantasy, Emotion, and above all "projection" should have so large a place in his vocabulary as in that of modern writers. Researches in Anthropology also occupied his attention though we may not unjustly say that they represented to him less material for independent investigation than aids for the illustration of arguments already arrived at. His terminology has not indeed attained the precision to which we are accustomed but this does not diminish the penetrating acuteness of his analysis. Moreover, his philosophic interest and power show him to be in line with a great tradition of thought upon the fundamental issues of life.

Seeing that he has been so long forgotten, let me quote some tributes from notable men to illustrate the real importance of his place in the development of theological opinion.

To those who advocate the cause of Humanism or Naturalism, such as Bolin, Jodl, Carl Beyer, etc. Feuerbach is a hero, whose prowess can only be exhibited in a wondrous collection of historical parallels. He is the David who slew the giant of Hegelianism, the Aristotle who turned away from the Platonic world of ideas to seek the real principle of life in life itself, a Copernicus who has changed the centre of destiny for the human universe. "The beginning, middle, and end of Religion is Man." "All theology is anthropology". "Religion is the dream of the human race." With such sharp pebbles from the stream of eloquence did/

did this doughty writer assail and overwhelm his opponents, and his disciples are using them still.

One of his latest biographers, Adolph Kohut, (L.F. Sein Leben und seine Werke, u.s.w. Leipzig 1909), in a most readable book declares that no creative account of Feuerbach's life has yet been written, though many sketches exist, and he essays this task for the benefit of the laity, using as new material hitherto unprinted letters of Feuerbach and his father. Feuerbach, he declares, is by no means down and out (abgetan is the favourite word used by the friends of our author here only to be contemptuously **denied**.) The centenary celebrations of 1904 in so many places amply demonstrate this. He is a man for the present who, hastening in advance of his time, has stated in final and fundamental ^{ideas} form ~~which~~ which will continue to influence our successors and whose worth and importance our present generation are in a peculiar position to recognise and appreciate very highly.

With more academic calm C.N. Starcke (L.F. Stuttgart, 1885) says he is a "key-man". His interest in him is due to this fact. He is one who showed what most interested his age and he is the kernel from which the future breaks forth. "The realism of our time is a shell, a medium, the kernel on the contrary is idealistic, (p vi. vorrede). Feuerbach is indeed the original sketch for this idealistic time under the mantle of realism. If we would seek a time that was realistic at heart, then it was the previous century, i.e. the XVIII th... Ideals found no development beyond where it was possible to have them transformed into hard/

hard cash. In literal sense Egoism had been made the principle of morals before the eyes of this Medusa the moral ideal was changed to stone."

A powerful explosion and not a quiet advance made a way for the ideal through Rousseau and his emphasis on feeling. As yet however it had no form. In the Revolution of 1789 men spoke of the Rights of Man, but all was undetermined, 'nur Redensart'. Freedom, as also Feeling, must have its bounds determined. What had man a right to? How was he related to the Society of which he was a part.?

"The Holy Alliance understood perfectly how to ~~twirl~~ about for long such a mode of speech until it became a most bloody irony. Under the pressure of this irony fell the youth of Feuerbach..." (p VII)" As the people became clearly aware that the sense of reality had failed them, then the Materialism of Moleschott and Vogt became for a time the flag which they followed: but the difference between this and the Humanism (Menschentum) has been sufficiently set forth by the latter himself."

How far this is an accurate survey of the position of our author we shall have to see later. It is time to pass to more critical estimates employing terms of distinct appreciation.

Höfding, e.g. in his "History of Modern Philosophy" says that Feuerbach's contribution to the elucidation of the

the religious problem is one of the most important offered in the course of the following decade. "He occupies the first place, an energetic thinker richly endowed, as a critic of the whole Romantic philosophy associated chiefly with the name of Hegel but found also in Schelling, Fichte and Schleiermacher." But he adds, "He so exhausted himself in getting beyond the speculative philosophy that he had no energy desire or leisure for the positive and scientific working out of his new point of view."

To come to writers of the present-day, we find Von Hügel de-voting several pages of his "Essays and Addresses" on the Philosophy of Religion to our author. On p. 29 he writes "I want to take the problem, not according to any formulation of my own, but in the combination of remarkable psychological penetration, of rare knowledge throughout large reaches of the religious consciousness and of sceptical assumptions and passion presented by Ludwig Feuerbach in by far his greatest work", *Das Wesen des Christentums*".

"There earlier positions of Feuerbach", he continues, "even where they have ceased to be axiomatic for professed philosophers, are still in secondary forms and in semi-conscious ways most certainly operative in various sceptical works. The vein of doctrinaire violence that undoubtedly runs through the book does not prevent the work remaining to this hour the most probing and thorough account/

account of the certain or even the simply arguable contributions made by man to religion, --- of the resonance of man's mind and heart in response to religion; and there has not been, I think, since Feuerbach any mind of a calibre equal to his own that has argued with so unflagging a conviction for the sheer illusion and mischievousness of all religion."

G. Wobbermin, in his book, (1921)"Das Wesen der Religion, Systematic Theologie nach religionspsychologie Methode," vol 2 chap xi, writes "Feuerbach is historically the most significant and influential representative of Illusionism. He proceeds from his conception of the Nature of Religion to this precise and sharp statement of the question of truth, which again is dependent upon his penetrating insight into ^{the} psychological structure of the religious consciousness." And again, p. 401, he points out how attempts have been made in the last fifty years to supplement Feuerbach's theory with facts from medical materialism, religious and sex aberration and psycho-analysis.

Leuba, so much akin in many ways, writes p. 38 P.S.Ref. "No one before Feuerbach had seen so clearly as he the creative roll of desire in the making of Gods and religions, or, at any rate, no one had attempted to explain so fully the Christian religion as entirely the product of man's instinct for happiness."

And finally, not to overload the pages with these citations,/

citations, I will mention the very important discussion by Karl Barth in his book, "Die Theologie und die Kirche (Vol 2, Essay on Feuerbach). 1928. München.)

He defends his introduction of a paper on Feuerbach in his history of recent theology on three grounds, 1st, that there is no one so intensively and exclusively occupied with the problem of Religion, or 2nd, so equipped with his extraordinary knowledge of the Church Fathers and of Luther, or 3rd, with such a grasp of the theological situation.

"His anti-theological statement shows one most important possibility within the problem of the New Theology which sharply lightens up all their other possibilities, so that we would lose something definite if we did not let him have part in our conversations."

One feels of course that Barth is very glad to include such an awful example in his review that he may warn off any who indulge in subjectivity or plead the difficulty of relating his Sinaiatic thunderbolts to the plain experience of men. Feuerbach is a splendid stick with which to thrash the theologians of 'religious experience' and the adherents of the Schleiermacher tradition. If the transcendental dialectic fail to persuade, this threat of Humanism will certainly make the pilgrim stop and consider his path. At the same time it is as valuable as any statement or appreciation I have read and illustrates the/

the power and sympathy of Barth.

It is quite clear from such quotations that we have to do with a remarkable man, whose name may be forgotten but whose thought and spirit continue. Varied as are the judgments upon his doctrine all are agreed as to his virtuosity. Friend and foe agree also that his work is incomplete, that "it is not a system but a development", (Starcke). The style is "Aphoristic and unsystematic", more that of an essayist than that of a philosopher. Feuerbach confesses that his aim is to reach the people, though in the first edition of Das W.C. he says he does not expect so wide an interest in it. Wit, humour, satire these he will employ, he says, especially in the earlier writings but always in the service of truth.

Merz, in his History of European thought, vol, 4, points out that Feuerbach has a place with the political and feuilleton writers whose method of pungent diatribe was carried over into the realm of science and Philosophy... Appealing to the people, it was they who set the problems which the professors in the Universities had to answer, when presumably they would have been happier developing their own themes and carrying on the old traditions. There was gain in the public interest invoked, but the dust of the market-place, the quick passions of uneducated people and the polemic of rival hucksters did not conduce to the single-minded discovery of truth or the willing-hearted acceptance/

acceptance of its supreme claims.

However that may be, certainly Feuerbach's spirit and outlook were fashioned and coloured by ^{the} movements and atmosphere of his time, both political and intellectual, and it is necessary to enter upon a short account of these that we may understand him aright.

Chapter II.

The Political, Philosophical, and Theological Movements
During the First Half of the XIXth Century.

It is generally supposed that philosophy, like art,
from common man and affairs in a world of their own.

CHAPTER : II.

THE POLITICAL

PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL MOVEMENTS

IN THE FIRST HALF
OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

AS A NECESSARY BACKGROUND FOR OUR SUBJECT.

"Oppression makes the wise man mad."

Browning

interest in the political, following the course
of the Revolution in France and in Germany.

"The men of the first generation of nineteenth century
Europe grew to maturity under the shadow of a great dis-
illusionment -- the fathers had eaten sour grapes and the
children's teeth were set on edge."

Hernshaw.

"Stay still, don't move; do what you have been accustomed
to do, and consult your grandmother upon everything."

Popular Saying of the Day.

of silent Revolution. Its crisis and its struggle.

The signs of our age. We see the struggle of the

people.

Chapter II.

The Political Philosophical, and Theological Movements
during the first half of the XIX th Century.

It is generally supposed that philosophers live apart from common men and affairs in a world of their own. The supposition is largely untrue and it is specially untrue of those who lived in the opening years of the nineteenth century. Goethe alone of the writers of the time achieved the olympian calm with which men of his class are credited and that was due partly to his distinctive personality and partly to the favourable circumstances in which he found himself at the Court of Weimar. In lesser measure Immanuel Kant, 1724-1804, shared this spirit of detachment, but he can scarcely be said to belong to the epoch under consideration. Yet Kant himself had experience of the wider world - for he had a peculiar interest in both travel and politics, following the course of the Revolution in N. America and in France eagerly. (Höfding vol. 2. Hist. of Phil.). The abbreviated termination of Hegel's "Phenomenology" was due in part at least to the presence of Napoleon and the disorder of War. Feuerbach and his contemporaries were surging in a great upheaval of human affairs scarcely less critical than that through which our generation has passed or is passing. It was a Post-War epoch but it was no bloodless or silent Revolution. Its cries and blows echo through the pages of our author. We see the struggle of the people/

struggle of the people for political liberty, the slow unbending of authority, and how the new claims of science and commerce begin to effect the intellectual and practical affairs of the people.

In the record he had given us of his father, published 1851, certain aspects of the life and character of that earlier time are portrayed, while his own experiences brought him into touch with its political as well as its intellectual movements. These were all the more deeply engraven on his memory because they were so much antagonistic to his ambitions and a cause of his failure.

Briefly let us set down some of the salient facts. Germany in the beginning of the XIX th century had not yet found political unity. The hammer of Napoleon rendered cruel service to that end. It smashed the old Empire with its loose fragments of some three hundred states and prepared the way for the new. In the Rhenish Confederation formed under the protection of Napoleon the German princes were taught some of the lessons of closer co-operation. Thus when freedom came in 1815 the German Confederation was ready under the direction of the great Powers to reorganise the Diet and to introduce a larger national spirit.

The opportunity was unique." Not since the Reformation had the people been so profoundly moved." Great hopes were entertained of a progressive movement which would work in close harmony with representatives of all classes. In addition definite promises had been made that constitutions would/

would be granted to the people in their several states, and the Duke of Weimar boldly fulfilled his pledge to the surprise and resentment of many of his titled neighbours.

The issue was not however to be settled so easily or so soon. In the Cambridge Modern History, vol. X p. 346, we read, "The original draft of the Federal Act had pledged every member of the Confederation to grant his subjects a representative constitution within a year. But this power had been emasculated by the omission of the time limit and the substitution of 'will' for 'shall'; the clause became a prophecy and not a command; and, as Gorres complained, it was mangled and maimed until it guaranteed to the German people no more than 'an unlimited right of expectation'.

The evil spirit of Prince Metternich had been at work and Absolutism gained the day. To the forceful leadership of the Austrian statesman must be added as contributing to the down-fall of popular hopes the hesitations and selfishness of the German princes, the receding of the tide of national feeling into the creeks and channels of narrow particularism and even in places the real effectiveness of local administration in the hands of the bureaucrats.

The situation was not without its contradictions. It is surprising to find that Prussia is regarded as the centre of Liberalism and the Emperor of Russia as a Jacobin withstanding the anti-popular machinations of Austria. Later the spell was cast off. The southern states ^hwere Feuerbach's home/

Chapter II.

Home lay, took the lead in the movement for representation and liberty, while Russia drew back to its former fears of the people, and Prussia became once again the land of authority.

Such reaction and absolutism inevitable led to the exercise of a strict Police supervision extending from the Universities to the organs of the Press. The liberty granted to the latter is not so recent or assured that we can think strange the frequent suppression of magazines and newspapers critical of the Government. But it is a little strange to find respectable professors under surveillance, as when Schleiermacher's sermons and hymn-book were brought before the censor for examination. Yet earlier, Kant for a time was favoured by the unwelcome attentions of the Authority entrusted in the care of education and religion and the three theologians who had been formed into a College of censors paid special attention to his book "Religion within the bounds of pure Reason". With the death of Fred. William II. there came a return to the more favourable conditions of liberty granted to him by Frederick the Great and Zeidlitz, his minister. The students of course might well be expected to have a hand in whatever trouble was brewing and they received their due share of attention.

No doubt there was reason enough for all this. Unrest was in the air and must find leaders and a voice. Professors spoke courageously; in 1837 seven of them in Göttingen protested against the repudiation of the Liberal constitution.

De/

De Wette, 'the Nathanael of Modern Theology' was dismissed from his chair at Berlin because of a letter he wrote. When politicians were silent, secret societies carried on their plotting and propaganda, and many of the student Corps and Verbindungen of the present day trace their history back to these stormy times. Fries, when professor at Jena, although no friend to Secret Societies, made no concealment of his sympathy with the formation of a General German Studentenbund whereby the bonds formed in the common struggle against Napoleon "the world conqueror" could be sustained. ("Höff. II.243)

Two incidents are so remarkable as to merit further mention and will illustrate the above statements. In 1817, Oct. 18th, the University town of Jena witnessed a strange sight that occasioned more alarm than was really intended. At the Wartburg festival the students commemorated both the Reformation and the Battle of Leipzig, when Napoleon was overthrown. "There were prayers and sermons, then a dinner and toasts to Luther and the Grand Duke, and finally a bonfire. In Maasman, the master of the revels, committed to the flames imitation of the Reformation, ^{of} reaction militarism and ^(emblems) French fashions -- Schmalz's pamphlet, Kotzebue's German History and other obnoxious works, a corporal's cane, a pigtail and a corset. It was for the most part a youthful ~~general~~ indiscretion, but when professors like Keiser could say that for general significance the demonstration had never been surpassed, there was perhaps some excuse for the alarm of Courts and Cabinets". (Cambridge Modern History, vol. X, p.357)

More serious was the assassination of Kotzebue, poet, playwright, satirist of Romanticists and students alike, and the agent of the Emperor of Russia. On March 23rd, 1819 he was stabbed by a student of Jena University when at Mannheim. As illustrative of the way in which such an act could be viewed we may turn to the letter written to the mother of the lad by Professor De Wette who had come into touch with him during a holiday. He condemns the wrong done, "evil can never be overcome by evil, the end never sanctifies the means"; but there is this significant sentence, "Taken in itself this act, performed by a pure and pious young man with the conviction and confidence which animated it, is a beautiful sign of the time." A sign of the time certainly, as those in authority also thought, but far from beautiful in any time. It is not surprising that De Wette fell into disgrace. (Lichtenberg ~~ap.~~ 40). For the part which he took in this celebration of 1817 of the sequel of 1817 Fries was forced to resign the Professorship of Philosophy which he held. The patronage of Karl August was not sufficient to protect him from the angry denunciation of Prussia and Austria. A via media was discovered by transferring him to the chair of Physics and Mathematics. (Höfding History of Philosophy II. 343.4.)

The Universities now received special attention. It was decided to send Commissioners to visit them. The education of youth must be strictly supervised and along the lines laid down by the State. "He who serves me must teach what I command/,"

command," said Francis II of Austria to the staff of the Larbach Lyceum, (Cam M.H.X 357). Lange (Hist of Mat. II 246) tells us that in 1824 August 21 a circular rescript from the Ministry of Education in Prussia was issued and ran as follows, "The Royal Science Examination Commission is invited at the same time to have a strict regard to the thoroughness and inward content of Philosophy and its study, in order that the shallow and superficial philosophemes who have recently but too often formed the whole study of philosophy may at length yield to a thorough training in philosophy and that the true philosophical study may again receive its honoured and valued position etc. etc."

Hegel now became the accepted interpreter of Absolutism and was called by his enemies "an official philosopher" because of his disavowal of sentiment and revolutionary talk. His attacks upon those who gave way to such exuberances were valuable to the Government, though ⁱⁿ his later days his patrons were not so sure of his political teaching. That "the real is the rational" may seem a watchword of acquiescence but it was capable of being inverted and employed for their own ends by the followers of the goddess of Reason. (Wallace Logic of Hegel. Trans. XX.) It is suggestive as to the uneasiness of the time to find Hegel writing to his wife (1827) that he had looked at the university buildings in ^{Low}ain and Liege with the feeling that they might one day afford him a resting place when the parsons in Berlin make the Kupfergraben completely intolerable for him. 'The Roman Curia would/

would be a more honourable opponent than the miserable cabals of a miserable boiling of parsons in Berlin." Almost Hegel's last writing was an article on the English Reform Bill of 1831. He acknowledges the danger of this measure, but perceives the inevitability of the change and points to the English experiment of municipal self-government as a security against the dangers of revolutionary principles... Even the moderate liberalism of this paper was too much for the growing fears of the Prussian Government, and a second part of it which Hegel was preparing was stopped by the Censor. (W. Caird's Hegel, pp 103, 104). At the same time the rule of Hegel counted in the court and University for long and Feuerbach never escaped from the result of his criticism^{ic} of the Hegelian system.

Two upheavals in the political situation of Europe made quite clear that stability had not been reached despite all the efforts of reaction. The first was the French Revolution of July, 1830. It drew to Paris many ardent spirits, including Heine, and Feuerbach longed to follow them. Paris they felt was to be the future home of freedom. Lange, in his 'Histy of Materialism,' vol II 142, writes, 'If you wish to fix a definite point to describe as the end of the idealistic period in Germany, no such distinctive event offers itself as the French Revolution of July 1830. Philosophy had lost its charm since it had entered into the service of Absolutism... men had become sated with Romanticism. Heine took up his abode in/

in 1830 and it became the fashion to ~~despair~~ despair of Germany's future and to regard the more realistic France as the model of the new epoch. " The German rulers were again ready with promises of constitutions to their people, but they also took more substantial measures to protect themselves, on the one hand by the treaty of Berlin, 1833, a measure for mutual help, and on the other hand by the institution of the Zollverein or Custom Union which excluded Austria but added much to the prosperity of their country.

Again, in 1848 came the crash of Revolution to warn them that all was not right. Austria which had been the home of reaction suffered greatly. The mob sacked the palace of Prince Metternich, and it was only with the help of Russia that the Hungarian generals who had led the outbreak were overcome and executed. A proclamation in favour of free institutions, religious liberty and universal education was made, but in 1851 it was cancelled. In France Louis Philippe abdicated in favour of his grandson. In Germany many of the princes hastened to grant constitutions, and sanction was given for the convocation of a great National Congress of Representatives of the people by a provisional self-constituted ^SAssembly.

But even this Assembly proved for the German patriots a vast disappointment. The flow of words was interminable, the results vague. Feuerbach defending himself in his V.W.R. at Heidelberg in the end of 1848 from the charge of desertion or neglect asserts he took no part because the movement had no reality. It thought that words, especially the word Liberty/

Chapter II.

'Liberty', could work miracles. When other methods are in operation, he declares, he will not be an idle spectator but he wants no empty talk. As the King of Prussia on the ground of scruple refused the crown offered to him, Germany had to wait for Bismarck's fuller plans and the campaigns against Austria Denmark and France to reach through blood and iron the united life of a nation. The time of the worst reaction was to come. It lay, says Grün, between 1850 and 1860 and so bad was it that the cannon roar on the Alma sounded as blows of freedom. We are apt to forget with our own ordered progress that the Continent was so much the scene of confusion, upheaval and oppression, yet Italy did not achieve unity till 1870 and when Gladstone visited Italy in 1851 he found there 20,000 political offenders in prison.

Amid all these changes the two chief leaders of reaction were at times conscious that they were fighting a losing battle. Many of their sayings have been preserved. "You can do everything with bayonets except sit on them", confessed Metternich; and again, "Ancient Europe is at the beginning of the end, I have come into the world either too early or too late. Earlier I should have enjoyed the age; later I should have helped to reconstruct it; today I have to give my life to propping up the mouldering edifice."; while Francis II declared, "My realm is like a worm-eaten house, if ~~any~~ one part is removed one cannot tell how much will fall."

Feuerbach's own sayings reveal the bitterness of the times.
In/

Chapter II.

In 1830 he could open the aphorism, "What is Christianity now? Only permission in the land of the philistines under police protection to eat one's bread with security'. In 1851, March 14, writing to Kapp in America, he exclaims, "Europe is a prison. The difference between a free man and a prisoner is only a quantitative one, only this, that one has a somewhat roomier prison." And again at a later period, he writes, "There only is divine faith, truth and soundness where there is Nature, where atheism, the theoretical of course of which the Bible, at least the old Testament knows nothing, is an impossibility, divine faith an incommunicable necessity, where it is one with the understanding of man himself, where man's understanding can (itself) think — no other cause than a God, where consequently the proof of God is still not a necessity on the satisfaction of which prizes and stipends are offered, the confession of faith is still no merit which is announced by servile newspaper writers and police-servants in order to gain for themselves through belief in the Highest the favour of the All-Highest (Aller Hochsten)."

For Germany the political tension was relieved in many places by the strong administrative genius of the rulers, by the advantages which came with the Customs Union, and through the development of Science and the aid it rendered to mechanical and technical efficiency. It is worthy of note in this connection that the first railway was opened in Germany in 1835.

These/

Chapter II.

These beneficant occurrences affected even the spirit of Feuerbach who turned them to his own argument in the Preface to W.C. written in February, 1843, "In these works I have sketched with a few sharp touches the historical solution of Christianity and have shown that Christianity has in fact long vanished not only from the reason but from the life of mankind, that it is nothing more than a fixed idea, in fragrant contradiction with our fire and life assurance Companies, our railroads and steam carriages, our picture and sculpture galleries, our military and industrial schools, our theatres and scientific museums."

But sufficient has been said about the political situation to give us a background to understand the details of Feuerbach's career which will have to be considered later. It is time to endeavour to supply a similar outline of the philosophical and theological situation.

The Philosophical and Theological Situation.

Although Feuerbach's career was destroyed and his influence diminished by the power of the Reaction, the references in his writings are naturally more in defence of his own views against the current intellectual doctrines. No one can say that these were insignificant. The contrary was the case. If the years before and after the fall of Napoleon displayed in Germany a remarkable poverty of political genius, they offered a remarkable wealth of intellectual power. As the XVIII century drew to a close the/

Chapter II.

the Rationalism of the illumination period gave place to the Romantic Movement, the transition being marked by the "Sturm und Drang Periode", which finds expression in the "Sorrows of Young Werther" by Goethe. [cf. also Hegel's *Phenomenology* II. 668.]

Feuerbach has given us some extracts from his father's letters which reveal the influence of this sentimental tragic mood, the silence of the beloved and the ensuing agony, the threat of suicide if his friends had not been so dear to him, the longing for the dagger of the robber to pierce him etc. etc.

Romanticism, with its headquarters for a time at Jena, and later at Berlin, was more than a German movement and more than a literary mood. It swept across the whole of Europe and it attempted a philosophy of life in every sphere. Reaching back into the past to escape the arid boundaries of the Rationalism of the previous century, it drew new vigour as in England from the Ballads and songs of earlier days. The danger that threatened it and indeed overtook some of its representatives was an idolatry of mediaeval mysteries and outlook, the sacrifice of reason ^{to} imagination, the suffusion of Romance with sentiment. It tended to become and actually became in some cases exclusive and aristocratic, a company of 'beautiful souls.' (cf. Hegel's *Phen.* as about)

Its chief services for German literature lay in the translation of Shakespeare by A. W. Schlegel and Tieck, the humour of Jean Paul Richter and the patriotic songs of/

Chapter II.

of the "Vaterlanddichter", foremost of whom was Novalis. But its influence extended to Philosophy and Religion and carries us into the midst of the great system builders of the XIXth century, Hegel, Fichte, Schelling and Schleiermacher. Haym in his work "Die Romantische Schule", p 7, points out that 'Dichtung' and 'Philosophie' have always since the beginning of our great literary epoch in Germany worked together and interpenetrated one another in lively fashion. If indeed the essence of Romanticism is to be brought under one formula, he says, "it is to be found in ~~this~~ extreme spirituality, in the flowing together of the life of imagination and of thought, and herein again lay the possibility that the finest outpourings of the life of the soul, the impulses of piety, could thus bind them together in peace." (p8) As the several members of the group did not as a matter of fact hold together on the question of religion, it is well to remember that the movement had its weaker and harmful side as well as its nobler.

It was impossible for these scholars to pass by the three great books of Immanuel Kant, especially "Die Kritik der Reinen Vernunft". A criticism of preceding theories they themselves challenged criticism and completion. Awakened from his dogmatic slumbers by the scepticism of Hume he sought to decide the limits of/

Chapter II.

of the understanding, to discover the principles necessary for experience, and to find room for the "Ideas" of Freedom, Immortality and God in a wider view than that possible to the followers of Descartes Locke and Berkley.

Feuerbach's interest in Kant is indicated by a reference in his "Bayle", p 222, "Philosophy before him in Cartesius and Leibnitz had still the character of indifference over against philosophy in itself. They express their thoughts only as subjective opinions and hypothesis with a certain légèreté and indifference. Dogma is still presupposed as the highest interest, or this supposition in the minds of men is respected." Philosophy as a true and original activity, that is to say, first appears in Kant, and Feuerbach is relentless in his advocacy of thought free from dogma.

Kant's doctrine was avowedly a theory of knowledge in the first instance though it contained elements which took it out into the wider field of reality. Wallace in his book on Kant (p. 219) says truly, "He left behind him no system, but he threw out suggestions of matchless fertility." Thus we find that schools of the most opposed character claimed adherence to his philosophy, according as they emphasised or rejected one or other of the Critiques. Agnostics laid stress upon the ignorance of the transcendental involved in the nature of our knowledge, while theologians/

Chapter II.

Theologians proclaimed the primacy of the practical reason and the assurances it gave of the moral and spiritual Kingdom.

It is not necessary to go into details here of the contradictions and difficulties which Kant left ^{out} ~~at~~ his successors. One especially formed the object of many controversies, the dualism that obviously existed between sense and understanding. Both were necessary; according to the famous saying, "Concepts without perceptions were empty and perceptions without concepts were blind." Knowledge was thus only of phenomena, while the 'thing-in-itself', the ground of phenomena, lay outside the category of causality. Jacobi, with his own doctrine of realism, wittily commented upon the 'thing-in-itself', declaring that "without this proposition one could not enter the Kantian system and with it one could not remain in it". And Heine declared the distinction between things that exist for us and things that do not exist for us to be an Irish bull in Philosophy. Undoubtedly there was a problem here which required to be investigated. The energetic mind of the time could not rest satisfied with this mysterious 'thing-in-itself, or with the other gaps and chasms which investigation revealed. With immense courage and subtlety it grappled with the problem of the 'Given' or the 'Non-Ego' in knowledge in morality and/

and in religion.

Fichte's moral enthusiasm found in the 'Non-Ego' that which was posited by the Ego itself as a limit or barrier within or against which it was to work out its destiny and win its freedom. Schelling's doctrine was more imbued with the spirit of Romanticism, ever inclined to mysticism, preferring symbol and intuition to the contradiction of the moral life. Nature is not merely a limit; she is akin to the Spirit which seeks to comprehend and use her. "Matter," says Höffding (History of Modern Philosophy, II, 165), "is slumbering spirit, spirit in equilibrium, and spirit is matter in process of becoming." Hence there is identity of Subject and Object in the absolute principle which underlies all things. Hegel in epigrammatic fashion after he had broken with Schelling declared that this Absolute is "the night in which all cows are black." (Preface, *Phenomenologie des Geistes*).

Feuerbach and his circle had no love of Schelling; witness, for example the Introduction, Briefwechsel zw. Ludwig Feuerbach und Christian Kapp, p 8 and 9, where Schelling accuses Kapp of plagiarism and Kapp returns the charge, and the description Feuerbach gives of his sensations when looking into the volumes of Schelling, but less personal criticism is to be found in chap IX W.C., in an Essay "In criticism of the Hegelian Philosophy (Vol II, /

II p.207) and in "Vorläufige Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie (vol II, p.244).

In the last he says, "Spinoza is the real and proper founder of the modern speculative philosophy, Schelling reinstated it and Hegel brought it to completion." And again, "The Identity-Philosophy is distinguished from the Spinozistic only in this, that it quickens the dead phlegmatic Thing of Substance with the Spirit of Idealism, Hegel especially makes the self-activity, the power of self-dis-tinction, self-consciousness an attribute of Substance," And again p 260, "Schelling and Hegel are opposites. Hegel represents the manly principle of self-dependence, self-activity, in short the idealist principle; Schelling the feminine principle of ~~recept~~ receptivity, of susceptibility: first he is the receiver from Fichte, then from Plato and Spinoza, finally from Jacob Böhme, in short the materialistic principle. Hegel is deficient in intuition, Schelling in power of thought and definition. Schelling is a thinker only in universals, but when it comes to a matter of particulars and definitions he lapses into the somnambulism of the Imagination.... Rationalism is with Schelling only appearance, irrationalism truth... Hegel makes up for the lack of realism by stout sensible words, Schelling by beautiful words...Hegel as the self-negation of negative thinking, as the completion of the old philosophy is the negative beginning of the new: Schelling/

Schelling is the old philosophy with the imagination or under the illusion that it is the new Realphilosophie."

But it is in the "Criticism of the Hegelian philosophy" (II, p 207) that we find the concisest statement of the way in which Feuerbach viewed the relationship between the great writers of this epoch. To quote a few sentences, "The only philosophy which begins without presuppositions is that which has the courage and the freedom to doubt itself, which produces itself from their opposition. The new philosophies have however, taken as a whole, begun with themselves not with their opposite. They have directly presupposed philosophy, i.e. their philosophy, as the truth. Mediation has with them only the significance of clarification as with Fichte, or of development, as with Hegel. Kant was critical over against the old philosophy, but not against himself. Fichte presupposed the truth of the Kantian philosophy. He has no further wish than to raise it to the level of science, to bind together what Kant has left ~~separ~~ate, to deduce these from one common principle. Schelling takes for granted also the philosophy of Fichte as proved truth on the one side, while on the other side he is the one who reinstates Spinoza in opposition to Fichte. Hegel is Fichte mediated by Schelling. Hegel carried his polemic against the Absolute of Schelling, he recognised in him the lack of elements of reflection, of understanding, of negativity, i.e. he enthused, he defined, he fructified the/

the absolute identity with the seed of the Begriff (of the Ich of Fichte) but at the same time he still takes the Absolute for granted...Hegel was to Schelling as Fichte to Kant. Both were true philosophies according to their content and material, both had only a purely scientific, formal interest."

What Feuerbach has in mind in these reflections is shown later on, p. 211, where he says, "The Hegelian philosophy consequently comes up against the same objection which the whole of modern philosophy encounters from Cartesius to Spinoza, the reproach of a direct break with sensible perception, the reproach of an immediate presupposition of philosophy." i.e. Nature and what is given in Nature have no real part in the construction of the system. (see p. 230 centre).

In line with these last words we may quote the reference in W.C. (p. 87 Eng. trans) "Interesting material for the criticism of cosmogonic and theogonic fancies is furnished in the doctrine revived by Schelling and drawn from Jacob Böhme, of eternal Nature in God," (i.e. the ground of existence which God has in Himself). "The simple meaning of the doctrine is that Nature or Matter cannot be explained as a result of intelligence; on the contrary it is the basis of intelligence, the basis of personality without itself having any basis; Spirit without Nature is an unreal abstraction, consciousness develops itself only out of Nature."/

Chapter II.

Nature." "But", he goes on to say, "this materialistic doctrine is veiled in a mystical yet attractive obscurity, in as much as it is not expressed in the clear simple language of reason, but emphatically enunciated in that sacred word of the emotions, God."

If Feuerbach therefore came into touch with rich veins of philosophic thought in the world of his day, he had also to assay and test many theological doctrines. To this task it can hardly be said that he devoted the same care or disinterested appreciation. The Scorn which comes to controversialists all too easily was a favourite weapon ~~as~~ in his hands. "The unbelieving unbelief of modern times makes a hiding place for itself behind the Bible which is in its nature and origin indefinite, "(W.C. p 251 Eng. trs.), he complains, and again, p 109," The speculative theologians and philosophers of modern times foist in all sorts of pantheistic definitions, although they deny the principle of pantheism -- a self-contradictory fabrication." and also, p 53, note, "The fabrications which modern rationalistic orthodoxy and pietistic rationalism have advanced concerning the Incarnation in opposition to the rapturous conceptions and expressions of ancient faith do not deserve to be mentioned, still less controverted. "and again, p 164 " I turn with loathing and contempt from modern Christianity in which the Bride of Christ readily acquiesces in polygamy, at least in successive/

Chapter II.

successive polygamy. I turn back with reverence to the misconceived truth of the chaste monastic cell".

Yet disappointed as Feuerbach was with his intellectual and spiritual associates, the age was not so barren as he declares. The labours of the Tübingen school betrayed and occasioned a great ferment of thought. Bauer applied to the New Testament the methods of criticism which De Wette had used in connection with the Old Testament. Strauss, whose career suggests many parallels with that of Feuerbach, emphasised the Hegelian dialectic in sacred History with his "Leben Jesus" (1835) and in Christian thought with his "Christliche Glaubenslehre" (1841.2) but ended in a hopeless materialism with "Der Alte und der Neue Glaube" (1872). If the activities of these and their associates are not to be ~~be~~ reckoned for gain to the Christian cause, and they certainly awakened many to the reality of historical and critical questions that must be faced, yet such works as "The Sinlessness of Christ" by Ulmann and J. Müller's "Doctrine of Sin" prove the existence of vigorous and valuable positive thinking. Also the names of Lampe, Spender, Francke, and Bengel remind us that Pietism exercised a wide and beneficent influence. Schleiermacher and even Kant before him were the recipients of its spiritual powers. Through Zinzendorf and the Brethern it opened up springs of individual and religious feeling. Over against the dulness of orthodoxy and rationalism alike it/

Chapter II.

it continued the teaching of Philip Jacob Spener and sought to bring to men the doctrine and blessings of regeneration. Without polemic it endeavoured to make clear in the Reformed Theology the distinction of essential and non-essential, and though it taught the importance of the individual it yet emphasised the need of instruction especially in Bible knowledge. This devotional study ran out into practical works of benevolence, passed beyond the bounds of nationality and entered upon the modern crusade of Missions to heathen lands. Tholuck, born in 1799, lived till 1877 to see these interests so dear to his heart firmly established. Ably contending against Rationalism as he did, he persuaded men not less by his devotional than by his theological and critical writings.

But here is the judgment of Dr Hastie in his introduction to "The History of German Theology by Lichtenberger," p. XXIV; "The work of German Theology throughout the century has been in its own way, however much it has been misrepresented and decried, a work of revival and renovation and reconstruction. In the midst of the disturbed faith and the distracted consciousness of the times and its manifold yearnings and gropings after a new order of life and thought, it exhibits the application of the highest energies of the human mind, in the free spirit of Protestantism, to the investigation and comprehension of what/

Chapter II.

what is most vital in Christianity and most essential to religion. And although it has learned to restrain the speculative flight of the individual reason, and to abandon many a cherished idea and form, it remains not the less conspicuously conscientious, hopeful, and reverential in dealing with all the cardinal problems of religion."

At the same time it is good to remember that Hastie is thinking not simply of the first part of the XIXth century but especially of the latter part when Ritschl and his school had definitely set theology in the path of Christian experience and history. There were indeed many disturbing factors in the life of the Church. The relation to the State had not been settled at the Reformation and Luther had given the Prince a place of authority larger than that assigned to him in e.g. the Westminster Confession of Faith. Also the Consistorial system hampered and delayed the growth of liberty within the Church. The Union of the Reformed Churches and Evangelical in 1817 was more of force than inclination, so that in 1845 there was recognition granted to the Lutherans in Prussia who had separated. But in 1853 the decree went forth the Union must not be broken.

Controversies within the Church were many and periodicals and magazines appeared to represent the various issues. Endeavours were made within the Church to introduce reforms both intellectual and practical. Although Bavaria and ERLANGEN/

Erlangen were the homes of Lutheran Confessionalism, the mediating theology held sway. Ministers were uneasy and so too were the people. Desiring the rites of the Church, ~~were~~ are told, in Baptism and Confirmation and Marriage, they paid their Church tax and wondered what the sermons were all about. And at the back of everything there sounded the appeal of the Communist Manifesto of December 1847, "Workers unite! You have nothing to lose but your chains!"

In considering the general influences at work in this period we cannot pass over the extraordinary persistence of Rationalism. The influence of Christian Wolff was a force even after Kant had dealt faithfully with him. He died in 1754, yet his teaching continued to direct the thoughts of large numbers of people. Among the clergy were many who feared the appeal to the feeling of the Pietest or the Idea of the philosopher. Loofs has pointed out in his "Leitfaden zur Dogmengeschichte" that whereas Rationalism reached its height in England about 1750 it held sway for many years after that in Germany. Kant, critic of Wolff as he was, still in many ways showed its influence. The very title of his book on religion, "Religion within the limits of pure Reason" makes this plain (1793) and from him we have the definition of Rationalism, "He who holds as morally necessary, i.e. as duty, merely natural religion can be called rationalist in matters of faith," and this is/

is distinguished from Naturalism and supernaturalism.

(Loofs' Grundlinien der Kirchengeschichte, par 306). ^{v. Reliq. within the limits to 8th IX. A Potomac E.I.}

Hegel was himself a child of the Aufklärung, a larger movement than Rationalism but including it, and however he might speak about 'objective reason' he himself showed in his deductive method, his preoccupation with mind, his tendency to substitute principles for persons the spirit of that school.

Feuerbach with his practical interest in religion was ever on the alert to detect its baneful presence, e.g. Luther's doctrine of the two natures appeared to him just such an expression of the old theology of the old Church. But he himself did not escape the snare, and Lange reproaches him for giving us in W.C. a "Reason hanging in the air". But Bolin takes him to task for this, and protests that he does not take into account the later development of his doctrine. While this is partly true and there is a development, even in his later works the cold and narrowing influence of the old theory of a detached and disinterested reason is to be found. One thing certainly marks Feuerbach from the theologians that while he used reason to criticise, they for the most part used it to confirm. It served its part in the overthrow of dogma and sharpened independent judgment on such matters as the wars of religion which had disgraced the XVIIIth century. That Feuerbach was affected seriously by this movement is seen in his study of "Bayle" with/

Chapter II.

with its reference to just such affairs.

Two great writers exercised throughout this period a commanding influence. Firstly, Hegel with whom the interests of Theology and philosophy were closely linked together, so that Feuerbach could say, "The Hegelian philosophy is the last refuge, the last rational support of theology". (Vorläufige Thesen, II, 262.); (and Grundsätze § 5) "The Speculative philosophy is the true, the consistent, the rational theology"; and secondly, Schleiermacher, with whom began the rejuvenescence of theology and the establishment of religion in her own right. Noble in character, learned in many spheres, eloquent in the pulpit and in the study alike, Schleiermacher exercised an influence on Feuerbach greater than he admitted. He calls him "the last theologian of Christianity (I.249) but declares he was too cowardly to confess a theology without a God" (W.C, p.9). Generous reference is made elsewhere however to the unforgettable impressiveness of his personality and his preaching. Apart from this the relation of Feuerbach to Schleiermacher as also to Hegel is worthy of further consideration and must be content with this brief reference at the present stage.

Reviewing the various movements of the period we are impressed with the many factors which were working for unrest and disintegration. It is only right to say that Feuerbach's voice was not alone in its protest and criticism. It is wise also to consider that revolts have long memories and the/

Chapter II.

the fibres of their roots in this case stretched out across Europe even to America and to far distant controversies. The age was strained and dissatisfied. Absolutism in State and University and Church pressed heavily upon its desires for ampler life. Religion, beset as ever by many foes, had discovered new utterance but struggled uneasily within the state-made union of the Churches uncertain even of its friends and advocates.

Chapter III:

The Personal History, Experience and Activity
of Feuerbach.CHAPTER. III.

THE PERSONAL HISTORY,

EXPERIENCE, AND ACTIVITY

OF FEUERBACH

AS INTERPRETATIVE OF HIS THEORY OF RELIGION.

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" Who will may hear

Sordello's story told ."

Browning

"Those obstinate questionings

Of sense and outward things ,

Fallings from us, vanishings;

Blank misgivings of a creature

Moving about in worlds not realised."

Wordsworth.

Chapter III.

The Personal History, Experience and Activity
of Feuerbach.

We must now look a little closer at the personal history and experience of the man who was so sensitive to the movements of the age. These details will cast light upon his final verdict as to the validity of religious experience, and they will show it to be a development through a sharp antagonism to an effort at a positive statement.

The family into which Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach was born was one of distinction. Of the five sons the first became an archaeologist of note, the second and third professors of mathematics and law respectively, while Ludwig the fourth was encouraged amid the changes and disappointments which befell him by the constant loyalty of Fritz his younger brother. The romantic tendencies of the father have been mentioned, but these did not prevent him rising by talent and energy to a place of high rank in legal affairs. The title he bore was indeed both of length and consequence, "Königliche bayrische Wirkliche Statsrat und Appellationsgerichts Praesident." His inclinations were to philosophy but the discouragement of his father and the pressure of circumstances through an early marriage led him to seek a road which would provide the means of existence for himself and the eight children who appeared in due course. When his son Ludwig sought to disregard these stern necessities and to/

to pursue philosophy at all costs, it was only after he had received grave and repeated warnings from one who had personally reviewed the difficulties of such a career.

"My will and my reason curb the passions", his father had written and it was well for his son that he had his father to finance him even with the slender assistance which he requested. Of his mother we need only say that she played her part with the supreme sympathy and affection we find in the story of many of Germany's famous sons.

Born on the 28th July 1804 at Landshut in Bavaria and dying on the 15th September 1872 at Reckenberg our author longed for a recognition which came too late. Yet the years between were full of many labours, interesting literary and philosophical contacts, much hero-worship, more rebelliousness against the idols of the University and the ~~Staatliche~~ State, lively hopes, disillusionment, hardship and retirement.

Starcke speaks of the mystery of his character. He refers not to the attractiveness of a man who was often silent in company, moody at times and halting in speech till the barriers broke down under the pressure of thought and feeling, but to the "resignation", practical as well as philosophical, with which he passed from his dreams of a professor's chair and accepted the isolation of a home in the country. Did he ever really reconcile himself to such a life? one is tempted to ask. Was his resignation really a/
a/

Chapter III.

a repression?

The question arises also whether his theory of religion and life were influenced by these circumstances. "Feeling is a dream with the eyes open," he writes, (W.C. chap XV, p 141 Eng trans), Wishes are for him no guide to reality. Did he gather these lessons among the ashes of his youthful hopes? Unfortunately for the theory, the key to his philosophy was early fashioned, disappointment came later and it came largely because he mocked at those who said that Religion was more than a dream. It is possible to say that if early success had been his lot he might have been ^a more balanced man. One cannot tell. On the other hand success might have made him more materialistic than he ~~is~~ actually is, it might have taken from him the sincerity of his appeals for sympathy and love. Or again, it might be argued that religion should have come as a welcome release to the often depressed student of the Bavarian village.

Certainly he was what is now called an 'introvert', self-centred in thought and imagination, like a dreamer who sought by pinching his body to waken himself or assure himself he was awake. The solidity of the world revealed by the senses came to him as a relief and comfort against the unsubstantiality of his desires. This effort to escape illusion itself formed a complex which determined his outlook. Bolin has a pathetic chapter on Feuerbach's loneliness, entitled, "Vereinsamt". The quotations from his/

his letters show that his shyness was something which accompanied him all his life. Writing to his brother Fritz in 1831 he says, "Withdrawal within ourselves and modesty is alas the fault of all of us. Humility is with us the peculiar original sin." Even in 1837 he confesses that he is a peculiar person not to be classified, and later he laments, "My whole life has been made up of limitations, renunciations and denials, of being thrown back upon myself," ~~and~~ Yet on the other side there was not lacking confidence in himself, and even pride; "My time comes yet.," he writes near the end, "therefore only patience." Kohut calls him "this eternal optimist", "this great child". But we may leave to psychologists the interpretation of such a character, and ourselves, wary of imaginative construction, keep to the more obvious path of fact and experience.

Psychological processes do not give a final explanation. They may show the symptoms but not the cause of them. Feuerbach had a mentality as well as a mood, an intellectual position as well as an emotional pose and we do not do sufficient justice to him if we say he needed only a psycho-analyst to put him on the right path.

As a schoolboy, we are told, he read his Bible carefully and the desire of his father coincided with his own that he should follow the study of theology. "The first tendency which came forward with definiteness in my time of youth, he says, roughly in my 15th of ¹⁶year~~s~~ was not for science, nor even philosophy,/"

philosophy, but religion. This religious tendency arose in me not through religious instruction, i.e. about confirmation, which had rather left me, though I knew it still perfectly good, quite indifferent, or through other outward religious influences but purely from myself through the need of a something which neither my environment nor the school instruction gave me. As a result of this tendency I set religion before me as the goal and calling of my life and determined to be a theologian. But what I once was to become, that wished I now to be already. Consequently I busied myself as pupil at the gymnaseum zealously with the Bible as the foundation of Christian theology." (Kohut. pp 28,29) Hebrew he studied not only at school but privately with a Rabbi. Among the books he read were Gibbon's Decline and Fall, Mosheim's Church History, Herder's letters on Theological Study, Eichhorn's Introduction to the Old and New Testaments and a theological Church History of the XVIth century. At this time also he made acquaintance with Luther and Hamann, the so-called Magician of the North, critical of his fellowtownsman Kant and a believer in the simple apprehension of reality as given in the facts both of nature and of revelation.

In his school-album he enters the following quotation from Opitz, "Whoso lays aside the desires of the world and thinks on that which is not to perish lays an anchor so sure that no storm or tempest moves him in the very least." (Vol

II. p 380, Curriculum vitae meae).

We are reminded of Renan in his youthful days, destined to be a more genial critic of Christianity, who, we are told, was so devout in spirit that he never neglected to introduce the cross into his signature. Neither ever lost something of these early impressions and Fauerbach retained more of selfdiscipline and unworldly regard for others. The emphasis upon the practical side of Christianity, "die Menschenliebe," in Herder's Letters had greatly impressed him and the influence was permanent.

In 1823 he went to Heidelberg as a student of Theology and, encouraged by his father, applied himself with such diligence that he afterwards declared in his dry humorous way, "Theology has destroyed my digestion". Even the intellectual fare was to prove before long unpalatable.

Of Paulus, the head of theological rationalism, he declared that his lectures were nothing more than "a spider 's web of sophisms which he limed together with the mucous refuse of a miscarrying ingenuousness." The elegance of the language foreshadows his later achievements in real vituperation and express more than the usual dissatisfaction of student life. Others came under his scornful comment. "The only philosopher here is Erhardt, but this is a philosopher in name and not in fact. He has indeed frequently good and beautiful thoughts, but they stand there so forsaken beside him like orphanchildren and girm at one another/

another like dogs and cats, instead of shining bright together in one flame of love and sacrificing themselves to one fundamental thought as they ought to do. " (Vol II p 382)

One professor alone pleased him, Karl Daub, and part of his excellence was that he pointed beyond himself to the genius of Hegel. (Daub, we are told, revised the proofs of Hegel's Encyclopaedia.) In a very charming interchange of letters with his people at home he expresses his wholehearted desire to enter upon the study of philosophy. It is in other hands in Berlin than in Heidelberg, and besides would he not have the opportunity of hearing the great Schleiermacher and the famous Neander. His parents feared the allurements of the great city, but the lad replied somewhat sententiously but sincerely, "The devil has his quarters not only at Courts but in small towns and villages, but the man who carries something else in heart and sense than the common life and strife will go through the midst of hell unspoil: what it extorts from him is only mocking jest. There as here my narrow solitary room will be ~~only~~ the great wide world in which I move and a kindly Charon to carry me out of the land of joyous mortals into the silent Kingdom of the dead where are my books: there as here, alone by myself, will I consume my poor dry bite of supper instead of carousing in thirsty company, and cold water will be my sparkling fiery champagne: there as here will the sandbox be/

be the horn of plenty for my many and great merrymakings, and the ink will be the Burgundy at least for my pen".

It was earnest pleading and indicated a sober resolve and a change of direction. Kohut remarks truly, "As Ludwig undertook this Mecca-journey, he had already passed beyond theology. (p 34). It was, as he said later, that something had entered into his being (Wesen) which had not yet appeared in his consciousness (Bewusstsein). He stood ready in his being as a novitiate in the vestibule of the temple of Isis while his consciousness lingered yet in Palestine.

His father knowing that philosophy promised little as a "Brotstudium" hesitated to yield to the impassioned appeal of his son. "I too have dwelt in Arcady" he urged, but the boy replied that he had lived dwelt felt and thought in theology... he could sing and rejoice like David, lament with Jeremiah over the fall of the divinely dedicated city, he had been with the disciples through the Holy Land hanging on the lips of the Master, drinking in the honey of his teaching. "I have lived in Theology. But now she pleases me no more, she gives me not what I demand, what I require, not my daily bread, not the necessary victuals of my spirit: to the wretch on the cross she proffers a sponge of vinegar instead of the desired drink of cool water... Palestine is too narrow for me, I must, I must into the wide world and this is borne only on the shoulders of the philosopher.... To turn myself back into theology means to cast again a spirit that has become immortal into mortal hell once for all laid aside: for philosophy offers me the golden apple of immortality/

immortality and assures to me the enjoyment of eternal happiness, a presence a likeness with myself... I will press Nature to my heart before whose depths the cowardly theologian draws back trembling, whose meaning the physicist misunderstands, whose deliverance alone the philosopher completes... the man, but the complete man, nor the man as the doctor sees him in the hospital or under anatomy, as the jurist in the state or penitentiary, as the financier sees him in the baker and brewer... Share with me the joy over the founding of a new kingdom in me, over my new life and the defeat of a world which cared for me in such step-motherly fashion that she has left me no other way than to consume myself with vexation, and rejoice over the beneficent feeling to have escaped the hands of the dirty parsons and to have as my friends spirits like Aristotle, Spinoza, Kant and Hegel."

To his brother Edward he wrote more concisely, "extra philosophiam nulla salus." What could a father do but shake his head, quote his ^{own} experience, counsel prudence and submit and give introductions to his friends in the great city!

Berlin fascinated the young Southerner. Never was there such a University, Other universities are mere "Kneipe" (light student gatherings) compared with this hive of industry. Hegel's lectures were much clearer than his writings, we are told, because adapted to his hearers, and after attending but a few the new student writes that he sees already in bright flame what with Dahn appeared still dark and unintelligible.

He/

He required all his enthusiasm, for his food was most abstemious and his manner of life most secluded. He formed no club connections, took no part in political life, and yet as a foreigner and as the supposed member of a secret society, he was both despised and the object of police supervision. These matters he did not mention to his father but the latter came to hear of it and broke out against the folly of the time, not forgetting to commend the thoughtful silence and self-control of the boy.

Only for a short time did he attend Schleiermacher and Neander. "The theological mix-up of freedom and independence, reason and faith were vexatious even unto death to my soul which loves truth i.e. unity, definiteness, the unconditioned." Philosophy had won its victory for the time over theology, the ancient queen of the sciences.

Time was to cast a shadow over his worship of Hegel, but Berlin never lost the attractiveness of a first love. Often his thoughts turned to the Prussian capital. There surely amid his disappointments he hoped that sufficient freedom might be found for one of his disposition. "Prussia I revere as my second, my spiritual, my true fatherland," he writes, a statement which must be understood in contrast with the narrow conditions of the south. A visit in later years brought back many vivid experiences. At this corner he met Hegel. There in the Dreifaltigkeit Kirche he listened to the eloquent and architonic sermons of Schleiermacher.

Phantasy served Feuerbach ill in his hopes and memories. Even Berlin would not open the door to the man whose teaching had flouted the authorities.

Already in 1827-8 the alert mind of the student was moving away from his master. "My words with which I took farewell of Hegel were somewhat along these lines, he writes, 'Two years now have I heard you, two years undividedly dedicated to your philosophy. Now I feel the need to throw myself into the exact opposite. I am now going to study anatomy.'"

We are to consider later and in more detail the relation of pupil and master, but it is necessary to say here that Hegel's teaching on Theology and Philosophy excited ~~his~~ suspicion. Was the task of philosophy merely to recognise and justify by a process of rationalisation the particular Christian doctrines? Had religion no sufficient ground of her own? And on the other hand, was philosophy only a disguised, an esoteric theology?

As for the larger speculative question, what was the relation of Denken and Sein, Logic and Nature? Where was the necessity of the passage from the one to the other? Did the dialectical movement ever take one outside itself? Beyond the Logic was not the thinker forced to recognise the immediateness of Nature? For he writes (*Curr. vitae mae*, 1827-28) "Were there no Nature, never would the immaculate virgin Logic/

Logic produce one from herself."

With the whole atmosphere of the University Feuerbach felt himself dissatisfied. Like a good German thinker he hated mediating theories and later characterised them as he had found them among his teachers in the following sarcastic fashion, "Christian and modern elements were stirred together into a mass of sausage in which the orthodox Church doctrine supplied the meat, the Schleiermacher theology the bacon, and the Hegelian philosophy the spice." The wings of the young student were beginning to weary for other climes. The sand of Berlin was irritating his eyes, Before he was to cleanse them finally in the pure air of the country, he presented his Doctor-dissertation in 1828 to Erlangen University. The title of it makes plain that the spirit of Hegel yet held sway in his thinking, ("De ratione una universali infinita". The paper was sent to the theological professor, G.A. Harless of Erlangen, and also to Hegel. In both cases Feuerbach sent letters in which with modesty and yet with independence he asserted that he was convinced of the truth of the chief contents and believed that one positive thing he had done was "to destroy a deceptive appearance of the sensible consciousness which could appear only at a time where the single individual valued himself as absolute and infinite and consequently the Universal would be ascribed to him as an attribute, thinking as a power, as artistic skill, as aptitude. For with the ancients, just to/

to touch on this in passing fashion, where in general not the immediate not the real personality but only the individuality perceived, thought, mediated through art had worth, there was valued, and so to say existed, no individual soul; the soul passed for the absolute Universal, as God self, Animus Deus est, as with the Indians Brahma is called pure thinking, intuition, Wisdom, the Soul". (Kohut, p. 55). The chief thing to notice is the enthusiasm for Reason, a sphere where individuality does not count, a distinct forecasting of the interpretation given in W.C. and later. Reason is of the essence of man, it is not an abstraction, with it essence and existence fall together. (Vol II 386) In his letter to Hegel he says further, Christianity cannot be understood as the perfect and absolute religion, this can only be the kingdom of the actuality of the Idea and of the existing Reason. Christianity is nothing else than the religion of pure self, of the person as exalted spirit, which exists in general and is consequently only the antithesis of the old world. What significance, for example, has Nature in this religion?... She lies there not comprehended not taken up into the unity of the divine Being, full of mystery, so that only the 'person' (not Nature, the world, spirit) celebrates its salvation which was just its knowledge,. Reason has therefore in Christianity not yet been set free."

His father is very pleased with it all, jokes about a professor's/

professor's chair at Erlangen where the son is lecturing as a privat dozent on Descartes, Spinoza and philosophy in general. There was no sign, however that he was to carry the place by storm. While his father might write with fond pride of the alert mind, the good presence and the fluent speech of the young man, his friends confessed that his oratorical endowments were not the strongest side of his genius. Further, the trend of his thought was against the fashion of the day and the pietists disavowed him.

The real crisis came in 1830 with the publication, anonymously, of his book, "Gedanken eines Denker über Tod und Unsterblichkeit." So far as man's personal hopes were concerned there was more about death than immortality in it, and though, as I have said, published anonymously, ^{it} was generally ascribed to Feuerbach. The Bavarian police laid hold upon it. Not only in Bavaria but elsewhere, as his father at once perceived, its influence would be more than prejudicial, it would be fatal to the hopes of his son. This sombre verdict proved all too true. Time and again the author applied for some post only to find this spectre destroying all the good efforts of his friends. On one occasion the Pro-Rektor of a university addressed to him a polite letter, referring to the report that he was the author of the book, and saying, "I ask you to put me in a position to prove the baselessness of this imputation."

Feuerbach/

Feuerbach made no reply and afterwards regretted that he had not answered this inquisitorial challenge as he thought it should be answered. One kindly critic pronounced it "clever but comfortless" and shrewdly^{wd} hinted that it was easy for a young man with an indefinite capital of years before him to deal lightly with the final extinction of himself as an individual and the transition of the material to other forms. To do the young man justice, he tells us (Bolin p 4) that he wrote it with heartfelt and painful thoughts but steeled himself to indifference because of the call of present duty.

It anticipates his later treatment of religion, especially immortality, in so far as it emphasises the psychological explanation of the belief and traces it back to the vanity of the individual who builds this 'pons asinorum' to take him over the gap between this present life as it really is and his view of it. It is all very eloquent, lively, satirical, and it must be confessed, unsatisfactory. Its merit is its frankness, its criticism of the positive theology, and its disclosure of the method which Naturalism everywhere follows. (Vol III pl) The theme and the argument constantly reappear in his other works and in other settings. (Vo W.R. pp 17-20) "What is the use of a meal if the hunger is past?", he asks in one of his Satir. theolog. Distichen, under the title "Das nützlose Jenseits".

The/

The discouragement of his hopes of office did not diminish his literary activity nor his plans. He proclaims that his failure is his freedom, i.e. to become a writer. "I had rather be a devil in league with the truth than an angel in league with a lie." This sounds a little like whistling to keep his courage up, but he really was pursuing his studies diligently. In 1833 his 'History of Modern Philosophy' appeared, in 1834 'Abaelard und Heloise, or The Writer and the Man.' His thoughts turned to Paris, for since the Revolution of 1830 and the residence of Heine there, 1831 Paris was the El Dorado of youthful Germany, Realism was the keyword of the future, industry assumed a new importance, yet theological and political thought still interested the young author. He felt that Paris would give him the inspiration he needed. Could his father give him funds to go there? No, came the reply, funds were not available. Should he try Zürich? Alas, there were too many hungry Privat-docents there already. He becomes more restless. At one moment he laments he has no Mecaenas, at another he cries, the world is wide, France, America, lie before him. There are some very interesting letters between Feuerbach and his friend Kapp when the latter went to America. [V. Bolin, p. 186 ff. (1832; 41; 50)]. The land of the free and the brave was set before him somewhat after the discouraging manner that we find in Dickens's account in his "Martin Chuzzlewit". The correspondence is a peculiar study in/

in contrasted views, Feuerbach scarcely believing that all the beautiful things he dreamed about America were not true, and the other seeking to make him aware of the hardness and barrenness of life in the new country.

Events were moving however within the circle of domestic interests that were to shape his career after their own pattern. The hand of Necessity which later he emphasised as so determinative in the affairs of men was guiding his own. In 1833 came the death of his father. Two years later he became engaged to Bertha Löwe whom he married in 1837 settling at Dorf und Schloss Bruckberg between Ansbach and Nuremberg and connected with a porcelain factory which originally belonged to the State but was now a private company in which his wife was deeply interested and his brother-in-law manager. (Grün I, 222).

The reception accorded to his 'History of Modern Philosophy' (S.W. vol IV) was very good. There was no doubt as to the intellectual capacity and independent force with which he dealt with Spinoza, Bacon, etc. Bolin admits however that Feuerbach lacked the historical sense and that behind these studies there were the exposition and interpretation of his own views. In 'Leibnitz' (S.W. vol V) which appeared in 1836 we have what is meant to be an extension of the former work, its second part. The influence of this study is to be found in the new interest in individuality along the line of the 'Monad' /

'monad' and a more acute recognition of the religious problem. In 1838 there came from his pen "Pierre Bayle", 'A contribution to the History of Philosophy and Modern Culture.' It took him back to a study of Rationalism among the disorders of the XVIIIth Century. A recent outbreak of religious strife between Protestants and Roman Catholics in Bavaria seemed to show that the old evil spirit of religious repression had not passed away. "The aim of my Bayle was to instruct and shame an infatuated and exasperated people." (Vor. WR. Lect. 2.).

Starcke in his Introduction, p 19, stated in concise form the various stages of Feuerbach's development. In "Leibnitz" he finds the close of his first, or metaphysical period. Here the substantial, the actual is to be found in the Universal. The second period opens with Bayle "in 1838 and closes with the very important Grundsätze" 1843. There he saw the actual in the individual in conflict with the universal, while Reason was cast hither and thither between them. He confesses a certain difficulty in defining the limits of this period, but he selects the year 1843 so that the Grundsätze become the last significant work from this standpoint. Already at this time "Sensibility" is proclaimed, but it is with still a trace of metaphysical "Resignation", with which later Feuerbach will have nothing whatever to do. One/

One must here satisfy oneself with the sensible world, as if there were talk of a reality in itself outside the sensible world. First with 'Luther', 1844, begins the last period of the history of his thought. Reason is close bound to the sensible reality, or, as Feuerbach himself says, "First in 'Luther' I have fully thrown off the philosopher and allowed the philosopher to pass completely into the Man. I have passed from the recognition of the reality of sensibility in natural science to the recognition of its absolute reality. This insight I gained first in the sphere of religion". (S.W. I. XIII).

Some of these points will come up later in the course of our discussion, but our present interest lies more in the definitely religious works, four of which with 'Bayle' we shall treat in some detail, gathering about them or the criticism of them, the philosophical principles involved. In 1841 appeared 'Das Wesen des Christentums', (vol VII) 3rd and enlarged edition in 1848-9. 'Das Wesen der Religion' followed in 1845 (vol I). 'Vorlesungen über das Wesen der Religion' (vol VIII,) in 1851 and 'Theogonie', nach den Quellen des hebraischen, römischen und griechischen Altertums, (vol IX) in 1857. These and other writings occupy ten substantial volumes in a collected edition begun in 1846. "Theogonie" was intended to be his swan-song, (though a supplement was added later, "Zur Theogonie"), his whole system presented in/

in compact form. With it he would revive his oriental Latin and Greek linguistic studies and with them his youth in which they had their roots and then make an end. He confesses that the youngest is always the most beloved and so 'Theogonie' is the most prized. His only regret was that outward circumstances are so unfavourable." Up to the present indeed I have had no lack of will nor of mind and material, but I lack the agreeable locality, the nest for the hatching out of my thoughts, and alas I belong to the birds which carry on their task of propagation only in a special place... But it is better to end as a swan than as a talkative goose."

These last words refer to the unfortunate bankruptcy of the porcelain factory at Schloss Bruckberg which had been his home for nearly 25 years and his removal to Dorf Reckenberg in the neighbourhood of Nuremberg and especially to the very uncomfortable quarters he had to put up with there. Feuerbach wrote in his diary (Grün vol II p4):—

"Bruckberg was with my limited means the basis of my economics, but economics is the basis of Philosophy and morals," and later he wrote "My parting from Bruckberg is the parting of soul and body. I have signed today my contract of rent with H.V.B., and with it haply I have signed my death-warrant." Not very brave words perhaps, but F. confessed elsewhere that his was not the heroic spirit which could rise superior to its chains. In addition to these troubles his health began to fail; first in 1866 a slight shock/

shock befell him, then another in 1870 and the end came in September 1872.

A wider public had become aware of his necessities. In 1862 a grant of 900 thalers had been made by the Schiller Foundation, to be spread over three years. Karl Grün with whom he had much correspondence, later published, on Christmas 1871 handed over a considerable present of money from a group of friends with the kindly words "It is not forgotten by us, as it ought not to be forgotten by the whole German people that you are that critic who has never taken anything from man without giving it back to him again two or three times over, whose "Essence of Christianity" was the enrichment of man alone and whose "Theogonie" was in single-hearted fashion the apotheosis of human development".

Some evidence of the respect and appreciation in which he was held was revealed in the huge concourse which gathered at his funeral, 20,000, it is said, in the famous Johannis Kirchhof at Nuremberg. It was arranged (Bolin, p. 340) by the Social-Democratic Labour Party, of which since 1870 Feuerbach had been a member. That death makes strange companions of us all is instanced in the fact that this was the resting place of Albrecht Durer, Hans Sachs and Wilibald Pirckheimer.

His wife with a sincere excess of devotion is reported to have said, "He was more than mortal, he was a god." But one finds less reason to excuse the orator who at the graveside began impressively "Auch die Götter sterben." Reading over these/

these farewell and commemorative speeches, it is hard for us today to envisage a situation in which they have reality. What strange misinterpretations of Christianity must have been in the minds of people, under the influence of Pietist and Puritan, to make this rebound from the heavenly realities back to the uncertain joys of this earth!

But here are some quotations which bring the situation near to us. "He it is to whom we are debtors and whom the coming generation yet in another fashion will thank, who above all has torn down the curtain which separated and divided us from our proper selves, who has torn away the veil and the bonds which for thousands of years through the hands of priests has been laid on the eyes and hearts of men and as a result of which our race pictured itself on our earth as on a place of cursing, a vale of woe, imagined that everything high, beautiful, noble, everything divine is to be found only beyond and above us, not in ourselves, which imagined we must first die in order to come into possession of all these highest goods, for there above behind the stars, behind the arch of heaven dwelt the great God and there only is true eternal life, there in the beautiful other land. This dream of mankind it is which Ludwig Feuerbach, he at least before all, once for all has destroyed and shattered to pieces... The world is one, eternal and infinite, and there is no above and below, present age and age to come. The highest revelation of the world's/

world's being is the self-conscious spirit in us, in our conscience, our reason, in collective humanity and history. Religion is not supernatural, not from outside or above, but it is much rather the characteristic work of Mankind, its proper feeling, seeing hoping, thinking, a product of its very self... What was the inner force and pressure of his being... Love of truth."

If one may be permitted to criticise such an address after the lapse of years has robbed our words of any impropriety, we may remark that the closing reference, (not quoted), to the distress of ~~his~~ ^{Feuerbach's} life and his consequent sympathy with the masses hardly realises the picture of the blissfulness of this present life. And when the appeal is made to close the ranks and hold by the common idea of Humanity that the spirit of ~~us~~ ^{Feuerbach's} may continue with them, it sounds a little vague to pour water into vessels that will soon be broken, and ask them to abandon the present comfort of a better life beyond the grave. Nor does it seem quite satisfactory to say, "Thy body we render home to the Mother who has borne us all: thy spirit we preserve for ourselves as our holiest bequest which shall never be taken away from us." A good name is certainly a noble legacy, but surely the man is more than the name, and what right has man, a creature of time, to say that our holiest bequests shall never be taken away.

Poems many in number and varying in quality poured from the pens of enthusiastic admirers. Of great importance was the/

the address on behalf of the Social Democratic party, not lacking in comprehensiveness certainly, (Kohut p 350) "In the name of all Social Republicans of the earth, in the name of the International Workers' Association in the name of the Social-Democrat Party of Germany, in the name of his friends, Vaillant, Karl Marx, Johann Jacoby, Bebel and Liebknecht I lay this well-earned laurel wreath on the bier of the noble dead."

These names show how Feuerbach's teaching had been appropriated by the school of economic materialism. Religion being an illusion and Necessity in the form of human economic needs being the paramount impulse, how easy to use the great literary skill of this writer for their ends.

How wide has the influence of Feuerbach been? That is not easy to determine. In the preface to the second edition of W.C. Feuerbach says "quite contrary to aim and expectation my writing has found a universal public." Certainly it has gone through many editions, reaching the fourth in 1881 and the tenth and twelyth in 1923, also it has found its way into Kröners Taschenausgabe, along with a 'Pierre Bayle', "Unsterblichkeit," V.W.R. and it is also, I believe, in Reclam's inexpensive issue. At the same time it is not easy to get copies of these. A Ludwig Feuerbach Gesellschaft was founded by William Bolin of Helsingfors to work out the implications of his teaching, theoretically and/

and practically, but I know only the writings of Bolin and Jodl.

His name is appearing however with strange persistence in many writings of to-day, as I have mentioned earlier, and there are reasons for this in the mood as well as in the thought of our generation.

Before we estimate the truth of his theory we must first give a statement of the contents of several of the books which express his views.

"Pierre Bayle" is for his philosophy
the primitive mist which contains though
in shapeless form the future world.
(Harsanyi, p. 11)

Chapter iv.

SUMMARY AND SURVEY

OF THE CHIEF WRITINGS

OF FEUERBACH.

SECTION

I. PIERRE BAYLE

" Pierre Bayle" is for his philosophy
the primitive mist which contains though
in shapeless form the future world. "

(Starcke,p89)

Summary and Survey of the chief writings of Feuerbach.

Feuerbach hated to keep diaries and so never set himself to compile an autobiography. In his letters to Grün and Klap we have however a sufficient record of the events of his life and his reactions toward them. It was a different matter with regard to the progress of his own writings. Chapters one and two of his V W R are of special interest in this connection, while the Preface to the Collected Works contains amid much self-analysis and biographical reference a somewhat pathetic utterance as to the passage of time and the changes which it brings. It is with reluctance, he says, that he issues this edition. "How can I swim against the stream of life and go backwards instead of forwards?" Yet as so often happens reflection won the victory over contrary feelings. He perceived that if his earlier and discarded positions were still used as weapons by his adversaries yet the dust of dead books might serve as fertiliser for new productions.

We shall not dwell upon the changes in the course of his thought for sufficient has been said of this in a previous chapter. It is enough to remark that he considered the reversal of his position to be so great that he could say of himself, "The true philosophy is no philosophy." Our aim is to give a summary and survey of the writings that give most fully and clearly his characteristic positions.

The important 'Grundsätze' der Philosophie der Zukunft" (S. W. II 269-346) 1843, is more suitably dealt with in the course of the critical part of the Thesis, especially Chap. V. section 4,5.

"PIERRE BAYLE", published in 1838 seems to me to be of the greatest importance, giving a disclosure of his mind not just at one particular/

icular time but as subconscious background that coloured even his after-thoughts.

It is, he says, (Pref. S.W.) written from the point of view of Rationalism and therefore stands opposed to his opinions expressed in W C. yet he admits that W C. is influenced by it, and there is no doubt that this is so, not only in the supremacy given to reason but also in the bias against religion and the 'crimes of religion' which are there discussed. Lange, as we have seen, is criticised by Bolin for saying that Feuerbach leaves us with an unattached Reason hanging in the air. It is contended that he sought a realistic monism in which the dualism of sense and understanding is suspended if not superseded. While that is his aim, no doubt, it is true to say that Feuerbach remains in the grip of reason and the laws of the cold intellect. Miracle is bugbear all through. Always a plea is made for an independent Science and Art, and religion is depreciated because Christian truth, being Christian only, cannot really be true. In 'Bayle' also is raised the question whether Nature and Reason can be equated, as is so often supposed, or if there be left in the end an irrational surd explicable only to the Supreme Reason, if any such exist.

'Pierre Bayle, a Contribution to the History of Philosophy and Mankind', as it was designated, appeared in 1838 when Feuerbach had married and taken up his residence at Bruckberg. It is found in vol. 6 S.W.

It continued his study of the history of modern philosophy and increased his prestige while it stiffened the opposition against him. Was it not tempting Providence, he admitted, to

to issue a book with such a title, only the name of the 'bad Bayle', who broke the peace of the pre-established harmony of Leibnitz, the loose sceptic, the dialectical guerilla chieftan of all anti-dogmatic polemic. Bayle's character and significance for the history of philosophy lie for the greater part already behind us, consisting chiefly as it does in his negative relation to theology (Chap 9). Feuerbach's concern therefore is to show the conflict between Faith and Reason, Religion and Morality, as it survives to-day, and he proposes to do this by illuminating the sensitive spots and incidentally making reference to his own position. That he desired to make use of the opportunity for this last purpose is frankly avowed. That chapter 4 should begin with the words, "Nun zurück zu Bayle" is of itself significant.

We are left to gather from other sources the details of Bayle's life and letters. They may be briefly stated as follows. Born in 1647 he learned both Calvinism and Catholicism, as he changed from the first to the second and then again back to the first.

Acting as professor at Sedan from 1675-81, he also occupied the chair at Rotterdam. The attacks of the theologians, especially of Jurieu, led to the cancelling of his licence, and so fretted his genial nature as to intensify the malady from which he eventually died in December 1706. His criticism of the traditional ideas of God and his relation to the world, exposing the contradiction between his power and his goodness, and so making the problem of evil central wounded not only rationalistic theology but also the revelation which he professed, and most probably with sincerity, to defend.

In order to find a place for philosophy and Morality independent of religion Feuerbach feels that he must declare that religion is hostile and contradictory to both. To this he is forced, he says, by the actions and claims of religion. In Catholicism the spirit is set free

over against the flesh, while in Protestantism faith opposes reason. This opposition is characteristic of Christianity, for whereas unity is the essence of classical paganism, dualism is the essence of Christianity. Christianity indeed adds to the many contradictions which are unavoidable and which paganism must accept superfluous ones : to the necessary and immanent struggle she adds soulshaking transactions, to bodily pains spiritual, to natural contradictions supernatural : God and the world are separated, heaven and earth, grace and nature, spirit and flesh, faith and reason. While the opposition of Church and State is only an outward expression of this attitude, the characteristic inner contradiction is that between Nature and grace, or more briefly and in the language of the Church, between spirit and flesh.

Here we see that Feuerbach's interpretation of Christianity is to be governed by the ascetic unworldly or otherworldly view of it. Over against this stands the life which gladly accepts the world, flesh and man, and establishes Art Science and Morality on an independent basis. Science begins in truth only where the scientific/~~man~~ spirit begins and this begins just where the sciences pass beyond the cloister into the hands of free men. (p 19) The Christian artist must represent what is Christian not as Christian but as beautiful. (p 10)

Does this otherworldly asceticism apply to Protestantism ? Yes theoretically if not practically, for Protestantism annulled the opposition of Catholicism between flesh and spirit, as for example in/

in the marriage of Luther. But why should not reason be free as well as Nature ? Quite in the spirit of Schelling and Hegel he declares, Nature is physical Reason. " Protestantism has no outward means to still the pains of the soul, since reason is bound up with man's very existence and he must in the last instance seek to put to rest the doubts which come from Reason by reasons which come from Reason herself. --- Poor man ! he has for his source of healing only the source of evil. The desires of the flesh are like insects, but the desires of the impulse of knowledge are like worms in the intestines.-- If peace comes, it is not the peace of truth, of reason, but of thoughtlessness or laziness or self-deception." This contradiction of Faith and Reason is found already in Luther and Calvin: "The Scripture is more than all men's thoughts feelings and experience," says the former : but it has become more evident in recent times.

A closer determination of this contradiction leads to an eloquent and incisive chapter, ch. 3, on the nature of Theology and Science and the conflict between them. In place of Science we may put Philosophy, p 33, because "Philosophy is the Science which alone represents the idea of Science absolutely, the spirit of Science as spirit separated from definite stuff."

The spirit of science is the universal spirit, p 31, the spirit absolutely, the ~~UNIVERSAL~~ nameless spirit. Theology is essentially Christian theology, its principle is not truth as such, but the Christian truth, what is true as Christian. Particularism is its being. Whoever considers heathendom from the standpoint of Christianity/

Christianity considers it falsely, unscientifically. Historical truth is given only when we deal with history in a purely scientific spirit. Science frees the spirit so that ~~the~~ love, truth, humanity are always found on the side of the scientists, p 32.

"Render to Reason the things which belong to Reason and to Art the things which belong to Art."

And now we have one of those frank descriptions of the scientific method which clarify the situation. The mere 'Dass' (fact or statement) suffices for religious consideration, but the 'Wie' and 'Wodurch' is the kernel of the study of Nature, e.g. how the organs are built, how used, in what does their nourishment consist. Questions of the wisdom and the goodness to be found in them lie outside Nature. These are subjective, in the mood of the beholder, and wonder at them may become wonder before a supernatural Being of Might Goodness and Wisdom.

What Feuerbach was seeking to get rid of was the idea of adaptation used in a petty and imaginative way, so that actual enquiry was set aside for 'Astrotheology', Lithotheology, Hydrotheology, Insecttheology, on the basis of which proofs for the existence of God multiplied and at one time were reckoned at 6561.

No direct view of Nature could be obtained for the idea of an external God was an intervening barrier. Occasionalism was the necessary consequence. Teleology appears to have good in it in so far as it makes us perceive the rational in Nature, but it is only appearance. Man remains in consequence outside Nature always

This vindication of the independent study of Nature is remarkable/

able for an eloquent passage in which Feuerbach admits that the scientists of the last century, the XVIII, were too limited in their observation of individual facts. They lacked the deeper sense of Nature in general. What Nature was to their God that she was to themselves -- a mere machine. For the most of them there was no Zug, no drawing to the home, no apprehension of kinship with her being, but rather a state of surprise, a wonder concerning this mysterious being, an external amazement, not an admiration springing from the deep, a mere curiosity and consequently in the first instance the attention was chiefly directed to 'curiosa' or oddities.

As for theology, she has succumbed completely to the marvellous so that Miracle, the will in its caprice and ignorance is the basis upon which it rests : its metaphysical principle is 'Creation out of nothing' for it tends to derive everything from God; 'nothing' being in this case simply the ontological or metaphysical expression of the groundless, the pure will.

While theology denies a natural origin for Christianity, philosophy affirms it has. Religion is an essential form of the human spirit, as Volksggeist, and so Christianity has a natural beginning, first in the very nature of religion, and again as the creature of a definite historical period, the downfall of the nation. We know the good not only through itself but through the unhappiness of evil. Christianity has to thank for its purity, its strictness, its consistency the political and moral corruption of the time.

Miracle which occupies a large place in Feuerbach's thought and

and is constantly being referred to in his writings is described here as a natural necessity. It is a form of representation in popular religion not in Christianity only although in the case in the case of the latter there are differences in kind and aim. "The belief in miracle is the essence of miracle." To take miracle as historical fact is to deceive oneself.

What then is a Fact ? The answer given is, "That which in the moment it happens shuts out the possibility of being otherwise and consequently for the beholder shuts out the possibility of the doubt which the assertion that it is and that it so is directed and necessarily brings with it." One cannot say that this definition of Feuerbach's is very enlightening or comprehensive. It deals only with an immediate and overwhelming experience, and for one so interested as he is in Science there appears no scope or need for reflection, investigation, comparison etc.

What galls him, however, is the superficial view of Nature implied in the idea of miracle. Nature for such a doctrine is a common trivial thing upon which spectacular inroads must be made to reveal to us the spirit of God. But in fact the miraculous, the divine spirit above Nature and ruling over Nature is solely Law in Nature: Law not as a dead letter but the living deeply sensitive Spirit, the inner creative all-determining soul of Nature herself.

Chapter 4 urges the independence of Morality from Religion as previously the argument has been for the separation of Science from

from Theology and it involves a defence of Atheism as compatible with morality. Morality is Nature and Nature is Reason incarnate, so that Reason and Nature may safely be left to guide our actions. At the same time these two are not identical for the true principle of human actions is temperament, the natural tendency to pleasure or pain, certain customs accepted in intercourse with our friends or otherwise a cheerful feeling which has its basis in our nature. "A society of atheists would exhibit civic and moral virtues just as well as any other society if they only strictly punished crime and joined the ideas of honour and shame to certain things." "If the French court had been atheistic, would there have been a Bartholemew's night ? " There are laws of ~~Nature~~ ~~which~~ thought not dependent on the will of man which by themselves and not as a result of free choice are right and true: vain and ludicrous would be the resistance of the human spirit against the being and qualities of these laws---- : so there are laws of action which flow from natural necessity, the most general rule being ' according to Reason '.

If it be said that the crimes of Religion, so frequently to the fore in discussions such as this, are not of the essence of religion, the reply made here is, First, Holiness is the highest category of religion and its subjective form is Faith which makes the object of faith a mystery to insolent eyes. But Holiness is not an original conception which as such belongs to Philosophy, because it depends on the conception of truth rationality morality, for only the true is holy though not yet is the holy true.
Secondly/

Secondly, religion becomes of necessity positive, a state-religion or a religion whose substance is the Church, a matter of inheritance and opinion bound to time and place. Even Protestantism which restored the purity and inwardness of religion became outward, formal dogmatic. God becomes a formal 'Pflicht-objekt'. Faith is duty to God, theoretical doubt becomes a crime of *lèse majesté*, for religion is a matter of the honour of the Godhead. The duties of man to man become a subordinate matter.

Thirdly, Feuerbach sums up this criticism, p 84, by the assertion that Theology tears Ethics up by the roots, seeing that she pushes the Good beyond man and takes from him his best, his true God, in order to give him instead an external foreign deity.

Chapter five continues the discussion of the independence of Morality and describes the nature and the place of Reason. Even the Roman Catholics admit neither Scripture nor Church nor Miracle can do anything against the laws of reason, as, for example in the case of the proposition that the whole is ever greater than the part. The last appeal is to reason and without it dogma totters.

Feuerbach has no doubt that Reason is "a clear and lively only light which lightens all men so soon as they turn the eyes of their attention and convinces them without contradiction of its truth and warrants them in the conclusion that it is God, that it is essential and the/substantial truth itself which lightens us directly through itself and causes to appear in their being the ideas of the eternal truths which lie in the universal principles and concepts of Metaphysics." p 89.

Wrongly/

Wrongly do the Epicureans think the witness of the senses to be the rule and test of truth, though they are right in maintaining that our senses cannot be subject to deception as they are the first rule of our knowledge and the origin of truth in the soul. It is absolutely necessary that Reason decide between different lawgivers. 'If any set against it a supposed revelation of God -- it is more reasonable to reject the testimony of Criticism and Grammar than the witness of Reason. If one does not grant that, it is all up with our faith (so ist es aus mit unserm Glauben). p 94.

In separating the special sciences as well as Ethics from Religion Bayle rendered a great service. Hold to Reason, says Feuerbach God is also in you, though not in name yet what is more in being. The name matters nothing. What concerns us is the determination, the concept.

So long as Scholasticism held sway, the separate sciences could not develop but first in Kant and Fichte philosophy and so ethics became independent. Critical as he is of these two writers elsewhere Feuerbach indulges in words of generous praise toward them here. In the Categorical Imperative Kant was the first to write a Grammar of Ethics in contrast to what had previously been only doctrines of happiness. Fichte nobler than Kant was the hero who alone brought to the world for sacrifice the whole power beauty and majesty of the moral idea. --. His ideas are strict, in part almost superhuman. But Ethics is no pedagogue whose business it is to teach and apply the empirical means to virtue. Ethics cannot /

cannot capitulate, fawn upon men, accomodate herself to his weakness, she must rather the more affright, shock, crush to pieces.

If the theologians say that this morality is too abstract and negative, their idea of religion is only a glorified self-seeking to which morality is simply a means and goodness only a predicate of personality and sacrifice only because of the reward. And so Feuerbach concludes in praise of Ethics, "Only Ethics is the true religion ; it is the spirit of reason, the openly outspoken, the self-evidenced, the spirit which does not conceal itself, going behind pictures of the phantasy, not hiding itself in dark symbols and confused ideas. " " Religion is nothing else than the universal love, conformable to reason, but love to men is the only true love." The theology which sets itself above Ethics is injurious to states. Only for that man to whom Ethics is theology, duties toward men duties toward God is duty a divine necessity, a judgment in the last instance, an infallibility, a vis primitiva, an indissoluble Bindecraft, an Entelechie des Willens, -- in short and what more can man say -- a truth.

Chapter six continues the discussion of the Conflict of Dogma and Reason.

Bayle's opponents being the rationalistic theologians who maintained that Scripture and the understanding were contradictory, Feuerbach goes into several details where we need not follow. Leibnity, we are told, out of gallantry to the Queen undertook to confute Bayle's objections to the agreement of Faith and Reason, but

but he pushes his own ideas between the dogmas and Bayle's objections. For Bayle the dogma of the Fall is "This St Bartholemew night of the ~~XXXX~~ intelligence." The explanations of theology are unconvincing. Why did God allow sin? To say that He only permitted it is to make Him a mere spectator. If it was to give man freedom, this indeed was a costly gift. If to reveal His glory as the skill of a steersman is best revealed in stormy times, then He loves His glory more than all His creatures.

Thus we have the conclusion, not without interest in view of recent developments of Calvinism, Protestant theologians sacrifice their reason and most holy doctrine to the Honour of God. Their last defence is the unsearchableness and incomprehensibility of God. (p.131.6.)

The next chapter, the seventh, continues still further the description of Reason as in Bayle and the theologians. To the latter she is simply a maid who is justified in speaking only of the common things of life but not of the higher: or, at the highest a concubine to whom only by night behind the back of his faith and in contradiction to her commands and therefore with anxious heart he makes furtive fleeting visits. But in Bayle Reason is the companion of one's life, the friend of his soul, the spouse with whom he is bound by the harmony of inclination thought and character.

Amid this eloquence it is important to notice that Feuerbach lays great stress upon the necessity of philosophising, speaking in/

in terms of praise of Descartes in this connection. From the man who was later to say, 'My Philosophy is no Philosophy', and by his sensationalism and nominalism to destroy its foundations, it is strange to find this saying, 'Philosophy is a necessity as much as Art is a necessity' p 143-4. 'The effects of philosophy are infinite but they are spiritual and therefore they withdraw themselves from the eyes. Only the unknowing can mistake them.'

He is more at home when he challenges the claim of the theologians to deal with facts. The present, he says, is the being, the soul of fact. The present fact I must believe, the mediate fact is a conviction in which the original fails us. It has been transformed in the blue haze of the power of ideas and imagination which involuntarily after lapse of years change the objects of the past. But the faith in facts as truths, in so-called dogmatic facts is the pure blank superstition of the necromancer; it only exists where faith in spirit is dead. A historical truth is just a historical truth, nothing more, not a divine truth subsisting for itself p. 151

If it is said that for Bayle mystery remains and that he continued in the Church as a Protestant, the reply of Bayle is quoted, "The mysteries contradict only the small miserable reason of man which is only one portion of reason not Reason itself." Yet Feuerbach feels constrained to add that Bayle's doubt was his fate the pressure of the world-spirit upon him. He believed but in contradiction with himself. He is an intellectual ascetic, a spiritual flagellant. His faith is a voluntary abstinence and Pönitz of his reason.

The concluding chapters, 8 and 9, give an excellent example of Feuerbach's powers of characterisation. Bayle is not one satisfied with empiricism: he has undeniable a philosophic spirit whereby 'the exact and full explanation of the least thing leads of necessity to the highest metaphysic'. In the possession of this spirit he differs from nearly all modern sceptics. He was no dogmatic sceptic, he was indeed sceptical about scepticism. An 'occasional' philosopher, he was also an 'occasional' sceptic, i.e. about definite objects and difficulties. p 219. Natural ties and circumstances bound him to the faith of his time, so that his scepticism reveals not Bayle himself but rather his relation to an external and respected power. Reason is meant to develop gradually within faith and out of faith, until she rise to such a recognition of herself as is to be found in Spinoza, one born out of faith and thus already a man of vocation and authority.

Again, p 222, Feuerbach emphasises the philosophic urge, 'an activity with true interest, and therefore an original activity', concerned only with what is highest first and original, something necessary indispensable which summons and claims the highest powers of men. But the condition for this is that man empty himself lose 'faith', become conscious of his need. With Kant such a philosophy is first revealed.

Although enjoyment does come with the exercise of this activity, there is nothing of utilitarian interest here. p 235. "The scientific/

scientific man is the objective man, for Science (equated here with philosophy) is itself the objective spirit in man because ^{that Science} of the fact/is the occupation with objects which express no immediate reference to the personal interests of men; even if these objects themselves should also be the most useful; the occupation, the activity is yet in the first place purely objective. In order to know them, one must put the utilitarian interest aside.

When man thinks only of his salvation he has no feeling for Science. Only he who can raise himself above himself is capable of grasping the sublimity of science. The first condition, and this is also the effect of Science upon man, is the quality of Objectivity (die Eigenschaft der Objectivität) which expresses itself morally as the virtue of righteousness, of impartiality, of truthfulness, of meekness, in ~~fact~~ short, as the virtue of freedom from oneself.

A curious quotation from Bayle on the necessity of the passions, instincts and even prejudices of men and women, unless the world is to collapse, leaves one wondering if Feuerbach himself is sensible of the power of 'blind instincts' and 'Nature' over against Reason. p 230. His comment is that Bayle here involuntarily wanders into Spinozism, 'that which in relation to us is blamable, unreasonable, ludicrous is in relation to the universe and the universal Reason, which considers the world-whole, unblamable perfectly good, praiseworthy. But the universal Reason remains with Bayle only an undetermined popular idea which furnishes no inner ground or conception; the true conception is the material impulse/

impulse, the power of Nature. --- The contradiction remains unsolved." But it was not Bayle's affair to remove contradictions. His significance is that he gives philosophy problems to solve without himself solving the riddle.

Does Feuerbach solve it by making Nature the body of Reason or, on discovering that Nature and man are full of crookedness, does he leave this problem of the power of Reason and her place in the universe unsettled, making up, as he says of Bayle and his contribution, for the scarcity of his gifts by the virtues of the giver?

In his estimate of Bayle there is much which reflects his own character, e.g. p 231 and influence; 'Bayle excites the appetite for philosophy, but he does not satisfy it. He gives us mere salt of which indeed a very great part has become tasteless for us, without appropriate foodstuff, nothing of the animal fare of the Leibnitz monad, nothing of the vegetable fare of the Spinozistic substance.'

And again p 217, "Bayle is not satisfied with Empiricism; he knows that it is nothing without philosophy or metaphysic; he ascends therefore their heights, but just as he is up upon them, the air becomes for him too thin for respiration and he does not remain init. He has, so to speak, no metaphysical persistence, he can give to the thought no substance, no endurance, it evades him as a shadow just when he is going to hold it fast; he betakes himself therefore quickly again from the heights of metaphysic down to the valleys of Empiricism which are more congenial to him."

To sum up this brief sketch in its relation to Feuerbach's

position/

position at this stage, we may say, negatively, that he has not yet definitely discovered the source of religious error to be in feeling or imagination, nor the process by which it works in projection, nor its influence on particular theological doctrines. He does however attack such theological ideas as the 'Honour of God' and the claim that dogma is superior to reason and thus, he says, to truth.

The fatal thing in religion is that it is utilitarian, personal and subjective. He seeks therefore the independence of Philosophy and Ethics from Theology and his argument is woven of several strands. We notice the emphasis he puts on the Dualism of Christianity whether Protestant or Roman Catholic, his definition of Philosophy as the spirit of Science, the universal spirit, objective impartial and impersonal, not content with the 'what' but seeking the 'how'. Nature is not a dead machine, but the body of reason, while Reason is a clear and lively light larger than man's, capable of containing mysteries and so capable of explaining even the passions and instincts of man.

Changes inevitable/^{ly} appeared in the position of Feuerbach as his mind developed, but it is correct to say, I think, that there are fundamental statements in/^{his} Bayle from which he never departed.

CHAPTER . IV.

Summary and Survey of the principal Works
dealing with Religion.

SECTION. 2/

D A S W E S E N

D E S C H R I S T E N T U M S .

" I know not what the world will do with this book,
or misdo, or entirely forbear to do, as is likeliest; but
this I could tell the world ---- You have not had for
a hundred years any book that comes more direct and flaming
from the heart of a living man."

Carlyle to his wife
on finishing 'The French Revolution.'

" Prayer, regarded as an internal **formal** worship of the
Deity, and so as a means of grace, is a superstitious de-
lusion. It is nothing more than an uttered wish..."

Kant. Religion within the Limits
of Pure Reason.

Section. 2. W.C.

" The Essence of Christianity "

We pass now to the consideration of the four larger theologic-
al writings of our author, in which are contained the maturing
development of his thought. As we shall note, they indicate chang-
ing moods amid the old hostility to Theology and the illusions
which it offers to men as the truth.

The first edition of Das Wesen des Christentums appeared in
1841, and we are told that it is impossible for a later generat-
ion to appreciate the effect made by its publication. " We are all
for the moment disciples of Feuerbach", wrote Frederick Engels.

Originally it was proposed to issue the book anonymously. Feu-
erbach wrote to his publisher, Otto Wigand, that there was a power-
ful attraction in this and that every name had its enemies. This
latter sentence may indicate not merely that the author had ex-
perienced many a tussle in the world of controversy but that he
had not as yet lost hope of a professor's chair. If not anonymous
the book might have such titles as, " γνῶθι σεαυτόν " oder
das Geheimnis der Religion und die Illusionen der Theologie, (not
it is to be noted, der Religion) Ein Beitrag zur Kritik der spec-
ulativ Religionsphilosophie, " or " Analysis der Geheimnisse der
christlichen Dogmatik", or " Religionsphilosophie vom Standpunkte
eines speculativen Rationalismus oder: im Sinne der genetische-
kritischen Philosophie." (Kohut p 170 & Schmidt p X)

But the publisher wanted the 'pull' of his name which after
all counted for something. It would of course bring down his en-

emies upon him. That could not be helped. Feuerbach had to face the truth that in hoping for preferment ~~he~~ at a University he was longing for the moon. There was even a satisfaction in setting down his name and challenging the world boldly. The subject of the book was as much popular as speculative, and apart from high moral motives he must not let slip the opportunity of a real hit. Thus it appeared with his name and the simple title.

In July 1854 the English translation came from the pen of George Eliot and it is remarkable that here alone in all her writings does she set down her real name, Marian Evans, (Engl Men of Letters, p 43).

Needless to say the book was received with varied feelings and remarks by the different parties of the theological and philosophical world. Arnold Ruge, the founder and publisher of the Hallische Jahrbücher für Kunst und Wissenschaft and afterwards similar Annals for Berlin, acclaimed Feuerbach as the founder of the only possible religious philosophy, the critic who dealt with Christianity as with other religions, making the religious needs themselves the object of investigation. Others wrote that Feuerbach expressed for them thoughts and conclusions to which they had long been inclined yet which they had not dared to confess.

Criticism, on the other hand was not lacking (v. Schmidt's edit. p XI). "Every theologian as theologian will and must criticise, says Feuerbach, but one must not be too hard on them, for they believe that all moral ties which for them have no ground in the nature of man are dissolved, that the framework of the universe is

overthrown

overthrown when their theological barracks collapse. "

To these critics our author gave vigorous response in his article in Ruge's Jahrbucher, 1842, "Zur Beurtheilung der Schrift, Das Wesen des Christentums", in the Preface to the second edition, and in a reply in the third person to Max Stirner's book, "Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum."

In the Preface to the 1st edition he points out that his book gives in a form concentrated yet expanded and well attested the occasional aphoristic and polemical thoughts of the author concerning religion and Christianity, theology and speculative philosophy. It contains the elements and only the critical elements be it noted of a philosophy of positive religion or revelation, but naturally as is to be expected, of a religious philosophy neither in the childish fantastic sense of our own Christian mythology, which allows every nurse's tale of history to impose itself as a fact, nor in the pedantic sense of our speculative religious philosophy, which sets forth, as did at one time Scholasticism, the articles of faith as logical metaphysical truth without more ado.....

Religion and philosophy are not to be identified. The 'Bild', picture or image constitutes for religion the essential difference. Religion is essentially dramatic. God himself is a dramatic, i.e., a personal Being. Whoever takes from religion the image takes from her the 'thing' itself and leaves only a caput mortuum in her hands. "Das Bild ist als Bild Sache," a phrase anticipating chapter 9 of 'Theogonie' where the symbol is also the thing. These are not considered as a mystic pragmatology as in Christian mythology, nor as/

Section 2. W.C.

as ontology as by the speculative religious philosophy, but as 'psychische Pathologie'.

His method throughout, he says, is objective, that of analytical chemistry, and consequently documentary evidence is given at every point. For the greater part these testimonies refer to a past age but that was the classical age of Christianity, whereas the present form of religion --- it takes six adjectives to describe it --- 'feigen, characterlosen, Komfortabeln, belletristischen, koketten, epicureischen Christentum.'

The history of theology has long proved a posteriori what Feuerbach proves a priori, viz., that the essence of theology is anthropology. Hegel's method is therefore perfectly rightly grounded: the history of dogma is a criticism of dogma. Although the infinite freedom and personalism of modern times has mastered the Christian religion so that the difference between the creative Holy Spirit of divine revelation and the apprehending human spirit is long abolished, the supernatural and superhuman character of the ancient time peeps out, at least appearing as a ghost in our heads. We go back to the question, What was this ghost in the first instance?

The preface to the second edition opens with a section which Miss Evans omits on the ground that it has too specific a reference to transient German politics to interest the English reader. But these four pages are a significant summary of the opponents (and their charges against him. In his writing they declare) whom Feuerbach attacked. Present-day Christianity, even ancient Christianity has been reduced to general principles, the speculative/

ative philosophy had been robbed of its honour in the concord it established between religion and philosophy, the so-called positive philosophy can no longer claim a 'personality' more than human flesh and blood. Finally apart from the offending of good taste he has weakened the power of religion as a political weapon for the subjugation and oppression of man, and antagonised those who regard religion as politically indifferent and consequently are friends to it in the sphere of industry and politics but in the sphere of religion itself are enemies of light and freedom.

Amid these conditions he exclaims, "Schein ist das Wesen der Zeit." The police are the boundaries between truth and science. The man who has character and hits the nail on the head is worthy of death !

The rest of the Preface is valuable as a statement of his aims and method, his relation of criticism toward Hegel especially, but also toward Jacobi and Schleiermacher. Though the general public, he says, will be able to follow his straightforward style, only appreciate the scholar will fully/the references of his work to many philosophical writings, for it has a necessary logical basis in history. "My work contains and applies in the concrete the principle of a new philosophy suited not to the schools but to man, yet it contains that principle only by evolving it out of the very core of religion." "This work is nothing but a faithful rigid historical-philosophical analysis of religion, the revelation of religion to itself, the awakening of religion to self-consciousness." He is not to be considered, however, as a mere historical critic who analyses/

Section 2. W.C.

analyses and dissolves the miracles as does Lutzelberger, nor is he a critic of Biblical Theology like Bauer, nor of Dogmatic Theology like Strauss.

" This philosophy has for its principle, not the Substance of Spinoza, nor the Ego of Kant and Fichte, nor the Absolute Identity of Schelling, nor the Absolute Mind of Hegel, in short, no abstract merely conceptual Being, but a real Being, the true 'Ens realissimum', -- Man : its principle is therefore in the highest degree positive and real." p IX

" I differ toto caelo from those philosophers who pluck out their eyes that they may see better. This philosophy is essentially distinguished from the systems hitherto prevalent, in that it corresponds to the real the complete nature of man." p VIII. Both in substance and in speech it places philosophy in the negation of philosophy, i.e. it declares that alone to be the true philosophy which is converted ' in succum et sanguinem', which is incarnate in man.

In words which Hegel would not have accepted as a true description of his teaching he asserts his direct opposition to the Hegelian philosophy, "I do not generate the object from the thought, but the thought from the object, and I hold that alone to be an object which has an existence beyond one's own brain... My philosophy generates thought from the opposite of thought, from matter from existence, from the senses: it has its relation to ~~its~~ object first through the senses, i.e., passively, before defining it in thought." " Speculation makes philosophy say only what it has itself /

self thought and expressed far better than religion: it assigns a meaning to religion without any reference to the actual meaning of religion: it does not look beyond itself. I, on the contrary, let religion itself speak. I constitute myself only its listener and interpreter, not its prompter. .. It is not I but religion that worships man, although religion or rather theology denies this.' 8

That his work is negative, destructive, he admits, but only be it noted with regard to the un-human elements of religion. The two parts of his book are complementary. The first exhibits religion in its essence, its truth, the second in its contradictions. In the first I show that the true sense of theology is anthropology, that there is no distinction between the predicates of the divine and human nature, and consequently no distinction between the divine and human subject. I say consequently, for wherever, as is specially the case in theology, the predicates are not accidents but express the essence of the subject, there is no distinction between subject and predicate, the one can be put in the place of the other: on which point I refer the reader to the Analytics of Aristotle or even merely to the Introduction of Porphyry. p XI.

In the second Part, which as Kant would say is a kind of Critique of religion, he shows that where a distinction is made between subject and predicate absurdities result, e.g. with regard to 'Son of God' which expresses as divine a relation that is really human, that is so explained in Part I, but in Part II it is shown that a different, non-human understanding of it involves one in absurdities. If the first explanation be true, the second is false. This/

This result is of course a consequence of the fact that the first deals with religion, the second with theology.

To the charge that he is reducing religion to a nullity, to a pure illusion, he replies that he is really exalting anthropology to ~~XXXXXXXX~~ theology, and points out that he does not take anthropology in the sense of the Hegelian or any other philosophy but in a sense infinitely higher and more general. So later (p 55, E.T.) he states that the anthropomorphism of the Incarnation is a worthy idea. "Religion is the dream of the human mind", he declares, yet it has its object upon earth, only that object is transformed. "I change the object as it is in the imagination (in der Vorstellung oder Einbildung) into the object as it is in reality." But the love of illusion and appearance is great, truth is disregarded and dishonoured.

Of this preface we may say that while it reveals the intellectual acuteness of Feuerbach it discloses also the limiting intellectual conditions under which he worked and which concealed from him the weakness of his position.

As for the book itself, in addition to the two main sections mentioned, there is to be found at the beginning an introductory chapter dealing with first, The Essential Nature of Man, and second, The Essence of Religion considered generally. This very important chapter was written, we are told, (G.W I, 200) after the essential part of the book was finished. At the close of the book there is given us, according to Feuerbach's custom, an Appendix of extraordinary in-

terest with numerous remarks or explanations, illustrations, citations. Of these introductory sections it might be said that ~~they~~ in themselves they give sufficient material for discussion, without dealing with the particular application of the principles there set forth to the details of the Christian doctrine. They will afford the basis of our criticism of Feuerbach's position later.

In the first section, "The Essential Nature of Man", our author has to prepare the way for his own theory as Science (i.e. grounded in fundamental principles) as well as for the special theory that in religion man makes himself the object of worship.

We notice three propositions, 1st, Religion is identical with the distinctive characteristic of man, which is self-consciousness. " In this characteristic man is apart from the animals, for consciousness in the strictest sense is present only in a being to whom his species, his essential nature, is an object of thought." 2nd, This specific self-consciousness is consciousness of the infinite, i.e. of man's infinite nature, i.e. of man as a species. 3rd. " Consciousness of the infinite is nothing else than the consciousness of the infinity of consciousness." This last proposition may be said to strike the key-note of Feuerbach's philosophy.

When man is considered a little closer, he is found to be composed of Reason, Will, Love. These are the constituent elements of his nature which he neither has nor makes but is. In these three elements the individual can be dominated by man as Universal or can make them infinite affirmations and so experience infinite joy. These activities are perfections. " Assuredly every being loves/
loves/

loves itself, its existence -- and fitly so. To exist is a good. "Alles", sagt Bacon, "was des Seins würdig, ist auch würdig des Wissens." Everything that exists has value, is a being of distinction -- at least this is true of the species : hence it asserts, maintains itself. But the highest form of self-assertion, the form which is itself a superiority, a perfection, a bliss, a good, is consciousness." Of course as an individual man can and must feel himself to be limited, thus being distinguished from the beast, but his awareness of limitation is only possible because he perceives the infinitude the perfection of his species. Vanity comes in when a man piques himself on his outward form as being his individual form and not a specimen of human beauty in general, and error appears when a man identifies himself ~~with~~ and his inevitable limitations with the species directly.

'Man is nothing without an object (p4 E T)' But the object to which to which a subject essentially necessarily relates, is nothing else than this subject's own but objective nature, "The power of the object over him is therefore the power of his own nature". "We can affirm nothing without affirming ourselves." "The object of the intellect is is intellect objective to itself; the object of feeling is feeling objective to itself."

These and other sentences make plain the anthropocentric tenets of our author and at times they have quite a Hegelian flavour, as when he says, 'the discrepancy between the understanding and the nature, between the power of conception and the power of production in the individual consciousness, on the one hand, is merely of individual/

dividual significance and has not a universal application; and on the otherhand it is only apparent."

These words culminate in the sentence, p 8 E T. "The eye of the brute reaches no farther than its needs and its nature no farther than its needs. And so far as thy nature reaches, so far reaches thy unlimited self-consciousness, so far art thou God."

To make feeling alone the object of the infinite, as do Jacobi and Schleiermacher, is to abolish the distinction between specific religious and non-religious feeling. The latter writer is condemned also for being too cowardly to confess a theology without a God. "He seeks a God outside feeling, and hence arises the old question, 'Does God exist?' "

Along such lines as these does Feuerbach enunciate one of his fundamental principles, "Man cannot get beyond his true nature", a very ambiguous statement, indeed, but the key to Humanism always.

In the next section, "The Essence of Religion considered generally", the same abstract reasoning is followed. This essence hidden from the religious is evident to the thinker, i.e., to Feuerbach who regards it objectively.

Already he has laid down, 1st, that the object of the senses is out of man, 2nd, the religious object is within him, 3rd, the object of any subject is nothing else than the subject's own nature taken objectively. And now he declares it is our task to show that the antithesis of divine and human is altogether illusory, nothing else than the antithesis between human nature in general/

Chap 4.
Section 2. W.C.

general and the human individual, or rather " the human nature purified, freed from the limits of the individual man, made objective," i.e., human nature in general is our human infinite.

We must remember of course that there is no such thing as an existence in general. Qualities are the fire, the vital breath of existence. Man takes a point of view above himself, above his own nature, the absolute measure of his being : he distinguishes between what God is in himself and what he is for me. But this distinction and this transcendentalism is an illusion. The measure of the/^{Race}~~species~~ is the absolute measure law and criterion of man, and as for the nature of God if the predicates are human the subject also is human.

The identity of Subject and Predicate is illustrated in the course of the development of religion, which consists specifically in this, that man abstracts more and more from God and attributes more and more to himself, (p 21 & 31). There is also a parallel movement between the idea of God and of man. " Where man inhabits houses, he also encloses his gods in temples. The temple is only a manifestation of the value which a man attaches to beautiful buildings." "Physical strength is an attribute of the Homeric gods: Zeus is the strongest of the gods."

"Not the attribute of the divinity but the divineness or deity of the attribute is the first true Divine Being," according to this primitive view. The reverse is true. "Thus what the theologians and philosophers have held to be God, the Absolute, the Infinite is not God: but that which they have held not to be God is God, namely/

Section 2. W.C.

namely the attribute, the quality, whatever has reality.... The fact is, not that a quality is divine because God has it, but that God has it because it is divine in itself."

With the unification of several, and those contradictory attributes, especially in personal form, the origin of religion is lost sight of, above all the fact that the true subject has been "converted by the activity of the reflective power into a predicate distinguishable or separable from the subject. "Man, especially the religious man, is to himself the measure of all ^{reality.} ~~things~~ " Whatever strongly impresses a man he personifies as a divine being, and this dictum appears in Feuerbach's later works repeatedly.

Religion has no material exclusively its own: everything existing has been an object of religious reverence, i.e. has been treated imaginatively. As for the infinite attributes of God, every new man is a new predicate, a new phase of humanity, and so humanity has infinite attributes. Only in the realm of the senses, only in space and time, does there exist a being of really infinite qualities or predicates.

Time and not the Hegelian dialectic is the medium of uniting opposites, contradictories, in one and the same subject, (i.e. successive acts of the same man doing different things). But distinguished and detached from the nature of man, and combined with the idea of God, the infinite fulness of various predicates is a concept without reality, a mere phantasy, a concept derived from the sensible world but without the essential conditions, without the truth of sensible, a concept which stands in direct contradiction/

ion with the divine Being considered as a spiritual, i.e., an abstract, simple, single being, for the predicates of God are precisely of this character, that one involves all the others, because there ~~is~~ no real difference between them.

This discussion of Subject and Predicate naturally brings in the theory of Spinoza. In his case Substance can have an indefinite number of predicates, because it itself has properly no predicate. It is a matter of indifference to know them. "Thought and extension are the real positive predicates. In these two infinitely more is said than in the nameless innumerable predicates, for they express something definite -- in them I have something. But substance is too ~~indifferent~~ indifferent, too apathetic to be something: i.e., to have qualities and passions: that it may not be something, it is rather nothing." (p 24).

All this brings Feuerbach back back to his position that in religious thought and experience the predicate is the true subject revealing what it is ; it is also proved that the divine predicates are attributes of human nature. "Religion of course knows nothing of these anthropomorphisms; to it they are not anthropomorphisms. It is the very essence of religion that to it these definitions express the nature of God. They are pronounced to be images only by the understanding which reflects on religion and which while defending them yet before its own tribunal denies them."

And now, p26, Feuerbach strikes at an objection which naturally would be raised, and by a tour de force bends it to his argument.

The abasement and self-depreciation which characterise the religious man is really the assertion of his ideal in the safer custody of the divine nature. The more human God ~~appears~~ becomes, the greater is the apparent difference between God and man. The positive in the divine is human, so the human in man can only be negative. What is the need of positing the same thing twice? By way of illustration, it may be pointed out that man denies his reason for he can only know of God what God reveals, he loses his personality that God may become personal, and refuses goodness/for God only is good. Yet the Holy is in opposition to me only as regards the modifications of my personality, but as regards my fundamental nature it is in unity with me. So with sin and the powerlessness to do good. These affirm the reality in God of that which is in my own nature. On p 28 and /In a note to p.29 a historical and doctrinal illustration is given when it is declared that the Augustinian doctrine of man's total corruption is only an inverted Pelagianism. Both say the same thing, both vindicate the goodness of man, but Pelagianism does it directly, in a rationalistic and moral form; Augustinianism indirectly, in a mystical, that is, a religious form. What to the latter is a subject is to the former an object.

But how does this remarkable inversion takes place? "Man, — this is the mystery of religion — projects his being into objectivity, and then again makes himself an object to this projected image of himself thus converted into a subject: he thinks of himself as an object to himself, but as the object of an object, of another being than himself.

In this projection man virtually retracts his nothingness and makes himself the end of God. "In and through God man has in view himself alone." And he makes a plausible reinforcement of his argument by an appeal to what is a theistic principle, "How could the divine activity work on me as its object, if it were essentially different from me ? "

This objectification of himself in religion is involuntary and as necessary to man as art or speech, but it is to be distinguished from what takes place in reflection and speculation when man sets himself up consciously for examination. Yet changes come with the times, the religion of self-abasement disappears, so that man claims less from God and more for himself. Compared with the Israelite who trusted himself to do nothing except what was commanded by God, the Christian is a free-thinker, leaving the external duties which occupied the Israelite to the man himself. The matter is summed up in the dictum, "What yesterday was religion is no longer such to-day; and what to-day is atheism to-morrow will be religion," a dictum which of course admirably suits Feuerbach's own claim that he is really no atheist but a prophet of the future faith.

Leaving the Introduction with its general statement of principle with regard to the Essential Nature of Man and of Religion, we turn now to survey Parts I and II with the application of first principles to the various doctrines of the Church.

First of all we have the doctrine of God, as a Being of
the /

understanding, as a moral being, and as Incarnate, with consequent details of the Christian theology such as the Passion the Trinity and the Mother of God, the Logos and the Divine Image, the Cosmological Principle in God, Mysticism or Nature in God, Providence and Creation out of nothing.

Other sections are entitled, The Omnipotence of Feeling or the Mystery of Prayer, Faith and Miracle which are linked inevitably together, the Resurrection and the miraculous Conception, the Christian Christ or the personal God, Christianity as distinguished from Heathenism, the significance of voluntary Celibacy and Monachism, the Christian Heaven. These comprehensive and varied topics are dealt with according to the true or anthropological essence of religion, while later in the second part in almost half the number of chapters, these doctrines are shown to be contradictions when regarded according to the false or theological essence of religion.

What this really means is that with calm assurance and much subtlety he applies his method of inversion and his principle of contradiction.

The opening chapter is an attack, not without justification, on the God of the Schoolmen and Rationalism, God as pure essence or understanding, and it is also directed against Kant, Scepticism, Theism, Materialism. " God freed from anthropology is nothing else than the objective nature of the understanding or the understanding itself regarded as an object."(p 35) "God is a need of the intelligence, a necessary thought,... the highest degree/

degree of the thinking power." (p36)

These sentences represent a subtle analysis of God as epistemological or metaphysical Being, apart from real interest for religion, and even then it is only a part of man's understanding as it appears to him to be necessary for knowledge and action. "The ontological predicates are merely predicates of the understanding," (note p 40) which conditions and co-ordinates all things, which places all things in reciprocal dependence and connection because it is itself immediate and unconditioned. "The understanding posits its own nature as the causal first premundane existence, i.e., being the first in rank but the last in time, it makes itself the first in time also. "

Reason is thus set in a commanding position, for it is not dependent on God, but God is dependent on it. " Even in the age of miracles and faith in authority the understanding constitutes itself, at least formally, the criterion of divinity. Even omnipotence cannot do what is contrary to reason. (p38) So we cannot conceive of an understanding essentially different from that which affirms itself in man, for" they all fall within the power of my thought and thus express my understanding. " (p41) The understanding is in consequence the infinite being, the necessary being, "Reason is existence objective to itself as its own end, the ultimate tendency of things. That which is an object to itself is the highest, the final being; that which has power over itself is almighty." (p 43)

Feuerbach waves aside in the following chapter (God as the

Section 2. W.C.

~~XXXXXXXX~~ a Moral Being or Law) this ontological deity, 'merely the mathematical point in religion, the ultimate point of support'. (p 44) "The consciousness of human limitation or nothingness which is united with the idea of this Being is by no means a religiousness consciousness, on the contrary it characterises sceptics materialists and pantheists. The vital elements^{of religion} are those only which make a man an object to ^{man} ~~himself~~." It certainly is the interest of religion, he concedes, that its object should be distinct from man; but it is also, nay yet more its interest that this object should have human attributes. Luther is quoted many times here as elsewhere to emphasise the human qualities of Christ and of God; e.g., "That would be a miserable Christ to me, who should be nothing but a purely separate God and divine person... without humanity. No, my friend; where thou givest me God, thou must give me humanity too." (p45) The conclusion is, "God as a morally perfect being is nothing else than the realised idea, the fulfilled law of morality, the moral nature of man posited as the absolute being."

One important thing is to be noted here, Disunion from such a deity, implying the breach of a law and consequently our moral nothingness, is painful as it is not with regard to omniscience where there is no command to be omniscient. The conception is no merely theoretical, inert concept but a practical one calling me to action, to imitation, throwing me into strife, into disunion with myself. Deliverance comes to a man blunting the fatal sting of sin when he is conscious of love as the highest absolute power/

power and truth. Love is the true unity of God and man, of spirit and nature, denying their separation. "The deeper we can bring Christ into our flesh the better", said Luther. (p49 note) We are forgiven because we are no abstract beings but creatures of flesh and blood.

Here it is obvious we are at the beginning of a monstrous travesty of Christian doctrine, for Feuerbach is mastered by his theories. "The consciousness of the divine love, or what is the same thing, the contemplation of God as human, is the mystery of the Incarnation." The descent of God to man is necessarily preceded by the exaltation of man to God. How otherwise could God have become man? The dogma is criticised by reducing it to its natural elements or qualities, immanent in man. Mystery arises only from the mingling or confusion of the idea or definitions of the universal, unlimited, metaphysical being with the idea of the religious God, i.e., the conditions of the understanding with the conditions of the heart, the emotive nature; a confusion which is the greatest hindrance to the correct ~~thinking~~ knowledge of God.

Feuerbach attacks, on the one hand, those who allege that the Incarnation is a purely empirical fact which could be made known only by a revelation in the theological sense. "This is ~~XXXX~~ crass materialism." Why? Here Feuerbach discloses the presupposition of his theory. "The Incarnation is a conclusion which rests on on a very comprehensible premiss." His explanation, i.e., is deduced from his first principle. Yet he calmly goes/

goes on to say, "It is equally perverse to attempt to deduce the Incarnation from purely speculative, i.e., metaphysical, abstract grounds, for metaphysics apply only to the first person of the Godhead who does not become incarnate, who is not a dramatic person." (p 51-52)

What is the relation between the two things in the dogma, God and Love ? asks our author. Is God something besides love ? The love is only an attribute, not a subject or substance. In the background of love therefore there lurks a subject who even without love is something by himself, an unloving monster, a diabolic being, whose personality separable and actually separated from love, delights in the blood of heretics and unbelievers... the phantom of religious fanaticism.

Yet love is the essence of the Incarnation. It ruled the Majesty of God, not love of God to himself but to man, and this is human love. Every religion worthy of the name presupposes that God is not indifferent. Every prayer discloses the secret of the Incarnation and involves God in human distress. Love does not exist without sympathy and sympathy presupposes a like nature.

But it may be said that the Christian Incarnation is altogether peculiar, that at least it is different from the incarnations of the heathen dieties, whether Greek or Indian. There are differences, certainly, and in vol. I. S. W. we find an article, 1844, entitled, "Der Unterschied der heidnischen und christlichen Menschen vergötterung"; the differences specified are well worth quoting. I. Paganism deifies only the qualities and passions of

man, but Christianity the whole man. Hence II. Christianity is universal over against the national deities of polytheism, and it cares for each individual over against the privileged classes.

III. Christianity is humble, because the honour of the godhead is inherited from its Father, ^(i.e. from his own nature) whereas the heathen acquiring this honour through merit are proud. On p 332 ~~S.W.~~ this summary is to be found; the heathen deifications were only illusory shallow superficial, the Christian were deep fundamental radical; in heathendom divinity was only a privilege, an assumption of aristocracy, in Christianity it is a well-founded orderly common good. Because Christ is the end of all human sacrifice, he is the end of all deification, God for all.

These sincere if somewhat complimentary references to Christianity do not obscure the fact that, as shown already, the Incarnation is an analytic fact, no mysterious composition of contraries but a human word with a human meaning. The elevating influence of the Incarnation is this that the highest lowers himself for the sake of man. How can the worth of man be more strongly expressed? And how more powerfully could we learn to love all flesh and blood upon the earth, as Luther says. (p57 W C) But answers Feuerbach, "that which in the truth of religion is the essence of the fable is to the religious consciousness only the moral of the fable, a collateral thing." "God loves man" is an orientalism, but religion is essentially oriental.

It is easy to see how along these lines in Chapter 5 "The Mystery of the Suffering God" is analysed and explained. (p 59) "Love attests/

attests itself by suffering, and the Christians consecrate passivity. To suffer for others is divine. Religion speaks by example. Example is the law of religion. Christ suffered for others; we should do likewise.

Hence Christianity is the religion of suffering, and we see how Feuerbach has an opening for the expression of the ascetic view of it. The mystery of the suffering God is therefore the mystery of feeling, of sensibility. What would man be without feeling ?

Quite in the Hegelian manner, though with more sympathy and insight, the Trinity is represented after the pattern of the threefold qualities of man, feeling intelligence will knit together into one. Only man is the original Trinity. God regarded as an extramundane Being signifies that religion is inward and solitary. Yet solitude is the want of the thinker, Society the desire of the heart. Hence the third person in the Trinity which we need not make a separate object of our analysis" (p67). The Holy Spirit owes its personal existence only to a name, a word. It is nothing further than the love of the two divine Persons toward each other.

As for the Virgin Mary, this doctrine fits in perfectly with the relations of the Trinity.

The Son is a falling away from the metaphysical idea of the Godhead. He affirms imagination as a necessity. He is the nature of the imagination made objective. So Christ is the Word, the Logos, the Divine Image. And here Feuerbach has many true and/

and helpful things to say as to words and their relation to the meaning of Christ. But of course the Word of God is simply the divinity of the Word.

In chapter 8 the Mystery of the cosmological Principle in God is discussed. This is the second Person in the Trinity, the world-creating principle, but the meaning is that Christ is the divine principle of the finite, the intermediate between the noumenal nature of God and the phenomenal nature of the world, not representing to us the pure idea of the Godhead, nor the pure idea of humanity. Seeing that every being, intermediate between God and the world, is a being of the imagination, the psychological truth and necessity which lies at the foundation of all these theogonies and cosmogonies is the truth and necessity of the imagination as a middle term between the abstract and the concrete. The cosmological process is nothing else than the mystic paraphrase of a psychological process, the unity of consciousness and self-consciousness made objective. (p 81) Or, (p 86) The cosmological thought in God, reduced to its last elements, is nothing else than the act of thought in its simplest forms made objective, positing itself and then another different from itself. Like a true disciple of Hegel, Feuerbach says real difference can be derived only from a being which has a principle of difference in itself. "But I posit difference in the original being, he adds, because I have originally found difference as a positive reality."

Mysticism is swept aside with some contempt. It is deuteroscopy, a fabrication of phrases with a double meaning. Our task is to show that theology is nothing else than an unconscious esoteric/

esoteric pathology, anthropology, psychology, etc. - a very frank if naive confession.

In connection with the doctrine of eternal Nature in God, as in Schelling and Jacob Böhme, the source of Schelling's ideas, it is obvious that we are near to many cosmogonic and theogonic fancies, as our author says, but he has some things to say here on personality which are revealing and determinative. The doctrine of Nature in God aims, by naturalism, to establish theism, especially the theism which regards the Supreme Being as a personal Being. (pp 93-100) But personal theism conceives God as personal Being separate from all material things. The personality of God is not to be established through Nature but through Man. The need of a personal God has its foundation in this that only in the attribute of personality does the personal man meet with himself, find himself. Stressing his favourite opposition between personality and Nature, Feuerbach says, "Where personity is a truth or rather the absolute truth, Nature has no positive significance and consequently no positive basis." Nature is not to be smuggled in again. The flower of sublimation arises only through the evaporation of matter.

The doctrine of Creation out of nothing exhibits again the opposition between man and Nature and man's attempt at domination. Subjectively we annihilate the world. We would rather be freed from weight, resistance, space, time, limitation, necessity. Let the existence of the world therefore be arbitrary and momentary. Omnipotence is nothing else than subjectivity free from limits.

We affirm in this doctrine the divinity of the will, as in the doctrine of the Word of God we affirm the divinity of the human word. It is however not the will of reason but the will of the imagination, the absolutely subjective unlimited will. The culminating point of the principle of subjectivity or religious egoism is thus reached.

Creation is identical with Miracle and with Providence, for the proof of Providence is miracle. This of course is for man only, not for the brutes, a privilege expressive of and guaranteeing his infinite value. Nature becomes the servant of man's needs, is degraded to a mere machine. In Judaism (chap XI) where this doctrine obtains, 'Utilism' is the theory of Nature and is in conspicuous contrast to the attitude of the Greeks who looked at Nature with the theoretic sense and heard heavenly music in the harmonious course of the stars. The Israelite did not rise above the alimentary view of theology. He opened to Nature only the gastric sense. Eating is the most solemn act or the initiation of the Jewish religion. In eating man declares Nature to be an insignificant object. Creation out of nothing, i.e. the creation as a purely imperious act, had its origin only in the unfathomable depth of Hebrew egoism. It pains the egoist that the satisfaction of his wishes and need is only to be attained mediately, that for him there is a chasm between the wish and the realisation, between the object in the imagination and the object in reality. Hence in order to relieve this pain, to make himself free from the limits of reality, he supposes as the true, the highest/

est, being, One who brings forth an object by the mere I WILL. Jehovah is Israel's consciousness of the sacredness and necessity of his own existence, the Ego of Israel which regards itself as the end and aim, the Lord of Nature. (p 119) Christianity is Judaism purified from national egoism and so introduces something new and essential for not the Israelite but MAN, subjective human nature occupies the centre.

Prayer, the simplest act of religion, "reveals the ultimate essence of religion; an act which implies at least as much as the dogma of the Incarnation, although religious speculation stands amazed at this, as the greatest of mysteries." One can understand how it fits in well with Feuerbach's theory of the subjectivity of religion, for to him it represents the omnipotence of feeling. It is the expression of wishes in the confidence, in the certainty that they will be fulfilled. (p 122-4) Wisely does Feuerbach say it is more than the expression of dependence. That alone robs a man of words. Prayer has its roots rather in the unconditional trust of the heart, untroubled by all thought of compulsive need.

Thus we come to consider Faith, for faith alone prays and the prayer of faith is alone effective, and Feuerbach quotes with approval Luther's definition, "Faith is that courage of the heart which trusts for all good to God." But of course he brings upon it the usual analysis. "Faith", he declares, "is the infinite self-certainty of man, the undoubting certainty that his own subjective being is the objective absolute being, the being of beings, and again, "The essence of faith is the idea that that which man wishes/

wishes actually is: he wishes to be immortal, therefore he is immortal; he wishes for the existence of a being who can do everything which is impossible to Nature and reason, therefore such a being exists; he wishes for a world which corresponds to the desires of the heart, a world of unlimited subjectivity, i.e. of unperturbed feeling, of uninterrupted bliss, while nevertheless there exists a world the opposite of that subjective one, and hence this world must pass away, --- as necessarily pass as God, or absolute subjectivity, must remain."

Miracle is the specific object of faith, for miracle satisfies the wishes of men in a way corresponding to the nature of wishes --- in the most desirable way. Of course to Science this is all absurd. "A circle in a straight line is the mathematical symbol of miracle." But less accurately he concludes, "With Christianity man lost the capability of conceiving himself as a part of Nature, of the Universe. "

With his desire to set religion and culture over against one another he remarks that the element of Culture, the Northern principle of self-renunciation is wanting to the emotional nature. The apostles and Evangelists were no scientifically cultivated men. Yet the sorcery of the imagination was, and still is, great where our wishes are concerned.

Of course the mystery of the Resurrection and the Miraculous Conception fall under the same explanation as the other, less properly dogmatic miracles; the wish realised in the one case over against the power of death, and in the other over against the imag-

inative horror of Nature in certain of her processes. We have in this latter case the key to the contradiction in Catholicism, that at the same time marriage is holy and celibacy is holy. Protestant morality, however, is rationalistic in its very beginning and this mystery had only a dogmatic and not a practical significance; they did not allow it to interfere with their desire for marriage.

The chapter dealing with "The Mystery of the Christian Christ or the Personal God" is more concerned with a description of feeling and dreaming as the key to the mysteries of religion than with Christ or God as they appear in the New Testament. "It is pleasanter to be passive than to act, to be redeemed and made free by another than to free oneself, pleasanter to make one's salvation dependent on a person than on the force of one's own spontaneity --- to set before oneself an object of love than an object of effort, to see oneself imaged in the love-beaming eyes of another personal being than to look into the concave mirror of self or into the cold depths of the ocean of Nature....."

A powerful instinct, immediately connected with the activity of the senses, viz. voluntary imitation, causes example to work miracles which the law could not do, and in this way Christ, a visible personal living law, a law made flesh, caused joy to the early Christians and bestowed the power to resist sin. More than the power of example is the power of miracle ascribed to Christ, so that the miraculous Redeemer is nothing else than the realised wish of feeling to be free from the laws of morality, i.e., adds Feuerbach/

Feuerbach (as if aware that Christianity also binds us to a noble code of ethics), from the slow and hard conditions to which virtue is united in the natural course of things. Morality the theologians tell us, is dependent upon faith, and the virtues of the heathen are only splendid sins: thus the Christian becomes morally free and good only by miracle.

A characteristic passage is found on p 144, where the relation of Christ to God is described in the subjective manner with which we are now acquainted. " God as God is feeling as yet shut up, hidden; only Christ is the unclosed open feeling or heart. In Christ feeling is first perfectly certain of itself, and assured beyond doubt of the truth and divinity of its own nature; for Christ denies nothing to feeling; he fulfils all its prayers.... he is the joyful certainty of feeling that its wishes hidden in God have truth and reality, the actual victory over death, over all the powers of the world and Nature, the resurrection no longer merely hoped for, but already accomplished; he is the heart released from all oppressive limits, from all sufferings,-- the ~~XXXXXX~~ soul in perfect blessedness, the Godhead made visible."

"So far the Christian religion may justly be called the absolute religion," and is distinguished from other religions in that the heart in its practical character is not divided from the imagination but restrains and delivers it from the confusion of a multiplicity of incarnations.

Belief in the personality of Christ satisfies the longing for

unity

unity and further with Christ the truth of vision is confirmed
by
~~WIKK~~ touch. He lays great stress upon this. "As subjectively
touch, so objectively the capability of being touched, palpabil-
ity, passibility, is the last criterion of reality."

In the chapter on the distinction between Christianity and
heathenism, (chap XVI) he returns to a matter which he has already
mentioned in connection with the Incarnation. Four things are
to be noted. I/ The Christian unlinked^{ed} himself from Nature, from
the chain of sequences in the system of the universe, made himself
a self-sufficing whole, an absolute extra- and supra-mundane
being. This stands in contrast to the animalism of heathenism.
II/ Christianity is individualistic; it cared nothing for the
species, (a remarkable assertion when we consider that Christian-
ity founded a new brotherhood!) But our author can be frank and
discerning also, for he says, (a strange confession in view of his
own theory) "Because of this immediate unity of the species with
the individual, this concentration of all that is universal and
real in one personal Being, God is a deeply moving object, enrapt-
uring^{to} the imagination; whereas, the idea of humanity has little
power over the feelings because humanity is only an abstraction;
and the reality which presents itself to us in distinction from
this abstraction is the multitude of separate limited individuals."
(p 153)
III / Christians make intelligence only part of a man, not the
essence, as did the heathen.
IV / Christ stands unique, an individual, yet at the same time
the ideal, the species, humanity in the fulness of its perfection
and/

and infinity.

The two closing chapters of the First Part emphasise the negative aspect of the Christian life for Celibacy and Monachism were necessary consequences of the belief in heaven promised to mankind by Christianity. The individual concentrates all upon God. Even activity for others has only a religious significance.

Without being morbid or nasty Feuerbach points out that sex is an essential part of our human system. Sex is the cord which connects the individual with the species. But he who belongs to no sex belongs to no species, hence the belief in personal immortality has at its foundation the belief that difference of sex is only an external adjunct of individuality, that in himself the individual is a sexless independent complete absolute being. (p170)

Personal immortality, he says truly, is a characteristic doctrine of Christianity, associated, as it is not among the heathen philosophers, with their fundamental view of life. Above all, the doctrine of immortality is the final doctrine of religion: its testament in which it declares its last wishes. The reality of God is made dependent on man's own reality. If we do not rise again, then is Christ not risen. God is the guarantee of my future existence because he is already the certainty and reality of my present existence, my salvation, my trust, my shield from the forces of the external world.

Yet no one is agreed as to the qualities of this life as of the life of God. And existence without quality is a chimera, a specter. Existence is first made known to me by quality -- not existence first/

first, and after that quality. The primary certainty, he remarks, returning to the principles stated in the Introduction, is everywhere quality, existence follows of course, when once quality is certain. So heaven, like God, must have definite earthly qualities expressive of praise and of blame. This belief selects a wreath from the flora of this world, and this critical florilegium is heaven.

As for the Method to be followed (in later works) p 179, "It is necessary to consider religion in its rudimentary stages... It is requisite to regard the various earlier religions as present in the absolute religion and not as left behind in the past, in order correctly to appreciate and comprehend the absolute religion as well as the others. A process of criticism by the higher religion does not seem to our author to require ^{to be added} ~~mention~~.

Returning to faith in the future life, he declares it is only faith in the true life of the present; the essential elements of this life are also the essential elements of the other. "The future life is this life once lost, but found again, and radiant with all the more brightness because of the joy of recovery." (p 182) "The natural or rational man remains at home because he finds it agreeable, because he is perfectly satisfied; religion which commences with a discontent, a disunion, forsakes its home and travels far, but only to feel the more vividly in the distance the happiness of home." If it be said there is a supernatural body, this is only imagination working by miracle, adequate to the feelings of man, but seen by reason as the union of contradictories/

ies.

So the first Part concludes, " Our most essential task is now fulfilled. We have reduced the supermundane, supernatural, and superhuman nature of God to the elements of human nature as its fundamental elements. Our process of analysis has brought us again to the position from which we set out. The beginning, middle and end of Religion is Man."

One would have thought that Feuerbach had sufficiently brought to an end the illusion of religion, but with the thoroughness of a philosopher he sets aside the pleasant/^{mood}~~need~~ of explanation to crown himself with the thundercloud and to wield the flashing bolt of devastating criticism by the principle of inner contradiction.

It can hardly be said that anything new emerges, though we meet as usual with apt phrases and subtle argumentation in relation to philosophers and theologians, and also at times a frankness which lays its finger on some vital characteristic of Christianity, only of course to point out its fallacy.

The essential standpoint of religion is the practical, or, we note, the subjective. No other religion has given equal prominence to the salvation of man. God as the object of Religion, and only as such is he God, belongs to Religion not Philosophy, to the heart's necessity and not to the mind's freedom. Where the idea of the world, of so-called secondary causes, intrudes itself between God and the world, Religion is abolished. Thus we have the contradiction between Religion^{or God} and Nature which runs through the whole/

whole history of Christianity. "Religion creates the world only to maintain it in the perpetual consciousness of its nothingness its dependence on God". This contradiction is manifest in Prayer the essential act of Religion, which appeals to God and miracle to realise practical ~~XXXX~~ needs. The world is nothing to religion, asserts Feuerbach, the world which is in truth the sum of all reality is revealed in its glory only by theory .

Chapter XX deals with the Contradiction in the Existence of God, i.e. religion separates God from man and yet unites him to man. At first the process is an "involuntary childlike simple act of the mind", but later in theology it becomes an 'intentional excogitated separation which has no other object than to banish again from the consciousness the identity which has already entered there.' Later religions seek to explain away the anthropomorphism of earlier.

But the crux of the matter is ~~just~~ this that spiritual existence being only an existence in thought feeling and belief, God's existence is a medium between sensational and conceptual existence, a medium full of contradictions. God is a matter of experience and yet in reality no object of experience, for "empirical experience is proved to me by the senses only." (p 201)

Proofs of the existence of God aim at making the internal external, i.e. setting God apart, but 'external' means in space, having sensational existence. But ~~this~~ is not what religion wants for God would not then be dependent upon inward disposition. The Ontological proof is the most interesting, because it proceeds from/

from within.

In chapter XXI there is quite a good discussion of Revelation, ever a central topic in theology, and its changing character, determined by man's powers of comprehension. But belief in Revelation is the characteristic illusion of the religious consciousness, for the religious mind does not distinguish between subject and object. "Religion is a dream in which our own conceptions and emotions appear to us as separate existences, beings out of ourselves." "That which comes from God to man comes to man only from man in God, from the ideal man to the phenomenal, from the species to the individual." It is correct to say that religion is the education of the human race, only religion must not be regarded as outside the nature of man. There is sophistry as well as superstition in a definite historical revelation. But understanding is the watchdog of revelation, and as man grows up he breaks the chain to show that superstition and folly are the ruling power.

As for the Bible, it contradicts morality, for there is moral progress beyond it; it contradicts reason because its truths are not universally valid; and it contradicts itself.

There is a contradiction in the Nature of God in general, for he is conceived under the form of the senses yet as freed from the senses. Also, a God who does not trouble himself about us is no God, while a God who does not exist in and by himself, out of men and above men as another being, is a phantom.

The idea of God is linked up with that of Revelation and through/

through it with that of personality; so here as elsewhere Feuerbach attacks the doctrine of the personality of God. Kinship and resemblance are deceptive and evasive expressions. Imagination introduces the idea of personality or individuality to keep apart what reason sees to be identical, father and child, archetype and image, God and Man. One qualification is added, and it is obviously necessary--- if sensible evidence can be produced it is of course to be accepted against reason's identification.

Hegel's speculative doctrine of God as well as that of Jacob Böhm is criticised because it makes separate God and Man and so lands in contradictions. God is a self only in the human self. The opposite of God gives qualities to God. Why not state the truth? Man's knowledge of God is man's knowledge of himself, of his own true nature. Unity of being and consciousness is truth. Where the consciousness of God is, there is the being of God -- in man therefore. What presents itself before thy consciousness is simply what lies behind it. If the divine qualities are human, the human qualities are divine.

We may pause to say that we may frankly admit the difficulties inherent in all these speculations as to the divine nature, and its relation to ourselves and the world. They are speculative but it has to be remembered that Feuerbach's own theory leaves us still with its own contradictions and problems of man and Nature and the Universe.

Theologians have always admitted the mystery of the Trinity, though they would object to the statement that originally it is

nothing/

nothing else than the sum of the essential fundamental distinctions which man perceives in human nature. Feuerbach hardly explains why we should project these specially along the historical line of the Christian Revelation or what experience elicit this description of God.

Of course he has no patience with Symbolism which admits of the supernatural. The Sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper have a beautiful and profound natural significance, but he argues this is lost when they are lifted into the sphere of miracle. So here as frequently he works round the discussion to Miracle over against Nature and Reason.

Faith is defined as "the power of the imagination which makes the real unreal and the unreal real." It does not matter whether we take the Protestant or the Roman doctrine. It is in direct contradiction with the truth of the senses, with the truth of reason. And Feuerbach closes with words which seem to echo some utterances of Bayle, "Wherever religion places itself in contradiction with reason, it places itself also in contradiction with the moral sense. Only with the sense of truth coexists the sense of the right and good." But the question is whether Feuerbach has not sacrificed Christian experience to the interests of a narrow reason limited to sensible relations.

The verbal cleverness of the special pleader is seen in the discussion on Faith and Love. There is an inevitable separation between them it is maintained, on many points, generally the separation of man from God by Faith and the union by Love, (as if
Faith/

Faith did not also unite in trust and confidence and Love on its side imply duality.) But the treatment of faith is largely as intellectual belief, a knowledge of God, given not by nature but by special grace. Faith renders a man partial and narrow, making the ground of decision not argument, reason, or the nature of things, but conscience, interest, the instinctive desire for happiness. (p249) Faith is arrogant, but it is distinguished from natural arrogance in this, that it clothes its feeling of superiority, its pride, in the idea of another person, for whom the believer is an object of peculiar favour.

We have here the characteristic principle of religion, that it changes what is naturally active into the passive. The heathen elevates himself, the Christian feels himself elevated. The humility of the believer is an inverted arrogance, unconsciously of course.

Feuerbach's peculiar view of personality enables him to turn the argument that after all faith in God is faith in love, in goodness itself, and that thus faith is itself an expression of a morally good disposition. In the idea of personality, he says, ethical definitions vanish, they are only collateral things, mere accidents. The chief thing is the divine Ego. (p260) The acme of personality is honour, hence an injury toward the highest personality is necessarily the highest crime, (note p321, 322). Faith necessarily passes into hatred, hatred into persecution, where the power of faith meets with no contradiction, where it does not find itself in collision with a power foreign to faith, the power of love/

love, of humanity, of the sense of justice." (260p). Faith does not make men moral, only happy, because any goodness resulting is done out of gratitude to God and not for its own sake, as Kant would say. (p262) And when we say God is Love, love is reduced to a mere predicate of a dark Subject.

If you say, "Love is God, Love is the absolute Being", the contradiction is done away. As for the place of Christ, he is the apostle of love, though not the cause of love, for the idea of love is an independent idea not deduced from the life of Christ or any special historical phenomenon. Man is to be loved for man's sake. He is an end in himself because he is a rational and loving being. (p268)

Showing that he is not free from the aloofness to history which is characteristic of Rationalism, Feuerbach declares, "In love and reason the need of an intermediate person disappears. Christ is nothing but an image, under which the unity of the species has impressed itself on the popular consciousness." Christ is the love of mankind to itself embodied in an image, in accordance with the nature of religion as we have developed it." (p268) Certainly in the theory of our author the need of any historical Christ disappears, except as a convenience, a symbol. This is not a serious treatment of an important subject.

The Concluding Application in chapter XXVII makes an appeal to rise above the standpoint of Christianity and of religion. To what? Well, religion is sacred as the primitive form of self-consciousness, but life as a whole is, in its essential substantial /

substantial relations, of a divine nature throughout. This sounds a little indiscriminating, for there are varieties of life as there are varieties of religion and if the latter argue against the existence of deity why should not the former; or is this the transformed Hegelianism with the old doctrine that the 'real is the rational.'

But we are forgetting Man; so, to continue our exposition, Man as the object of this new religious theory includes external Nature, for he belongs to the essence of Nature and Nature belongs to the essence of Man. "Only by uniting Man with Nature can we conquer the supranaturalistic egoism of Christianity." (note p 270) This theory, it should be noted is contrary to common materialism and to subjective idealism alike. Yet Man is separate from Nature, he continues, and "in thy gratitude to Man, do not forget gratitude to Holy Nature." In the Sacraments of life Man may produce the bread and wine, showing his difference from Nature, but water is Nature's own ^{pure} ~~free~~ gift, a universal element in life reminding us of our origin from Nature. The Sacraments show therefore this double relation of Man to Nature.

In such words as the above Feuerbach is consciously or unconsciously preparing the way for 'Das Wesen der Religion', in which Nature comes to the front and Man recedes, but where the thrill of ecstasy over 'Holy Nature' and the 'religious' importance of bread wine and water in themselves has died away. It may surprise one even here that there should be a desire to retain the words 'religious' and 'sacred' and to make apostrophe to 'Holy' Nature. Is

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Is this the survival of the Romantic spirit and the triumph of Imagination over cool Reason, the kernel of idealism breaking through the hard shell of materialism? Is it not the restlessness of Reason itself, the stirrings of the deeper nature of man?

Feuerbach states the matter quite simply; "The work of the self-conscious reason in relation to religion is simply to destroy an illusion... And we need only, as we have shown invert the religious relation, exalt that into the primary which in religion is subordinate." (p 274) "The necessary turning point of history is therefore the open confession that the consciousness of God is nothing else than the consciousness of ^{the} species; that man can and should raise himself (I have underlined these words) only above the limits of his individuality and not above the laws, the positive essential conditions of his species; that there is no other essence (Wesen) which man can think, dream of, imagine, feel, believe in, wish for, love and adore as the absolute, than the essence of human nature itself ." (p 270)

But what if this inversion itself destroy reason, and, substituting theories for facts, ultimately dissolve history man and Nature into a chaotic dream more desolating and more injurious than any of the dreams of religion? In due course this question must be more definitely stated. It is time to turn to the sequel to 'Das Wesen des Christentums' 'Das Wesen der Religion'.

CHAPTER. IV.

Summary and Survey of the principal Works
dealing with Religion.

SECTION. 3.

Das Wesen der Religion.

" I find nothing great:
Nothing is left which I can venerate,
So that almost a doubt within me springs
Of Providence, such emptiness at length
Seems at the heart of all things."

Wordsworth.

"Earth ! Mother of simple truth,
Relentless quencher of lies .

Meredith.

"Das Wesen der Religion".

This book, shorter than the others and set forth in paragraphs not chapters, has for its purpose the presentation of Religion so far as her object is Nature, (S.W Vol I.p400). In 'Luther' and Das W.C. he had set this consideration aside, abstracting as he must, for the kernel of Christianity there dealt with, he says is not God in Nature but in men.

Wobbermin thinks that Feuerbach should have dealt thus with religion generally before dealing with Christianity in particular and then he would not have given us in W.C. a mere a priori construction, i.e. God as Wunschwesen. On the other hand he might have given us only another a priori doctrine and we know how Schleiermacher's 'Der christliche Glaube' suffers because of the first part endeavouring to deal with religion apart from the special content of Christianity, (Glre. I part Para 34,3, last sentence). It is true, however, that the two works scarcely hang together and there is no reconciliation between Nature as Deity and Humanity except by throwing over Nature and transforming the feeling of absolute dependence into the principle of Egoism.

The style is crisp, cold, and objective, though sarcastic and even poetic phrases are not infrequent.

One should add that it is preceded in S.W. I, 361 by Supplements and Explanations which underline the power of Necessity, (I.374-5,361), the influence of phantasy and emotion in creating the supernatural out of the sensible, and the inevitable Ego-

ism of man; 'only death is without egoism.' These two latter points, phantasy and egoism, illustrate where W.R. is in touch with W.C. Only incidentally are the special doctrines of Christianity referred to, e.g., the Sacraments.

Succintly he states his fundamental principle, p 411, "The feeling of absolute dependence in men is the ground of religion, and the object of religion is originally nothing else than Nature, as the history of all religions and peoples sufficiently proves." Religion is innate in man as the feeling of absolute dependence, though not innate as the ideas of Theism. It is "as near to man as light to the eye, breath to the lungs, food to the stomach." Here Feuerbach touches on a favourite thought over against Rationalism and Materialism alike.

Varieties of religion are found, partly as a result of man's dependence on particular parts of nature, e.g., trees, hills, and partly because dependence on nature gives place in due course to dependence on political and moral Power, (the Roman Emperor is called your Divinity, and the Criminal Code is represented as the Code of Natural Law.)^{v. § 37} Elsewhere he gives yet a third reason, the differences in human nature and in races.

What then is this Nature? In note 2, p 410, he explains that he uses it only as general word, just as with spirit, for the description of the Wesen, Dinge, Gegenstände which man distinguish from himself and his productions and sets together in the common name of Nature, but not a 'universal' withdrawn from and separated from actual things, a personified and mysterious Wesen. (Not therefore we presume, 'Holy Nature' .)

The/

The faith that another being exists through and beyond Nature is due to the phantasy of man who injects himself involuntarily into Nature, makes Nature a symbol and mirror of his own being. (para 9)

Nature is not the effect, result of a spiritual, i.e. a willing and knowing or thinking being, as little as are the growth of the child in mother-love, the movement of the heart, the digestion and other organic functions the effect of reason and will. (13) Nature is, he seems to say, the great unconscious being, "the unconscious God is the presupposition of the conscious, (I. 361), "from lack of understanding comes understanding and not vice versa is the movement of the world. The inference would seem to be, though of course not drawn by our author, that man is not meant to go back to unconsciousness, or perhaps that Nature has some higher form than man yet to come.

Nature, however, is not purposeful in man's way, as setting her energies to a definite goal, hence the frequent misbirths. (para 47) She is just what she is. Feuerbach would seem to say that her movements are instinctive as the bird's flight or the spider's web. (para 47). "What for us is an insoluble theoretical problem that the spider does without understanding and consequently without difficulties which exist only for our understanding." "The appearance of Nature is for us indeed Reason, but the cause of this appearance is as little reason as the cause of light is light."

Yet Nature is not blind, nor dead, nor casual. She works in connectedness, which for man is reason, for wherever he finds reason he finds system, but from and with Necessity, not however, a log-

ical, metaphysical, mathematical, i.e., human necessity, but as sensuous, therefore eccentric exceptional irregular, a necessity appearing as Freedom. Nature is only to be comprehended through herself and is dependent in concept upon no other being. She is the 'thing-in-itself' over against 'what is for us. (48)

There is an evolutionary process going on in Nature; it is being proved that organic and inorganic are identical. Yet, or because of this, Nature has not unlimited powers. (17,18)

It would appear that there is something greater than Nature, Necessity, or it may be that this is just part of Nature's secret. (S.W.I,361). But this like so many other things lies unrelated to the various parts of his theory and is not worked out as it might be, revealing a Power in and beyond Nature and Man alike. He has much to say about Necessity and Need in "Ergänzungen .." e.g. "The super^{human}~~XXXXXXXX~~ power in the first instance, the power before which at first man bows the knee, is the power of Necessity, 'die Mächte der Noth', the power over death and life." (I.361) And the paper ends with a very eloquent passage, p 374-5, on the power of Necessity. It is the founder and destroyer of States. Before it every power bends. To it is ascribed the highest attributes of divine majesty.

It is true that he is referring to human necessity or wants, or necessity in relation to mankind, the 'Wesen' which lies behind man's conscious purposes and strivings, the Being behind the Nature of Man which brings to the ground the proud nations which think of their own people rather than of the whole race of mankind/
kind/

kind. But the Preference seems also to have a wider implication. At any rate we learn that Selfishness, not only in a personal sense but in a national also, is contrary to the Being of Man. Unselfishness is an inevitable law in history. But whence did History obtain this law? From the Being behind Man. Is this Being independent of Nature, or is Unselfishness the decree of the Universal Being and God Love?

The idea of Nature is described, of course, in opposition to the Hegelian theory and also to Theism.

The world, we are reminded, is not given us through thinking but through life, intuition, sense. Man is more than logician or metaphysician, But just this 'plus' appears to the metaphysical thinker as a 'minus', this negation of thinking as ~~XXXXXX~~ absolute negation. (25) Nature is for him nothing more than the opposite, the Other of Spirit, which exists only through an expression of himself apparently voluntary but in truth of necessity. But if Nature vanishes into Nothing from the standpoint of abstract thinking, so on the contrary does the World-creating Spirit vanish into nothing from the standpoint of the real world-view. From this standpoint all deductions of the world from God, Nature from Spirit, Physics from Metaphysics, the real from the abstract prove themselves the play of logic.

As for the Creation of Nature, creation is of course the great miracle; but, as in the world of politics so in that of theology, the small thieves are hung and the great allowed to run off, which means that men censure the miracle in Baptism but accept it in

Creation. Briefly, says Feuerbach, Nature is superfluous if God is our and its Preserver and Creator. As in W. C. we must choose between God or Nature.

Nor will he have anything to do with the the idea of God as First Cause (15). For in that case there comes the boundless army~~s~~ of subordinate gods, the regiment of middle causes, which after all are the real things, leaving God as a mere 'titular cause', an innocuous, most modest 'Gedanken~~ding~~', a mere hypothesis to solve a theoretical difficulty, to explain the first beginnings of Nature or rather of organic life.... In fact, we must not make the limits of our knowledge also the limits of Nature.

Certainly there is a weakness in the representation of God as just the first of a series of causes, and Theism has generally tried to avoid it, using the term 'ground' rather than cause, as of a power present throughout the series. In any case a hypothesis may be quite a useful and even necessary thing. Feuerbach however in his interest in Realism shows a lack of the philosophic sense for unity. "The tedious uniformity of causal series is really broken by the individuality of things which give us something new. Why go back to the First Cause which gives us the wolf as well as the dog ? It thus shows itself morally indifferent. (7). Also he whimsically says, 'My individuality depends on my nearest cause, my parents, and is lost if I go back to the First Cause.'

Man as represented in W R. is at once honoured and depreciated/

ed. We have seen Nature's independence of him, so that he has no sure place in her adventures. Yet they have also an inclusive relation to one another, as we see in Notes in W R and W C. And man is produced as the last and highest of Nature's creatures. If Nature is the ground of Religion, he is its aim. Why not, we may ask, ~~not~~ the aim of reality as well as religion? But that would be to throw away the whole theory of the illusion of religion. So much we can say is, that man conscious of his high position expresses it in religion, for only in man does the feeling of absolute dependence which is the source of religion come to consciousness. It expresses itself in Sacrifice, the essential act of natural religion.(23). As the slave of Nature I stride to sacrifice, but as the master of Nature I ^{depart} ~~separate~~ from sacrifice.

Rather pathetically Feuerbach explains how in natural religion man turns to an object which contradicts out and out the proper will and sense of religion, for here he sacrifices here his feelings to a Being in itself without feeling, his understanding to a Being without understanding, he sets above himself what he would like to have beneath him; he serves that which he wills to master, reverences what he essentially abhors, implores help from just that against which he seeks help. He unmans himself to make Nature human..... All in vain. Nature answers not. She hurls him inexorably back upon himself.

There is much about sacrifice elsewhere, but here it is the bridge from dependence to Mastery, to the favourite doctrine of our author, to 'Egoismus'. Rebuffed by Nature he must have a God, and/

and by phantasy and emotion creates one after his own image.

The wish is the origin, the Wesen itself of religion. Religion makes Nature homely, so does Culture, but Culture falls behind the wishes of religion, for she cannot remove the barriers grounded in the being of man; she can give Macriobiotik but not Immortality. Feuerbach is thus quite frank as to the limits of Culture and the Religion of Humanity. (32).

Wishes of course vary, as in the case of Greek and Christian, and so do religions. (55). This is, one will remember, a different explanation from that which traced it back to natural surroundings. The gods are realised wishes (51). As belonging to the world of ideas they belong to the Past or the Future; the Present is godless because idea and reality fall together.

Progress is away from Nature. Only the towns make history. The East has no history of progress because it has not forgotten Nature over against man. (38). So we have this remarkable conclusion, 'Human vanity is the principle of history!'

Feuerbach seems to fluctuate between various representations of God, as Nature, as Necessity, as the living ideals of men, and as fanciful ideas. Yet he has a grip on truth when he says, ^{and} quoting Luther ^{"as"} ("God is a religious word, Deus et cultus sind relativa." God presupposes man who shall worship him, as husband presupposes wife. "As sound is only in the ear and for the ear, so God exists only in religion and for religion, only in faith and for faith." (54). But his conclusion is the usual one, that religion is thus proved to be only subjective.

Along the same line he remarks that Seligkeit und Gottheit are one, and points out that man can be moral without God, but not blessed in the supernatural Christian sense of the word, for blessedness lies beyond the limits the power of Nature and man, presupposes a supernatural being who can do/^{what}for Nature and man is impossible.

Two smaller points may be mentioned to complete this account of the book. First, Feuerbach recognises that man's reverence for animals is not just because of their utility. Their colour, movement etc. affect him and are knit together by his imagination. This seems to qualify his doctrine of Egoismus and even of dependence. What is this special quality of the religious or sacred in such cases ? Is it a certain primitive awe ?

Secondly, it is pointed out that 'utility' is an irreligious expression. The word ought to be 'beneficent', for that is objective, referring beyond itself to another.

To sum up, we may say that in seeking to secure a place for Religion, apart from Philosophy Feuerbach follows the teaching of Schleiermacher in asserting the natural, implanted and inevitable feeling of absolute dependence, but he does not, in scientific fashion and with thoroughness give it the place it ought to have in any larger consideration of religion and its significance for the universe as well as man.

C H A P T E R. IV.

Summary and Survey of the principal Works dealing
with Religion.

SECTION 4.

Vorlesungen über Das Wesen der Religion.

" Thus is Man that great and true Amphibium
whose nature is disposed to live, not only like
other creatures in divers elements, but in divided
and distinguished worlds. "

- Sir Thomas Browne.

Those lectures, thirty in number, are of interest in many ways. 1/ They show us Feuerbach in contact with, yet aloof from, the fruitless movements of 1848.

2/ They give us a survey by himself of his personal achievements in authorship.

3/ They expand and illustrate, alas at great length, the compact sentences of the earlier W R., and yet he can say, "I love brevity. I say with few words what others say with folios. p 67.

Reference has been made earlier to the part which the student world took in the political movements of the time, and it was from them that the invitation came to Feuerbach to lecture in Heidelberg. They were delivered, however, not in the University but in the town before a mixed audience of the public from December 1848 to March 1849. One student at least, we are told, was converted from Hegelianism by hearing them. (Kohut, p 321)

Appearing in print in 1851, with the omission of one lecture only on the foundations of philosophy, and with new references etc., they represented, he tells us, "his only expression of activity in the so-called revolutionary time, when he took part only as a critical spectator and listener and on the simple ground of their resultless and heedless undertakings. He had declined to stand as a member of the Frankfurt National Assembly.

Too much faith had been put in words. The constitutionalists thought they had only to cry 'Freedom' and the Republicans a 'Republic', and the miracle would happen. Space and time are fundamental conditions of all Sein und Wesen, thought and action, prosperity and success. When he did take part in such a movement, it would/

would be with substantial grounds of success. "We want to be not political idealists but political materialists." We live in a time when even we unpolitical Germans must forget everything except politics, for individuals require to stand together to achieve anything" .

One might think that Religion and Lectures on it had little bearing on such a situation, but Feuerbach believes a new religion is required for the new age, (Lect 23. p 280 etc.) to solve its political and social problems. Religion is the oldest Culture and Culture ought to be perfected religion (p275). Yet superstition and religion go together also, and Goethe is quoted as saying, " He that has science does not need religion." Apparently it is only religion of a particular kind that is required, only that which is founded on Nature and Man. Wherein it differs from perfected Culture entitling it to the name of religion, Feuerbach does not explain. It seems to have some potent influence, for "Culture is not omnipotent, though it can relieve and lessen distress." (269 p).

His aim, as stated on p 29. and at the close of the lectures as his peroration, is emphatically a positive one, "To change men from friends of God to friends of men, from believers to thinkers from men of prayer to men of work, from candidates of the future life to students of this, from Christians who in consequence of their own creed and confession are half animal, half angel, into complete men."

These lectures also present us with one of the various surveys/

veys and the most detailed, which he gives of his literary history. It is a sad story in its personal aspect but illuminating for the study of his writings and the changes in his standpoint. In the mood of Spinoza or abstract philosophy he had criticised Leibnitz and others (p 10). Pierre Bayle ends his historical review. But through the study of religion and nature he had come to discover the principle of Sinnlichkeit in Religion and the full meaning of the senses (p 16). Later this came to be Man' or 'Egoismus', or again 'Nature' as organism. Whether you call his doctrine Religion or Philosophy he does not care. Name it as you please. The essence is, theology is anthropology (p 21). The two classes of his writings, philosophy and religious philosophy had only one theme, religion and theology and what depends on these.

The reason that 'Das Wesen der Religion' is taken as basis for these lectures is that its paragraphs are small and well-packed and permit of developing and illustrating the theme that God is not only as in Christianity the Good, the cause of Moral Beings of men, but the deified and personified Being of Nature. Theology is not only anthropology but also physiology (p 26). My doctrine or view is comprehended in two words consequently, "Nature and Man" together. Rather naively he tells us also that he chose this method to help to keep him from wandering.

There seem to be two transition sections, Lecture 10 showing the passage to Egoismus from the Feeling of absolute dependence through the need which confers power on the object to satisfy it through imagination, and again, Lecture 20, where there is a change/

change from the discussion of Natural Religion to one on Theism, going over from the strict limits of W. R. to W.C.

It is to be confessed that the lectures are prolix. Some useful expansions of passages and ideas in previous books are given. But as lectures they were not considered a great success. We feel, as Feuerbach himself says, that during twelve years in the country he has lost the gift of lecturing. The time when he said adieu to academic life was so terribly sorrowful and miserable that the thought of resuming lectures never could come to him. In the last lecture he apologises for their length on the ground that he is no academic 'docent'. Bolin says of him that he was a 'Forcher und Denker' but not a 'Lehrer' (p 20-1). Yet there are discussions which bring us nearer to his mind and outlook, and definitions which help to focus his teaching.

In chap. 4. in discussing the Origin and Object of Religion, he tells us more of what he means by 'Nature' and the feeling of absolute dependence, Sinnlichkeit, Egoism. Sacrifice and God. Luther is quoted where he can help to show the subjectivity of religion.. "God is as man thinks"..

The main positions have already been sufficiently indicated in the presentation of W.R., so we shall keep to what may throw further light upon the problems involved and their solution.

Religion has its origin in the Feeling of Absolute Dependence, and its object is Nature. Hegel's jest against Schleiermacher, that a dog must be the most religious of creatures because as conscious of dependence on his master, is swept aside with a jibe at the speculative philosophers who make things according to idea and/

and not ideas according to things. As a matter of fact fear and in a higher form reverence is a manifestation of primitive man's response to the awe-inspiring activities of Nature which he makes his gods.

But fear is not the complete sufficient ground for the explanation of religion as atheists and even theists say. Fear is transitory; if it cowers before the future, it gives place to an opposite feeling of deliverance joy gratitude love rapture. (We might also add that fear is paralysing weakening.) Even the thunder-storm brings blessings as well as blows, especially to such people as do not simply live for the moment but are able to grasp in a unity different impressions. The most comprehensive name which includes both this positive and negative ground of explanation is 'feeling of absolute dependence'... thanks for dependence on that object through which I am something as well as fear because dependent upon that through which I am nothing (p.36)

In presenting this positive ground Feuerbach says, "I separate myself from the earlier atheists and pantheists (who in this connection hold similar views with the atheists). The feeling of need is practical, teleological; the feeling of gratitude poetic, aesthetic. Yet he agrees with a French writer who says that thunder and death etc. have brought to man more of the idea of God than the constant harmony of Nature and all the demonstrations of Clark and Leibnitz. (Durkheim on the contrary holds that the gods are the powers that maintain the normal order of things.

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So here we have the direct proof that the feeling of absolute dependence is the origin of religion, that religion is the dependent mark of a finite/being. (Lect.V) If there were no death, there would be no religion "The grave of man is the birthplace of the gods." The only religious wish, the only prayer of rude peoples is, "Strike me not dead."

The feeling of absolute dependence is not of course the whole of religion, only its origin and basis. Man seeks means against that upon which he is dependent. Feuerbach is here working toward his further development of religion as 'Egoismus', and is seeking for a bridge to carry him over to an explanation of self-denial and sacrifice which seem to contradict this principle of Egoismus.

Meantime let us note that he says religion has no special organ, for, if so, there would need to be two, one for evil deities and the other for good; and later he declares that religion has no special material but can be attached to anything. (p 283). Yet the feeling of absolute dependence is so deep-rooted in man's nature that we may say that religion is innate. It is not, however, a cloudy undetermined abstract feeling, as it is with Schleiermacher. It has eyes and ears. Its object is Nature, the object of the senses, and consequently its impressions vary.

How then do we pass from the feeling of absolute dependence to Egoismus? (p 102) The feeling of absolute dependence is only an indirect or inverted or negative feeling of self mediated by the object upon which I am dependent. The power of the object itself/

itself.is derived from, is a consequence of the power of my need. The need is just as much the servant as the lord of his object, just as ~~mwek~~ as it is proud; it requires an object, it is unhappy without it, there lies its subjection, its surrender, its selfishness; but it requires it to satisfy itself upon it, to enjoy it, to turn it to advantage; therein lies its desire to be lord, its egoism. Where there is no need, there is no feeling of absolute dependence. "Noth lehrt beten." The need is the need of pleasure. (p 103).

We shall have to consider this later in connection with the Doctrine of the theogonic Wish, but we note here the reality of the object and the desire to give expression to a real element in religion, though the explanation, failing any active operation of the object, seems to be forced and verbal.

Feuerbach admits that the problem now raised of the reality of self-denial and the meaning of sacrifice in religion, (and both are undeniable) presents us with the paradox of religion. (p 85, 80 & 321) Both are, however, subject to the one chief and fundamental Wish for Blessedness (Seligkeit), which is the wish or idea of an eternal heavenly life from which the idea of the Christian Godhead is not separated. The renunciation is of earthly goods for heavenly when the words are uttered, "Not my will but Thine be done."

The problem of altruism is of course a difficult one, and perhaps Feuerbach gets out of it as well as any of the moral philosophers by making the sacrifice of self to mean the acknowledgement and advance of the larger self, the Moral Ideal, in which
man/

man comes to his full stature, or as some would say the individual becomes a person. But, to do this, he has to point out that the religious wish is not a selfish one, merely individual, but is determined by duty. Man's fundamental impulses, wishes, dispositions which belong to religion or culture are his duties. This of course is a matter where Feuerbach scarcely ever wavers, that man has the roots of morality in him. There is a Categorical Imperative, a moral 'Über' as well as a natural one, and the inference is that he must obey the first rather than the second, although the second, it is admitted, will have the last word in the event of conflict.

In lecture 7 it is pointed out that this Egoismus is not selfishness, contrary to theology, where strictly speaking every love which has not God for its aim and object, even love to other men, is itself egoism. (p 62) We have to remember that in a sense it is not so much moral as metaphysical egoism which is being advocated here. It is the impulse of self-preservation and the instinct of reason, grounded in the nature of man, without which man cannot live; it is exhibited even in the organism which appropriates what it can assimilate and sets aside what it cannot; it is evidenced in the self-assertion of men over against all unnatural and inhuman demands which theological hypocrisy, religious and speculative phantasies. political brutalities and despotisms seek to impose upon men." (p 63).

The mystery deepens as we set this creature of such vigorous impulse in the midst of Nature, for "we have gone above and behind/

behind the feeling of absolute dependence itself and discovered the last subjective ground of religion in human Egoism." (p 69)

What is this Nature of which we hear so much, the original object of religion, the ground and source of man? Unlike the work 'God' which is a mystical undetermined word with many meanings; Nature', we are assured, is a clear sensible unambiguous word and being." And he proceeds to define it, "Das bewusstlose Wesen der Religion is to me the eternal underived Being, the first Being in time though not in rank, the physical but no the first moral Being." Man is its child, part and yet apart, for the child as it grows up naturally criticises its parent (!). p 46. There is no deification of Nature. But Feuerbach never really decides whether man is to be included in Nature or not, or rather he decides for Nature yet leaves man a pathetic figure wrestling with fate.

He speaks of his love of Nature, (Lect. 11, p 116) and the replies to the challenge, "What is your definition of Nature? You do not give one. Spinoza spoke of God or Nature as synonyms. Do you?" "No," he replies. Nature is the 'Inbegriff' of all sensible powers, things, and beings, which man distinguishes from himself as not human; as with Spinoza, a being not supernatural, working not by will and understanding but by the necessity of its nature, but, as is not the case with Spinoza, not again a Being at the same time supernatural, supersensible, aloof, secret, simple but a Being manifold, popular, real, perceptible, by all the senses.

Nature/

Nature is everything which proves itself to man as ground and object of his life, apart from the supernatural infiltrations of theistic faith. Nature is light, electricity, magnetism air, water, fire, earth, animal, plant, is Man, so far as he is an involuntary and unconscious being, nothing more, nothing nebulous mystical, theological.

Nature is the "Wesen oder der Inbegriff der Wesen", and things whose appearances, expressions or effects wherein she reveals and maintains their "Dasein und Wesen", have their foundation, not in thoughts or purposes and resolutions of the will, but in astronomical or cosmic, mechanical, chemical, physical, physiological or organic powers or causes.

Over against the Cosmological argument for God, i.e., from the world to its cause, Feuerbach asserts Nature is self-subsistent, eternal. (Lect. 12, p 130). It is the reason of man, rising from particulars to universals, which has made God "the Cause in general." That is all, and it is an explanation that does not help, for we are interested in particular causes, and, if I must go on, why not go past God himself to his cause; while further to make God a cause of the world makes him dependent on the world.

These arguments suggest to Feuerbach an analogy between Nature and the State; as a republic is the historical task and practical goal of man, so the rule of Nature by and within herself is the theoretical aim. Nature has neither beginning nor end. (p 129) All is "Wechsel-wirkung", reciprocity, all is relative. Nature does not run out into monarchical points; she is a republic. Those accustomed/

accustomed to the princely regime cannot think of any common life of men without princes, nor can he who is accustomed to the idea from infancy think of Nature without God. "But Nature is ~~natural~~ no less thinkable without God, an external and super natural being than the state without a lordly idol."

Over against such a conception of Nature, however, is the conception of Miracle. (Lect 26). It is, says Feuerbach, one of the most important if we are to know the essence of religion, especially Christianity. We must set aside the miracles or marvels of Nature, though they are put forward to protect the claims of religion; they are for us marvels but not such in and for Nature. For one thing, (p 311), Nature gives no laws and receives none, as if sun moon and stars were human beings; these ideas are inapplicable here because human. She is a law to herself in so far as she works according to her own constitution; and so we set aside the view of Rationalism which supposes a God who gives laws to his world as a king to his subjects and who may abrogate what he gives. Again in religious marvels man is interested in himself, whereas natural marvels are indifferent to his wishes and needs.

Luther is quoted (p 307-8) as extolling the books of Scripture which give us the teaching and words of Jesus rather than his miracles. In this he was considering the latter only as historical happenings of the past, dead and gone, relative to the circumstances and individuals in connection with which they occurred bound to space and time. His interest is religious. It is no use believing Christ wrought miracles in the past, e.g., brought Lazarus/

Lazarus to life, if one does not believe he can still do that for oneself, for one's brother etc. (p 309) "We have still the power to work such signs," declared Luther, "when it be necessary." (p 310, and of. W. Glaug. in sinne Luthers). There is then comments Feuerbach, no difference, no real separation between faith in miracles and faith in God, and no other proof of his existence is given by God than these marvels.

As for the Resurrection of Christ, (Lect 27), this of course is a proof of God's power over death; but we are here in the realm of 'religious' not historical facts, and it is pedantic to refer the one to the other; religious facts exist only for faith.

Jesus as presented in the Bible is not a historical but a 'religious' person. The Resurrection is a saga, and since the belief in resurrection existed long before Christianity, the element of interest in our own resurrection through Christ is very marked. In fact, "religious miracles are not possible without man" (p 321).

We are thrust back to the realm of wishes. What are they? How are they defined? The question meets us again in 'Theogonie' Here, p 322, we are told that wishing is bound up with man's very existence and also with God's. "Keine Religion, kein Gott, ohne Wunsch, aber kein Mensch ohne Wunsch." But there is a difference for religion has wishes which are fulfilled only in the power of the imagination or faith, whereas man as such, who sets in the place of religion, education, reason, natural perception, and in place of religion, education, reason, natural perception, and in earth, place of heaven/has wishes which do not overleap the limits of a nature and reason, which lie in the sphere of natural possibility and/

and realisation.

Varieties in religion, (elsewhere due to difference of objects in Nature and differences in man, see para 37 W R., are to be traced back to variety of wishes; the Greek is content with this world, the Christian longs for another. (p 69) The Christians changed their gods because their religious tastes changed, the heathen gods did not give them what they wanted. " Religion is nothing more than the art of life. Every satisfaction of an impulse is a divine pleasure and so we reverence the objects or beings upon which this satisfaction depends." (p 68).

Thus, Lect. 29, God and Immortality are joined together, for without God the doctrine of Immortality has no beginning, no principle. Nature thinks only of continuance of the species, replacing the old by a new individual. Over against the rationalists Feuerbach adds significantly, (p353), and it applies to his own doctrine, " who does not wish to end with Nature must not begin with Nature."

A God is not a natural power, a world-cause, (p 349). A God is essentially an object of reverence, love, adoration, a Being of the heart not to be found by telescope or hammer, only in faith. He becomes therefore the realiser, or the reality of human wishes for happiness, perfection, immortality; deity is no longer self-dependent Being but an attribute of man. How can I separate my being from my wishes, for what I wish is my heart, my being. The warmest, most inner, most holy thought and wish of man is, or at least was, the wish, the thought of eternal life."

Yet/

Yet these are not necessary wishes, according to Feuerbach, for the barriers against which they cry out are barriers only to the imagination of man. That a man is tied down to space and time simply means that he is bound up with earth. "Apart from earth I am a phantom. I am essentially a being of earth."

The psychological proof of the being of God is thus only an indirect proof of the infinitude of the human spirit. (p 344). Let us concentrate on the real wishes of man which can be fulfilled in social progress and culture. "The one devil of mankind is the man coarse, superstitious, self-seeking, evil, but also the only God of man is Man himself."

Thus closes with a repetition of his aim, given earlier in this summary, a book of exhaustive completeness, requiring only in his "swan-song", his 'Theogonie' some further remarks.

"It is too philological for Messieurs the philologists
and too philosophical for Messieurs
the philologists."

Feuerbach to Berlin

Chapter IV. Section 5. Theogonie.

"THEOGONIE"

nach den Quellen der klassischen, hebräischen
und christlichen Altertums.

C H A P T E R . IV.

Summary and Survey of the principal Works dealing
with Religion .

Section 5. Theogonie.

"Full lasting is the song, though he,
The Singer, passes. " Meredith.

"It is too philological for Messieurs the philosophers
and too philosophical for Messieurs
the philologists."

Feuerbach to Bolin.

Chapter IV. Section 5. Theogonie.

"THEOGONIE

nach den Quellen des classischen, hebraischen
und christlichen Altertums."

As we have seen, this work was intended to be Feuerbach's 'swan-song', a recapitulation of his whole spiritual life, 'eine Wiedergeburt ab ovo' in the highest degree consolatory and elevating, a shelter in late life from the reaction of ' 50. (v Bolin, p 31 and Nachlass, vol 11. 121). He remarks upon its freedom from scholastic expressions, from unholy subjectivity, and also from all reference to German school-philosophy, although it was directed against the transcendental, philosophical, religious, political and even juridical Absolutism of the Germans.

"It is," says Bolin, p 32, " the simplest, completest, most mature of all his writings, where in the form of a certainty happy in itself he sets forth what his earlier works had represented in the form of wearisome philosophical arguments." To his opponents it was a 'mere snake in water', and the indifference was such that the ban upon it still continues, despite the new interest in the science of religion.

To consider it now in a little more detail, we may say that the style is more subdued than in the earlier works, the tone less scathing and bitter, despite occasional outbursts of invective, and the mood is more objective. References to the literary sources indicated in the title are many, especially in the earlier chapters dealing with the Iliad and the Odyssey. But the intention is philosophical or theological, and the literary material/

ial, in itself difficult enough of interpretation, for I understand that the theology of Homer is not definitely settled, is all poured into the familiar moulds. (p38). "The Wish is the original appearance of the gods. Where wishes arise, so also do the gods spring up." There is not treatment of the theories of scholars on questions of literary criticism, only those of Christian theologians. Of the meaning of $\epsilon\beta\rho\iota\varsigma$, the Furies, the conflict of the old and the new gods in Aeschylus we find very little discussion, though of course, (p 347) the principle is laid down that the theological ideas change with changing moral ones.

Homer is said to have used theology as a key to the Iliad, says our author, but he begins with the wrath of Achilles over the insult from Agamemnon, and this is equated with the will of Zeus. (chap 2)
Here also it is established that the gods are the representatives of human self-love, that they appear necessary only in the moments when man forgets and loses himself, that they do only what the man himself does or at least wishes to have done, as he wakes out of the tumult of passion and comes to himself, as, e.g. when the gods preserve the body of Hector for Priam which Achilles in his senseless hate had refused, it was for the interest and deeper intention of Achilles.

"Nature " plays a conspicuous part in his theorisings here as elsewhere, and in chapter 26 is equated with deity. "Gott und Natur sind nur ein Hendiadys," two words with the same meaning, but so also are 'Gott und Mensch '. Zeus is part Nature, part man. (p 226)(235)
But Nature's laws cannot be broken, she rules as necessity, and even/

even the gods must bow before her.

The true and last ground why gods do not fulfil the wishes of men is just that the gods are the servants of Nature and Nature only in her inconsiderate laws. Man himself, as part of a 'wish-denying being' toward man, is over against man, not only a daimon in good but also in evil. (p232).

More space is given to the fact noticed here, that our wishes are denied and thwarted, which would seem impossible if Wish is to be directly equated with God. In chapter 25, e.g., the gods are Janus-like, both denying and affirming our wishes, but that is due to the original natural element in their composition which later becomes separate. For example, the Parsee or Indian prays to fire or water, he presupposes, though he has no human form before his eyes, that this theological being of fire and water is a crypto-anthropomorphic being.

Homer did nothing more than give to this human sense of Nature-religion, as is appropriate, a human body also. He seized the Proteus, the man in fire and water, beast and plant, in short in all natural bodies, transforming and hiding himself behind them, by the throat and compelled him to the confession that Theology, as also natural theology, is only a deceptive incognito for Anthropology. So Homer is unfolded in accordance with the theory of Feuerbach.

As for the inhuman fate, chapter 24, which comes to men, he admits the gods are not only wish-denying and wish-affirming, but are on every side absolutely wish-denying. Chapter 21 says that
in /

in the wavering nature of human wishes is the explanation of the ambiguous and wavering relation of the gods to destiny, or necessity, e.g., if well, I want to live for ever, if sick, I want to die, and so of all our inevitable experiences, they are both feared and loved. But there is another explanation, as indicated above; 'the gods are not only gods/ (i.e. wishes) but at the same time Nature-beings.' "The wish is indeed the origin of religion, of the gods, and the wish itself as such rises from men, but the object of the wish springs from external nature, from the senses: for man has originally no empty supernatural phantastic wishes, the object of his senses were also the objects of his wishes.

From these remarks we see how difficult it is for Feuerbach to detach man and his wishes from the object to which they are referred. The nature-beings force themselves into our life against our wish. The object is prior to the wish and compels recognition of itself. Why should this not be the case also with the object of the supernatural wish which forces itself so inevitably into our life according to Feuerbach's own admission?

But to continue, religion is not derived from natural objects, but from man's impressions of them, and so the gods are not objects of revelation in the ordinary sense, but/a revelation of objects to the senses. only

Nature in man does not say the same as Nature outside, even though man's nature is grounded in Nature, (a statement which hardly makes for clearness). It is all wrong to derive natural and human laws from the same source without distinction.

Monotheism has its source, we are told, in sun-worship, yet on p 390 it is stated that we believe in one God because all our wishes run out to one great desire for happiness, and yet again in earlier writings, e.g. W G. it is said that man has a sense of unity in himself, and because of this he chooses one personality (Jesus in the case of the Christian religion) to be his god. In any case we notice that Feuerbach finds it impossible to get rid of this spell of unity, either in Nature or in Man or in the relation between the two.

Faith is defined, in Chapter 8, as, in its strict significance, nothing but the conviction or certainty of the wish of its fulfilment, e.g., in Immortality, over against a holding for true or a conviction from subjectively sufficient grounds, really sufficient wishes. In Romans XV, 13, God is a God of hope. In Hebrews XI, 1. faith is a sure expectation; its object is the promises, not an object of sense-knowledge

The so-called proofs of the existence of God, p 49. express a great misstatement about the being of gods, "since viewed apart from wishes in this way they are presented as if it were a matter dry and indifferent, just as if it were some mathematical truth." Over against the evils of Rationalism and speculative philosophy masquerading as religion he is anxious to show that religion is a warm personal relationship, though of course he narrows it to a feeling that is subjective. As he says elsewhere, "God is a religious idea", and, p 113, "Pectus facit theologum."

Contrasting the old theology with his version, he tells us/

us, p84, theology creates with God a world out of nothing which is nothing more than just nothing, while anthropology creates with Nature the gods out of the sensitive nothing (empfindlichen Nichts) in the human breast.

The idea of God is really derived from the senses, seeing that the wishes are from the senses. Hence the idea of God is not from a so-called religious sense, or Gefühl, which is only negative impotence,... just the empty space, the place 'where', but not the stuff or seed from which the gods arise. The material is just the fiery, infinite and untamed Glückseligkeits-trieb.

In chapter 9 the very important subject of "Der theogonische Wunsch" is discussed. The Wish is defined as the expression of a Want or Need(Mangel) , of a barrier, a nothing, whether Nichtsein, Nichthaben, Nichtkönnen,... a revolutionary expression against it. "The Wish is ^a ~~the~~ slave of necessity, but a slave with the will of freedom, a son of poverty, of want, but of the poverty which is the mother of desire, of love. In essence this is the impulse to happiness or to succeed in what one does or desires.

From this point of view intellectualism in religion and ^{are} rigorism in morals/~~xxx~~ to be attacked. God is no a priori being, without presupposition (p66), nor to be proved (49), nor the invention of priest and rulers (p105), nor is he 'moral powers' in the meaning of the modern bragging morality-phrase contradicting the happiness-impulse in man. "For morality without/

without happiness is a word without sense."

Along two lines it would appear that the impulse from which religion springs is innate and original, viz., as Feeling of absolute dependence and as Egoism or desire for happiness. Sometimes Feuerbach seems to refer to the one and sometimes to the other. (p47). He compares it to gravitation, to homesickness, to the hunger for food. It is ^{undoubtable, immediate,} approved and valid by itself, needs no proof, is sufficient and happy in itself. It is called deity.

Considerable space is devoted to the discussion of happiness and the two words which seem necessary to explain it, 'Seligkeit' (blessedness, bliss), or as that may seem too otherworldly, 'Glückseligkeit'. The ground of this bliss or happiness is to be found in God's freedom as Creator, for God is the fulfiller of our wishes, or, says Feuerbach correcting himself and showing how difficult it is for him even to escape anthropomorphism or, may we say, objectivity, the fulfilment of the wishes. (389)

God and happiness are one, (383) "God is the preface, happiness the context of Christianity," (381), and the qualities ascribed to the one may be transferred to the other, e.g. incorruptible, immortal, dependent on itself, and vice versa.

Feuerbach sees that there is in religion this wider ^{or universal} reference. That is both its claim and its implication, he says frankly. Happiness is cosmic in its demand for validity. "Unless grounded on omnipotence, blessedness is a pure hypothesis." But of course he reminds us, seeing that God only makes what

the earth

~~NATURE~~ brings forth, he is nothing else than Nature.

The desire for happiness is, however, conditioned by the rights of others to the same satisfaction. Conscience becomes the sense and authority of social usefulness. There is nemesis not only in outward evil but inwardly in the consciousness of the evil deed. Conscience is the 'alter ego', das andere Ich in Ich. So the father is the conscience of the son, friend of friend, the Jew of the Jews, the Greek of the Greeks. (167)

We seem to be working here on a purely empirical basis. Not only faith but 'conscience comes by hearing' and also from the eyes. Conscience is no special endowment (Anlage), above all it is not inborn, but something 'angebildetes', inculcated, often with much trouble driven into oneself by one's own effort (selbst Eingebildetes). Conscience is the fear to do something which involves punishment, even if this consist only in the unfavourable judgment of another, or, in the case of the majority, just the thought, "What will people say?". (p170)

To derive Right from a particular power, from a sense of right distinguished from the fundamental impulse of man, or from a special 'Rechtvernunft', to separate 'Right' from Egoism and Utilitismus, to make it a thing in itself, signifies to derive the hedge which I set as a protection for the pleasure-garden of my right from a particular 'Hedge-sense', to make the hedge from a thing for the garden to a thing for itself, an end in itself. For the judge and lawyers as such it is true the hedge is the chief matter, for it is the boundary of my rights, the/

the dividing partition between mine and thine; but for myself, the occupier or owner, the thorn hedge is only the instrument of my right to keep far away all profane hands and looks from the sanctuary of my self-love."

Certainly Right and Profit (self-love) may contradict one another, but only in special cases. It is not fair to make these exceptions the rule. The conflict of Right and Profit is only one between the profit and interest of another and mine. Unless a man accepts a law for others as well as for himself, he destroys the very foundation of human life and thought, for he wills that the same thing be and not be at one and the same time. (pp174-5)

This is a curious argument, we may remark, which reduces selfishness to an intellectual contradiction. The real argument is, I should imagine, more realistic than this. On p.172 e.g., he mentions "Gleiches Blut, gleiches Gut" as words which express the bond of tribal morality, or again, Feuerbach calls himself not only Egoist but Communist, 'Gemein Mensch'.

Does Conscience need God ? he asks, and answers, "not really". Yet man postulate a divine justice only because human justice does not always reach its goal. (p176). Even if it be said that man judges only the act, but God the conscience, thoughts and intents, does not the Church claim to do that with sword and fire ? What room is left for God ? (The argument, it will be noted, is one 'ad hominem' and so far an evasion.)

" The gods are not lawgivers, nor givers of conscience, but man out of the innermost ground of his nature, from Self-love, wills that there be a Moral Order, (shades of Fichte !) that with crime there be bound penalty and evil, with virtue reward and happiness. The gods only fulfil these hopes and fears."

These are some of the leading thoughts in Feuerbach's social theory. There is however no such thing as a Social Contract in the sense of the 'Contrat Social', the 'Tractatus politicus' or 'The Leviathan'. (ch 38). The Naturalism of our author revolts against the rationalistic presuppositions of these works. "These are groundless, not because godless, but because apart from Nature. (p354) At least they have made only one, and indeed a later, fact of the natural history to be the only and the first fact. The inner and fundamental condition, the mood, the reverence which the common life presupposes for its origin and continuance is that reverence for parents which is grounded in nature, absorbed with the Mother's milk, and arising from physical involuntary dependence and connectedness. There is no difference between reverence for God and reverence for parents, a belief held also by Durkheim. It is to be remembered of course that parents are themselves dependent upon Nature, and therefore only secondary gods, although from the point of view feeling, the human rather than the rational or natural, parents may be more honoured and precious than the gods, since they are the first and nearest cause of our greatest good which is life itself. Unless a man has had experience of an earthly father/

father, therefore, (p 356), he cannot know what God is like; who has never had the feeling of himself over against man as a child cannot think or feel himself a child over against Nature or Deity. So religion and social history go back to Nature and to our mother's milk.

As for Revelation, it is claimed by the pagans for their religion with as ~~much~~ right as by the Christians for theirs, and the difference in the representation of the deity is due to differences in the type and character of the worshipper. In the Scripture we have 'Dichtung' for 'Wahrheit', 'Sage für Geschichte', 'Götter für gegenständliche, materielle Wesen.' (p333). Only a mad-
~~MODERN~~ man would think the pages of Scripture lithographic documents of geology, the box of Noah a zoological garden, etc.

With many quotations from the Fathers and a new emphasis on 'Seligkeit' and also with a wavering between life as continuous and life as heavenly existence, the essence of Christianity is defined as "das Leben, aber das himmelische selige ewige Leben, this alone is true life. But with his unhappy perverseness in exegesis, (296) he explains that the verse, 'God is a spirit' does not signify that God is a God of spirits but that he is a God of the living and not of the dead.

In a chapter on 'The Symbol' (ch 39) he seeks to discredit anthropomorphism, saying, "Man represents the thing through the thing itself, e.g. washing with water to represent purity. The symbol was also the thing, $\epsilon\mu\alpha\kappa\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$, not $\epsilon\mu\alpha\kappa\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$, not similar but identical, though later religion forms and adopts the im-

age, mimicking reality. The symbol also represents the universal. It is a "Gattungsbegriff", but an individual which, part of the species itself, originally comprehends the whole species. (364.-5) For example, the Phallus is a symbol of divine creative power, but the phallus, not indeed the wooden or stone one, is an organ with which man makes not pictures of the senses but actual beings, consequently it is an organ of Nature's own productive power.

The symbol is pantheistic, not theistic. Light is a picture of the spirit, not because man has discovered a resemblance between the light in him and sensible light, but because with the opening of the eyes there comes the opening of consciousness.

The difference between God and man is only a difference between species and classes. (371) Deity is not something over and above human powers, but only above that which man wishes and thinks away from within a power, it is the human power itself, only freed from the burdensome limitations, additions and appendages with which in man it is bound up. (372) It was Aquinas, less human than the Reformers, who sought to make scholastic distinctions between the attributes of God and God, e.g. God has joy, delight, but not as passions, emotions !

Religion is distinguished from Morality (p285) by the difference of prayer from action and of wish from work, e.g. in the Iliad, 7.154, we read, "I battle against him and Athena gives me the victory", so the Scholiast to Apollonios Rhodios praises the poet because of his true delineation of Nature, seeing that the

men consider how the work is to be completed but the women, as being the weaker beings, only are allowed to pray and utter entreaties. Thus "prayer is the only purely religious organ of religion, the only practical as well as theoretical living definition of the nature of the gods, the only true unfalsified confession of faith, for how other than through prayer can I without mixture of atheistic Nature and self-trust prove and confirm faith in the omnipotence, providence and goodness of the gods."

[and sharpening of definition]

To sum up, we may say that amid some variety (and much repetition) there is not much real progress. As in W.C. he reduces all Christian dogmas to his anthropological measure, being simply the realised wishes of the human heart, so in Theogonie with the old religions of Greece, Rome, and Israel. There is a great accumulation of material just to prove the old positions. We may pay tribute to this industry and recognise the justice of his complaint of the heavy cost of the books he had to purchase to equip himself for this task. The W.R. and V.W.R. on the contrary develop a doctrine of Nature which avowedly takes us beyond the book on Christianity.

We note, however, that the feeling of absolute dependence has almost disappeared, and its place has been taken by the 'Glückseligkeitstreib'. Nature is still inexorable, but man is more intense than ever in seeking the completion of his nature as he conceives it. So too a fuller, if not more satisfying account is given of conscience and of social right. When the/

the spring of 1868-9 brought new health to him, he projected a new book on The Will and Happiness-Impulse, and a Treatise on Ethics. (Bolin p 174-6). But later he says, "Nothing new can be begun. The present is for me only a still continuing past."

A fragment on Ethics was found in his Remains.

Even when forty years of age he confesses to C. Kapp that his works are fragmentary (Bolin, p 170-1), setting forth the 'Whole' only from a particular standpoint; they end therefore in a note of interrogation. Such partial representation, he adds, must appear a monster over which a man must be furious, or, if the mood be gracious, greatly marvel.

The simplicity of this appeal may almost disarm the critic, for truly there has been matter sufficient for fury and for marvelling. But, if these works end with a note of interrogation, they demand an answer, and before an answer can be given a critical examination of them must be made. In doing so we may wisely bear in mind, what Feuerbach did not always remember, that it is only a particular standpoint. Though widely accepted to-day it is not a standpoint which enables us to interpret the "Whole" or even its most important sections, those parts of which we are most keenly aware and which we value most highly.

Its very particularity may, however, prove effective some outstanding truths, that prayer belongs to the essence of religion, that the feeling of absolute dependence rises into trust and joy, that Nature is not independent of God and that Man dependent upon both is the goal of Nature and member of a Kingdom of Ends.

Critical Examination of Feuerbach's Argument
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CHAPTER. V.

SECTION 1.

Introductory:

Influence of his Personality

and contemporary Politics.

Desire for Reality

and Anti-Hegelianism.

" I find I have been only in an enchanted castle,
 I have been imposed upon by spectres and appar-
 itions. I see myself and the whole frame of
 Nature shrink into fleeting ideas, which like
 Epicurus' atoms dance about in emptiness."

Thomas Reid concerning

Hume's Philosophy.

Chapter V.

Section 1. Introductory. Desire for Reality and
Anti-Hegelianism.-----
A critical Examination of Feuerbach's Argument.

We have now passed in review the most important of F.'s writings on Religion. Other writings may be said for the most part only to expand particular points raised but the principles remain the same. The emphasis undoubtedly changes, as will have been perceived, more indeed than Feuerbach was himself aware. Yet we saw how in the preface to S.W. he looked forward rather than backward and would use the past only as material for the future. We note also his confession to Bolin that he offers a view only from one particular standpoint.

From the beginning however religion is treated a something false, religious experience as ordinarily conceived does not give us reality: God comes to be described as a creation of the theogonic wish: man cannot escape his own nature; Theology is anthropology.

It is obvious that many elements are involved in the arguments employed, psychological, philosophical, political even, certainly social, not to mention personal experiences. It shall now be our task to disentangle these various strands and to test their cogency and worth.

1. We shall touch out briefly upon the personal and political elements for these have been dealt with sufficiently stressing at some length the philosophical presuppositions as they are developed out of opposition to Hegel.

Chapter V. Section 1.

2. The method employed is analytical and the approach psychological.
3. Hence (a) we are given a Schema of the human powers involving his theory of man, Nature and God, and (b) the stages by which transition is made from Nature to Man as the object of religion.
4. These elements are linked up with a peculiar Epistemology or religious Phenomenalism.
5. Thereafter we shall consider the Mechanism of the Theogonic Wish; 6. and the relation of Religion as practical to morality.
7. Passing to the substitute for Religion which F. offers us in Humanity as divine, we shall then set the Criticism of Barth alongside ^{Feuerbach's} ~~the~~ Theology and consider what Luther has to say of Revelation.

Concluding with a statement of Religion as immediate experience and a summary of the Thesis, or Conclusions.

A// Feuerbach's personal desire for reality and his political condemnation of "Schein" or appearance entered into his criticism of theology. Strange as it may appear, he denounced Religion because it was not real enough. In his early days he desired something which went beyond books and instruction and ecclesiastical systems. Despite all the wildness of his language there still remain traces of what we might call the religious instinct, so that now and again we are surprised by assertions of real insight. His interpretation of Christian doctrine is in/

in its own way more sympathetic and penetrating than Hegel's. One can only call extraordinary the number of his references to Luther and the Fathers. Leese, p 4, gives us this formidable list, "Tertullian, Salvian, Ambrosius, Hieronymus, Athanasius, Augustin, Cyprian, Arnobius, Lactantius, Clemens Alexandrinus, Origenes, Gregor von Nyssa, Chrysostomus, Theodoret, Minucius Felix, Albertus Magnus, Thomas von Aquino, Bernhard von Clairvaux, die Mystiker, Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, die Bekenntnisschriften, Konzilsbeschlusse, Bibelstellen und das Gesangbuch der Brudergemeinde -- die Genannte sind es, die Feuerbach plündert, um ein Gebilde zu konstruieren, das er als 'Wesen des Christentums' repräsentiert."

Finally I need only mention the somewhat pathetic insistence with which he declares that he is no atheist, at least in the extraordinary sense. We recall that in the Preface, S.W. p xv he complains, "He who says and knows of me no more than that I am an atheist says and knows of me just as much as nothing," while in W.C. he writes, "It is false to say, I say Religion is nothing, God is nothing. I only show that they are not what the illusions of theology make them." It is with the illusion of theology that he has to do, not with that of religion, as he indicated in the title for W.C. which was rejected. The trouble is that he is employing his own interpretation of words and deluding himself as well as others.

In his relations with Max Stirner he reveals this effort to save something from the wreckers. This writer, in his book, "Der Einzige und sein Eigentum", attacked him as a 'pious atheist' who/

who gives us only a theological deliverance from theology and religion. He takes away the Subject, God, but leaves the attributes, and this he has to do, for God is a Being compacted of all realities having the predicates of nature and of man. Stirner on the other hand went all the way of individualism and was prepared to renounce every obligation save that of self.

To this Feuerbach hotly replied disputing the presentation of his case as partial and misleading, and as for the title, well if he is to be dubbed atheist one gets the impression he does not object to the adjective.

His aim is after all not uncommon among those who have left a communion or party; he endeavours to retain all he can of what is best, i.e. the ethical elements of religion, while adapting both the doctrine and the practice to his own purposes. He tells us he denies only to affirm. In WC, he claims that the first or positive part is the important section and the second only imposed upon him by sheer honesty. In VWR P 28, 29, 329, he declares his aim is "to lighten the darkness of Religion so that it may not be the plaything of powers hostile to man who still today serve themselves with the darkness of religion for the oppression of men, to turn this unconscious twisted phantastic reverence and love of man... into conscious straightforward rational reverence and love. (also p 29 quoted). In searching for reality he found himself thrown back on Nature and sensibility. (VWR p 16)./

(VWR p 16). Through the study of Religion and Nature he had come to discover the full meaning of 'Sinnlichkeit' in Religion and the full meaning of the senses. And man is real not as a phantom or half angel half man but as a creature of earth.

"God was my first thought, Nature my second, and Man my third." So he discovered that Man is the beginning, the middle, and the end of Religion, and considered that he had found the essence of religion when he made it an affair of man and man alone.

But he was the victim of an illusion when he supposed that this was still religion. He had left out the reference to a transcendental object, although he was aware, (WC p 44), "It certainly is the interest of religion that its object should be distinct from man, but it is also, may, yet more its interest that his object should have human attributes." Hence in his efforts to explain the feeling of absolute dependence he finds he cannot leave man supreme as he desires except by a suspicious process of inversion. Nature has her say in the end, and so Von Hügel contrasts the warm humanity of W C. with the cold chill atmosphere of W.R. and the Stoic submission it inculcates. Along this course Feuerbach was carried in his search for something real. He thought it was the desire to uncover the essence of religion but in part at least it was the result of his opposition to Hegel.

B.
Feuerbach's/

B.

Feuerbach's relation to Hegel deserves a special note which will be added later. At present we remark only the reaction which, he tells us, is the clue to his theory (vol. I. 248). The transcendental deduction of Sein from Denken, the existence of the object from the thought of it drove him to emphasise in aggressive and, as will appear, excessive fashion the mere 'given' the data of sense-experience. He objected also to Hegel's statement of the relation of Philosophy to Theology, in which religion presents us with the concepts of philosophy merely under the form of imagination. He wants to be rid of "this unbelieving faith which professes to be satisfied with ideas which it knows to be incomplete." (Pref. S.W.).

" I battle against the abstract unhumanity of philosophy as much as against the imaginary illusion of religion." (V.W.R. 16, 17). "What to Hegel is secondary, formal subjective is to me first, objective, essential (I. 249). According to Hegel e.g. Empfindung das Gefühl, das Herz, is the form into which the content of religion must sink in order to become the property of man : according to myself, the object, the content of the religious feeling itself, is nothing else than the 'Wesen des Herzens'.."

Jodl, p 69, says that after laying the foundations of his philosophy Feuerbach makes the religious problem central and henceforth philosophy almost disappears. But may it not be said also that at the beginning in the laying of his philosophical/

ical foundation and in his attack on Hegel Feuerbach is prompted by an understanding of religion as an experience quite different from correct or even noble thinking. He begins his S.W. with Explanations and Expansions of W.C., which contain the essential consequences as also the premisses of this writing (p xvi). His doctrine is Religion or Philosophy, name it as you please, (3rd Lect. V.W.R.). Pure thought must be humanised. As pure thought it is not for men. (Intro. S.W.8).

"The world is not given us through thinking but through life, intuition and sense" (W.R. 25) Sinnlichkeit stood for reality (WR 16) over against thought, and although Feuerbach (S.W. XIII), says it is not to be taken abstractly by itself or else we shall have a dualism over against Spirit not to be surmounted, it continues to be a supreme and final test of reality. We must have a God that can be perceived felt and handled, in space and time like any sensible object. Sinnlichkeit passes over into the larger conception of Man, as Jodl points out and as Feuerbach himself indicates, (SW XIII), But it is man as a sensible individual over against the despotic Universal. Even when he comes to define Man as a being separate from the animals by reason of his self-consciousness, this unique quality serves not to lift man above the limitation of sense into the free world of thought. This privilege rather makes him more subject to illusion in so far as he makes a distinct object to himself of the self of which he is conscious. It is indeed a strange sequel to the vaunted superiority of man that in so important/

important and precious a matter as religion he should really be at a disadvantage with the animals. They at least do not deceive themselves.

But of the place of self-consciousness in his system we shall see more later. The point here is that in his effort to make Religion real he has to make it wholly human or rather human in a narrow and untrue fashion. "Apart from earth I am a phantom. I am essentially a being of earth "(VWR Lect. 29) Realism becomes Naturalism with the emphasis on sense-experience.

Feuerbach however is sufficiently the heir of the great idealist tradition ^{it} to make a spirited declaration against this conclusion. He is not a materialist nor is he a spiritualist. Both theories in isolation are false. Only together do they present the truth and neither must yield to the other. Here is psycho-physical parallelism anticipated but without exact details. Or, we have really a dualism covered by a name, "Organismus", an interesting anticipation of those religious psychologists who have enlisted the concepts of biology to explain "Behaviour" and who find in all the arts and activities of man a function of a particular environment. (Uren, p. 101 "Ames").

He presents the rather pathetic figure of a man who puzzles his friends as much as his enemies. He seeks to keep the even path between the flesh and the spirit. He is on friendly terms with the Materialist writers, see his review of Moleschott's book and correspondence, (Bolin p 26). (See Note, Feuerbach and/

and the Materialists). But he is also pledged to self-consciousness and morality. Do his Socialist friends upbraid him, saying, 'Your writings are useless rubbish', because they do not have any bearing on such a case as that of the woman who had become a criminal and in defence explained, 'I feel as if the evil thoughts rose out of my stomach,' a picture indeed of present-day Society? Then he replies, 'True, yet there are many evils, even stomach troubles which have their reason only in the head. I have set myself the task of the exploration and healing of the head and heart sickness of man'.

The theological question is dissolved into the social and political. In the preface to his S.W. XIV he says the question whether God exist or not, the opposition of Theism and Atheism belongs to the Eighteenth and seventeenth century, but no more to the nineteenth. I deny God, that is for me, I deny the negation of man. I put in the place of the illusory phantastic heavenly 'Position' of man which in actual life becomes necessarily the negation of man, the sensible actual, consequently of necessity also political and social 'Position' of man. The question of the existence or nonexistence of God is just, so far as I am concerned, only the question of the existence or non-existence of man."

He really leaves unsolved the problem of the reality of the spiritual over against the material and their relative importance. Or rather the die is cast against the claims of the spiritual by the sheer fact of sensible conditions. Religion to be real must be human only.

HIS METHOD.

CHAPTER . . . V.

SECTION 2.

Feuerbach's METHOD,

analytical and psychological
etc.

"Method is procedure according to principle."

"Dogmatism is procedure without previous criticism of
the conceptions involved."

(Kant)

Chapter V. Section 2.

HIS METHOD.

With this fever of realism in his blood he defines his METHOD. He calls himself 'an inductive theologian, a natural philosopher in the domain of spirit'. His enquiry is an empirical or historico-philosophical analysis, a faithful and correct translation of the Christian religion out of the oriental language of imagery into plain speech.' He repudiates all self-sufficient speculation. The general propositions in the Intro. to W.C. are, he tells us, 'no apriori excogitated propositions but are generalisations from known manifestations of human nature and in particular of the religious consciousness.' As a matter of fact this philosophical introduction was written after the rest of the book and only set first because that is the fashion. "I differ toto caelo from those philosophers who pluck out their eyes that they may see better. I therein call upon the senses themselves to witness to the truth of my analysis and my ideas.'

With such a Method Feuerbach is rather apologetic about the philosophical or theological atmosphere of his argument. He is 'forced to appear even to speculate or which is the same thing, to turn theologian while I nevertheless only analyse speculation, reduce theology to anthropology.'

Perhaps it were well for him to be apologetic since speculation and theology no one can escape who endeavours to understand life. It is easy for him to say '(Vol II, 414)

"Keine/

"Keine philosophie ist meine Philosophie". But what he means is not the abandonment of connected thinking on great themes, but freedom from abstract and empty concepts and concentration upon what the facts have to say for themselves. He wishes to give which is not merely historical but philosophical and in the main analytic. Bauer deals with Biblical theology, Strauss with Christian doctrine and the Life of Jesus. But Feuerbach claims a larger view. He deals with Christianity in general, with religion and the causes of religion as it has actually developed in Christianity and in Christian men, so that his quotations are from men such as Luther and Augustine, 'in whom Christianity was not a dogma nor doctrine but religion."

Now it is possible and proper to criticise such a method and to ask whether analysis and history can ever by themselves give us the essence of Christianity. Leese, p. 5, takes up this point and quotes effectively both Troeltsch and Hegel. Christianity is not merely a magnitude of historical importance situated in the past but it is an eternally present magnitude, an eternally present question which must be answered through a synthesis of historical and empirical induction and a point of view which on the basis of personal experience has come to some decision as to the truth or untruth of the Christian religion. Or as Hegel has put it with his gift of illustration. 'If the knowledge were only historical, then we must regard such theologians as cashiers in a business house whose books and calculations deal only with/

with the wealth of another man.. they receive indeed a salary but their merit is only to serve and register the property of others'.

This is quite right, but to the open mind history has its own witness to bring, and there are those who have been convinced of the truth and value of Christianity as the story unfolded itself before their enquiring soul. This result of course cannot come to one who regards it as a cold science as Feuerbach says he intends to do, (W.C. VI). These words are certainly ominous, but the names of the witnesses he claims to produce show that he was not quite so mechanically minded.

Quite as important as this objection to the method is the other that Feuerbach, claiming to be historical, is not true to his promise. Romanticism had its real interest in history, though mixed with speculation and imagination in many cases. But our author was influenced by the latter more than by the former. This indeed is his crime that professing to study and present historical facts he viewed them not dispassionately, but through the ideas which he had come to form in his revolt from Hegel.

In fact his enquiry is more psychological than historical, i.e. it is ruled as we shall see immediately, by an analysis of the activities of human nature. He presents us with a Schema or classification of these activities in a very neat and compact form, and this after it has been made is employed to/

to decide the whole question of the value truth and reality of religion. Based as it may appear on an actual survey of our powers, it is really an a priori construction, a formula as intellectual and potent as that of Hegel.

Starcke p 95, 96 points out that Feuerbach's terminology varies e.g. in Bayle the theoretical reason looks to the welfare of the individual (e.g. it might keep a woman from marriage because of the possible pains of motherhood) while the practical reason is the universal etc. But for the more important writings there is little change or difficulty except on the smaller matter of the difference between Herz and Gemüth and the larger concern of the definitions of man and Nature and the relation of the one to the other.

The point is that Psychology is to command the field. " Our task, he says (W.C. 86), is to show that theology is nothing more than an unconscious esoteric pathological anthropological psychology.' or more briefly, " My task is to solve a psychological riddle, unnecessary because history has already solved it.' (I.223.).

This is warning enough, and Jodl scarcely veils the presuppositions with which Feuerbach comes to investigate Christianity when he says, "the new thing in Feuerbach is his understanding of the practical, passive, not to say, pathological character of Religion. Its roots are not in thinking but in the heart and will." So much is certainly true that Feuerbach exposed the practical side of religion but/

but that merit was overshadowed by what he considered to be its unconscious and pathological elements.

As we go on to consider what further was presupposed in the exposition of religion by a psychological analysis of the human faculties, it will be useful to have before us for our guidance the three principles which Leuba has set down for the conduct of just such an enquiry, p.212. P.S.R.

1. Religious faith in God or gods rests on the conclusion of inductions from inner experience.
 2. Religious experience as inner experience comes under the competence of empirical psychology without any restriction.
 3. As empirical magnitudes the gods of religion come within the competence of science especially of empirical psychology.
- I quote this concise statement from Wobbermin (p 14 ff), for he make the illuminating comment, "thus for Leuba empirical psychology as the appropriate scientific discipline proves the religious belief in God to be an indefensible illusion, for religious experience under this view is only a particular derivative of the life of the human soul. Since religious experience usually is concentrated in belief in God, so belief in God has also to take its place under this condemnation also. And in consequence belief in God is emptied of its object and set before us as an illusion. Leuba thus takes over the role of a modern Feuerbach. Indeed the theory of Illusionism is carried through by Leuba in a fashion even more disproportionately rigid and persistent than by Feuerbach."

How far this parallel between Feuerbach and Leuba exists we have sought to show in a Note at the end.

It is time now to turn to the details of our author's Psychology.

SECTION 13

a) Psychological Schema of the Human Psyche
involving his theory
of Man Nature and God.
of the stages by which the Transition to such a
Nature is made as the
Object of Religion.

"Blood and brain and spirit three
(say the dearest gnomes of Earth)
Join for true felicity."

CHAPTER. V.

SECTION 3 /.

- a) Psychological Schama of the Human Powers
involving his theory
of Man Nature and God.
- b) the Stages by which the Transition is made from
Nature to Man as the
Object of Religion.

" Blood and brain and spirit three
(say the deepest gnomes of Earth)
Join for true felicity ."

(Meredith)

FEUERBACH'S PSYCHOLOGICAL SCHEMA of the human powers ~~in-v~~olving his Theory of Man, Nature and God.

Remembering that in general man consists of mind, affection, and will, (according to Feuerbach, these are not qualities or possessions of man, they are man) we may set down his schema thus, chiefly from the invaluable and important notes in W.C.

Over against Reason with Science and Inference as its instruments, Nature as its object, Law as its life, Morality as its expression showing itself in the Species or Race of Man developing along historical lines, we are to set Feeling with Imagination restrained and guided only by the deeper instincts of the Heart, finding God as its object, Miracle as its instrument and reaching out in faith and freedom to the blessedness of the supernatural life, concerned more with the individual than with the species, scorning the world through its doctrine of Creation out of nothing and a particular Providence, and declaring its independence of the world by habits of celibacy and Monachism which already carry it to the gates of heaven.

It is all very neat and compact and quite in the fashion of the speculative philosophers and theologians like Schleiermacher who loved a Lehrgebäude.

We notice that the decisive contrast is between Reason and Feeling (with Imagination) and between Nature and God.

Unlike/

Chapter V. Section 3 (a). Schema.

Unlike Kant and Hegel he refuses to distinguish Reason from Understanding. There is only one Vernunft or Verstand. The 'Ideas' of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, which were 'problematical conceptions' (p 236) such that we can have no knowledge of an object corresponding perfectly to an 'idea', and yet were the means by which a passage might be made from our conceptions of Nature and the Non-ego to the practical conceptions p 230), these were set aside by Feuerbach. So too with the Hegelian claim for the Reason which can solve the antinomies into which the Understanding falls: that also is set aside.

The Understanding or Reason is the scientific part of our nature, "that part which is neutral, impassible, not to be bribed, not subject to illusions, sees fact as fact." Other definitions make clear its interest in the Universal, in Law and in general concepts such as the Species or Race.

Linked with Understanding is Nature, its counterpart, which plays so large a part in Feuerbach's Schema. It cannot be said to be so easily defined as Understanding. Its meaning is elusive and changing in several respects. It is always making its appearance in W.C., W.R, VWR & Theogonie as we have seen. It is a ghost that is never laid, haunting him to the end. There is no need to be surprised at this for the problem is a critical one in every philosophy. Nor can we be/

be surprised that he should be challenged, VWR, Lect. XI p 116, What is your definition of Nature? You do not give one. Spinoza spoke of God and Nature as synonymous. Do you?"

"No, he replies, Nature is self-subsistent and eternal. She is a Republic. Nature is no less thinkable without God, an external and supernatural Being than is the state without a lordly idol." (Lect I). Nature is the Inbegriff of all sensible powers, things and beings which man distinguishes from himself as not human: like Spinoza **he** means by Nature a being not supernatural, working not by will and understanding but by necessity of its nature, but unlike Spinoza, it is not at the same time supernatural supersensible aloof secret simple, but a being manifold popular real perceptible by all the senses. Nature is everything which proves itself to man sensibly as ground and object of his life apart from the supernatural infiltrations of theistic faith. Nature is light, electricity magnetism air water fire earth animal plant, is man so far as he is an involuntary and unconscious being, nothing more, nothing nebulous mystical, theological..."

That is to say that Feuerbach will have nothing to do with Spinoza's distinction between 'Natura naturans' and 'Natura naturata' (The Ethics Part I. Proposition 29 note), maintaining that the latter is the only reality.

Practically the same definition is given in W.R. p 410, note/

note 2 where he safeguards himself as a nominalist at war with general concepts by saying that he uses it only as a general word, but not a Universal withdrawn from and separated from actual things, a personified and mysterious Wesen.

At the same time he makes statements which link up Nature more closely with Reason, presumably man's since we know of no other, and yet other passages/^{occur} where Nature is removed from this scene of appearances and becomes a thing in itself.

In Bayle "Nature is embodied Reason" and that seems to be at the back of his mind all along, for Nature is the sphere in which Miracles do not happen. Also in WC. p 133 Nature is the material to which mind gives the form, quite a Kantian idea and again involved in his conception of science.

Yet Feuerbach cannot get away from the "Natura naturans". (VWR p 27) "The unconscious being of Nature is to me the Eternal the underived being the first Being in time, though not ~~in rank~~, the physical but not the first moral being." And again WR. Para 47, "the appearance of Nature is for us indeed reason, but the cause of this appearance is as little reason as the cause of light is light.

1.
To sum up, we may say that Nature may mean/either sense material or sense objects; 2. sense objects as the material of physical law or necessity, the realm of science, presumably a closed system, since miracle is shut out, although there is some spiritual interaction not further defined and Jodl points out that Feuerbach in his definition of sensation and thought/

thought wants to leave the system of Nature open because there are so many objects in Nature uncomprehended (this of course is in line with a consistent nominalism and individualism.) see later on his theory of knowledge;

3. The eternal uncomprehended Power in the background, our great parent, and like all parents made to be criticised by their children, but unlike some parents at least we notice it has the power of the last word. In fact it looms large over humanity as a Fate or Necessity or, dare we say it, as a God. It is the source of man's life, it rules his temporal existence through his needs and it eventually brings him to the dust. In Theogonie, chap 26, he points out that in Homer, according to his interpretation, God and Nature are merely a hendiadys, two words with the same meaning, but so also are God and man. And in WR Para 28 he says simply "The divinity of Nature is the basis of all religion, including Christianity, the divinity of man the aim of all religion." The relation between the basis and the aim of religion and between Nature and Man is never satisfactorily dealt with, though Nature lends herself to the play of man's phantasy and reason so that he thinks his "impressions" of Nature are true both in a scientific and in a theological sense.

As for man's relation to Nature and how he is both inside and outside her we shall have an opportunity to consider later when we deal with the transition from the Feeling of absolute Dependence to Egoismus. The present explication of/

But it is to be recognised that Schleiermacher is too rich a thinker and personality to maintain consistency. His speculative and romantic monism is wont to neglect the teleological trend of life, although he defined Christianity, (para 11. Glre), as " a monotheistic faith of the teleological type which is essentially distinguished from other such faiths by the fact that everything in it is related to the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth." The historical element in the life of Jesus is limited to the events as they are comprehended by the narrow capacities of the first disciples, and the Resurrection, the Ascension, and the Session at the right hand of the Father are lightly dealt with because they are not considered redemptively important. His desire to construct a 'Lehrgebäude' leads him to make a division of his great work into two parts, para 29, the first dealing with the religious consciousness in general, as it is always presupposed but also always contained in every Christian religious affection, (or state of mind) thus postponing the definite historical reference and the contradiction involved by sin.

These general influences apart, para 50 is the most damaging sentence and closest to the subjectivity of which Feuerbach and others accuse him. "All attributes which we ascribe to God are not to be taken as indicating something specific in God, but only something specific in our manner of referring to/

to Him the feeling of absolute dependence." Under the influence of the Kantian phenomenalism he is reluctant to say too much about God in His own nature.

But with all his aberrations Schleiermacher traces this feeling to religious experience, desires to say that it is separate from other feelings, not in degree merely but in quality. It refers to the unity above all differences, not just to the world in the sense of the collectiveness of the temporal being and still less an individual part of the same. Religion is 'sui generis' and it gives us a feeling of the Universe as no other does. As one takes a comprehensive view of the 'Glaubenslehre' as well as the 'Reden', we must admit that Schleiermacher intends us to see in religious experience an objective reference and a genuine validity. (Wobbermin and Leese have both interesting and valuable discussions on this point), It might be said that his treatment of man too suffers from the mingling of various motives in his mind. Being equally dependent with Nature upon a God who is described as a 'Woher', a Source or a Causality, man is not given the place over against Nature to which he is entitled. Yet a defective presentation of God does not mean Schleiermacher offers a theology without a God. He was so far from being cowardly that he was courageously inconsistent.

Our chief concern, however, is to show that Feuerbach, appropriating/

appropriating the phrase 'feeling of absolute dependence' as characteristic of religion, also gives it an object, viz, Nature. At the same time we are compelled to notice his other statements which seem inconsistent with this. Nature as the object of the religious emotion is displaced by human phantasies, the God of heart, the God created of the human wish, while in another place Feuerbach seems to substitute the Race of Man either as an ideal or in its totality. These varying descriptions appear to reflect the mood in which he happens to be and are not related to one another in a final or satisfactory fashion.

At times Nature is treated with high disdain, and yet again Nature rebuffs her offspring driving him to take refuge in a God of phantasy. The boot is on the leg of now one, now the other. Human progress we are told is away from Nature, and as man develops, especially as he becomes more a political and less (comparatively speaking only of course) a physical being, his conception of God changes. Zeus is the father of kings. Physical existence is subordinated to civil and moral. The criminal code is equated with the code of Nature. The Roman Emperor is called by the Christians 'you, divinity'. Nature is forgotten. The East has no story of progress such as enriches the West because it has not set itself above Nature East and West are related in outlook and character as the countryman and the man of the town. Only the towns make/

make history: only human vanity is the principle of history, (WR para 37, 38, p 451).

Man, i.e. has to set himself above Nature to attain the richer life. What becomes of his dependence then? Or is Civilization after all a mistake? At any rate Nature has the last word. Death ends all argument. But does it, even for Feuerbach? "The grave of man is the birthplace of the gods." And this may possibly mean that man meets Nature's last challenge with a defiance which may have only imagination behind it, but appears with a force which suggests it has an authority above nature and even above Man.

But Feuerbach saves himself with words, "The feeling of absolute dependence is the ground of religion and its object was originally nothing more than Nature (W R p 411) Yet he reminds us that the lower stages of religion are carried up into the higher. If that be so, why should not the original objective reference be found in the higher stages as well as in the lower? Because God, originally nothing else than Nature, has been changed into a phantasy? or is it just because Feuerbach allows himself to be ruled by the early conception of religion and does not allow any real development in the religious consciousness? He is in fact a victim of the purely genetic method.

It would appear therefore that to Feuerbach the feeling of absolute dependence is not the merely subjective emotion which he declares it to be in Schleiermacher's theory of religion.

It/

he has no desire to reduce religion to something onesided, abstract. My F A D is no theological Schleiermacherish cloudy, undetermined abstract feeling. It has eyes and ears." Its object is Nature, the object of the senses, and thus our impressions vary and idiosyncrasies in our conception of Nature develop with varying sympathies (free translation) But, p 42, Man seeks a "Mittel" or instrument against that upon which he is dependent, e.g. a belief in immortality, or the religious wish and only prayer of primitive people, "Strike me not dead".

Fear therefore, he says wisely, more wisely than Leuba at times, is not the complete and sufficient ground for the explanation of religion. Fear for one thing is transitory, for it does not look at the future, but also because after the fear is past, a feeling opposed to fear follows, viz, deliverance, joy love gratitude.

And again he says, "I separate myself from the earlier atheists and pantheists, who in this connection hold similar views with the atheists, that I give for religion not only negative grounds of explanation, but also positive, not only ignorance and fear, but also the emotions opposed to fear, the positive emotions of joy, gratitude, love reverence which are deified." (VWR pp 3738).

It is obvious that he has enlarged this primitive feeling of dependence, using this sense of awe and mystery, "Mana" as/

as the scholars call it today, which is at the root of religion, so that man's nature and desires are brought actively and not merely passively into relation with nature. Thus man with his higher aims or deeper needs becomes the centre of the play in the effort to use Nature to his own advantage. She stands over against him as a great storehouse of wealth, a factory for tools whereby he will subdue all things unto himself until Nature (*bewusstlose Natur*) rings down the curtain and dismisses her workmen.

He accuses (VWR42) Theism of isolating Man from Nature. He does so himself without recognising that Nature herself receives a new meaning as the mother and source of such an independent offspring. She becomes the Universe, the Fountain of Life, '*Natura naturans*'.

This egoism also, this desire for the preservation of such a self as man is admitted to be, which Nature herself fosters, so that she becomes to it both nurse and guide, is not just worldly nor selfish nor merely human, but noble unselfish and related to the cosmic powers. For this Egoism is not absolutely self-dependent. It is dependent on other men and it is, as a need of his nature as well as an aim of his spirit, dependent upon that power which is above all and through all and in us all. But Feuerbach is limited in his power to give expression to this because of his conception of Nature as the realm of scientific law and exhaustively revealed in sense-perception./

he possesses self-consciousness.

And then a third stage is reached in this new definition of religion with the assertion that "consciousness is present in the strictest sense only in a being to whom his species, his essential nature, is an object of thought. The brute is indeed conscious of himself as an individual, and he has accordingly the feeling of self as the common centre of successive sensations but not as species: hence he is without that consciousness which in its nature as in its name is akin to Science, Science is the cognisance of species."

"Hence the brute has only a simple, man a two-fold life; in the brute the inner life is one with the outer; man has both an inner and an outer life. The brute can exercise no function which has relation to its species without another individual external to it but man can perform the functions of thought and of speech, which strictly imply such a relation apart from another individual. Man is himself at once I and Thou: he can put himself in the place of another, for this reason that to him his species, his essential nature, and not merely his individuality, is an object of thought. Religion being thus identical with the distinctive characteristic of man, is then identical with self-consciousness. But Religion, expressed generally is consciousness of the infinite, thus it is and can be nothing else than the consciousness which man has of his own not limited and finite but infinite nature.

C H A P T E R, V.

SECTION 4.

Feuerbach 's Doctrine of Self-consciousness
and of the Knowledge of the Infinite
or God.

His religious Phenomenalism

" When you go one step beyond the mundane system,
you only excite an inquisitive humour which it is
impossible ever to satisfy."

" Our ideas reach no farther than our experience; we
have no experience of any divine attributes or
operations: I need not conclude my syllogism:
You can draw the inference yourself. "

(Hume, Dialogues
p 409, & p 391)

Chapter V. Section 4. Knowledge.

Feuerbach's Doctrine of Self-consciousness

and of the knowledge of the Infinite or God.

The question of man's self-consciousness and knowledge has come at the end of an examination of the psychological study which Feuerbach makes of human nature.

'Feeling' we saw to be marked down as the decisive element in Religion and most fitly described as a feeling of absolute dependence. This led to a discussion of the object upon which a man feels himself dependent. Originally 'Nature', this object becomes 'Man', seeking a perfection and completeness over against the barriers of Nature, an ideal only to be realised in the Race or Species, upon which therefore he feels himself dependent. In this argument there is, it will be observed, a curious mixture of qualitative with quantitative perfection, as if the mass of humanity must be better because bigger than the individual. Yet man is not a mere individual or unit; he has a sense of the infinite within him, but this infinite is real only as it refers to humanity as a species.

To keep this 'infinite' of which man is undoubtedly conscious within the limits of humanity is the goal sought. Feuerbach achieves it by the limitation of man's knowledge to what is human and to what is sensible or perceived by the senses, by a statement of the relation of predicate to subject which denies ~~the~~ the existence of the subject when reference is made to God, and also by a reference to the varieties of religion.

The result is a religious phenomenalism which denies the transcendental/

transcendental object of theology and which makes other knowledge eventually also phenomenal, or simply our 'impressions' of the world about us with no assurance as to their independent reality or truth.

This however is to anticipate, and we must look at details. His fundamental proposition runs, 'Intro. W.C. p2', "The consciousness of the infinite is nothing else than the consciousness of the infinity of consciousness, or in the consciousness of the infinite the conscious subject has for his object the infinity of his own nature."

What is meant here is stated more simply perhaps in the words "The predicate is the truth of the subject, what the subject is lies only in the predicate. Subject and predicate are distinguished only as existence and essence. The negation of the predicates is therefore the negation of the subject." (W.C. pl9)

This effort to get rid of the subject and make the predicates alone real, for that is what it amounts to, is of course to demonstrate the illusory character of the divine being whose attributes are real only so far as they are abstractions of man's moral and intellectual ~~XXXXX~~ qualities. Man is the ~~Ens~~ realissimum. It is his predicates which are real. His consciousness does not go beyond his own qualities and infinity is a predicate of himself and not otherwise an object of his knowledge.

Feuerbach has here in mind not only the Scholastic problems of the relation between substance and accidents or the universal and the particular, but the associated argument, the Ontological, for the existence of God from the idea of a perfect being. In this, he says, we simply clothe the idea of God with the ideal or abstract qualities of human nature; since

Chapter V. Section 4. Knowledge.

since man originally used the idea of 'being' or 'existence' as the idea of truth, he comes to regard what is true as actually existing. "Now God is the nature of man regarded as absolute truth.. the truth of man; but God, or what is the same thing religion, is as various as are the conditions under which man conceived his nature, regards it as the highest being ... the qualities of God are nothing else than the essential qualities of man himself, and a particular man is what he is, has his existence, his reality only in his particular conditions. Take away from the Greek the quality of being Greek and you take away his existence. Being a Greek his gods are necessarily Greek and necessarily real existent. How can he doubt this, for it is essential to and identical with his own nature." Or, in the reverse process, "Man abstracts more and more from God and attributes more and more to himself." (W C. p 31).

Only with philosophical abstraction arises the distinction or separation between subject and predicate, existence and nature, the fiction that the existence of the subject is something else than the predicate, something immediate, indubitable, in distinction from the predicate which is held to be doubtful. But this is only a fiction. A God who has abstract predicates has also an abstract existence. Existence, being, varies with varying qualities".

There are two arguments here. ^{I/} ~~the~~ The matter-of-fact one, that with the progressive development of religion God is conceived variously, varying also with the country nationality and life of men.

2./The philosophical argument, a. that truth in idea

Chapter V. Section. 4. Knowledge.

ion of a concept is a predicate which adds to and enlarges the conception. It must not therefore be contained in the conception. Being is evidently not a real predicate." "The real contains no more than ^{the} possible. A hundred real dollars contain no more than a hundred possible dollars....But in reckoning my wealth there may be said to be more in a hundred real dollars than in a hundred possible dollars, that is, in the mere conception of them. For the real object, the dollars, is not analytically contained in my conception, but forms a synthetical addition to my conception (which, he adds strangely) is merely a determination of my mental state, although this objective reality, this existence, apart from my conception, does not in the least increase the afore said hundred dollars."

The test of reality, it is declared by Kant, p 367, belongs entirely to the sphere of experience, "in the case of sensuous objects this is attained by their connection according to empirical laws with some of my perceptions; but there is no means of cognising the existence of objects of pure thought because it must be cognised completely a priori." The notion of a Supreme Being is in many respects, he admits, a highly 'useful' idea; but for the very reason that it is an 'idea', it is incapable of enlarging our cognition with regard to the existence of things."

It is evident that Feuerbach has material here suited to his theories.

Two things require to be said however, before we pass from these quotations, the first has to do with Kant and the second with/

with Hegel.

We must remember the many and careful qualifications which Kant makes in K R V. in which he leaves room for other experience than sensible or sensuous, and so far prepares the way for the other Critiques. Most unjustly the first of the three books has been taken to represent his complete message, whereas the introduction itself warns us expressly that his criticism is really in the interests of religion. He wishes to abolish knowledge to make room for belief. (pp XXXIII & XXXV). The conception of a noumenon is not self-contradictory, because we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition. (p. 186) It must be carefully borne in mind, that while we surrender the power of cognising, we still reserve the power of thinking objects as things in themselves (XXXIII) and a little later, "while I cannot cognise, I can quite well think freedom, that is to say that my representation of it involves at least no contradiction..

The Ideas of pure Reason, though carefully set about by limiting descriptions are retained and apply to the Universe, the soul and God. The Idea is merely to be adopted as a point of view. It does not determine an object to which it directly relates, (pp. 471, 416). It is merely a regulative principle or maxim and provides us with no extension beyond the realm of experience. (p410)

In the "Critique of the Practical Reason" God, the soul, and Immortality are reinstated, and there is an interesting anticipation of this in a note at the foot of p. XXXIII KRV. Dealing with the difference between a possible thought and one which corresponds/

Chapter V. Section 4. Knowledge.

responds to a real object, he says, "Something more is required before I can attribute to such a conception objective validity, that is real possibility, the other possibility being merely logical. We are not however confined to theoretical sources of cognition for the means of satisfying this additional requirement, but may derive them from practical sources."

And again, looking beyond the division of theoretical and practical reason, he writes, p 494, "But this systematic unity of ends in this world of intelligences,--- ~~which~~ as mere nature is only a world of sense, but as a system of freedom and volition, may be termed an intelligible, that is, a moral world (regnum gratiae) leads inevitably also to the teleological unity of all things which constitute this great whole, according to universal natural laws --- just as the unity of the former is according to universal and necessary moral laws ---, and unites the practical with the speculative reason."....

Feuerbach will not accept, however, this extension of reason^{al} to the noumenal world. He accepts the principle of the Categorical Imperative, but it is limited to man and has no reference to a world of ends in which Nature plays her own part. Indeed reason as practical is for that very fact anthropomorphic. God so far from being unknown is so well known that he is none other than the Race, Man as infinite.

Nor will Feuerbach accept Hegel's critical restatement of the Ontological argument, and this brings us to our second point.

Hegel refused to be content with Kant's presentation of the case/

case, and while acknowledging the destructive value of his words over against the old theology considered there was more to be said.

Hegel rightly pointed out that Kant's view of experience was simply that of the world of the understanding or the categories of scientific thought, and so according to his premises his argument was justified. Further Kant was arguing against proofs of God by means of a process of syllogising in which the conclusion was really more than was contained in the premisses, and God instead of being the ground of all was derivative and dependent. (logic, p 104.102)

As for the famous illustration of the hundred dollars, the same in content whether real or merely conceived, this is a barbarism of language, for God is not a 'thing' like a dollar. (108-9) Philosophers, he pleads ironically, are not wholly ignorant of the difference between Being and Thought. The mark of everything finite is just this difference, its being in time and place is discrepant from its notion. God on the contrary, expressly has to be what can only be 'thought as existing'. His notion involves being. It is this unity of the notion and being that constitutes the notion of God. --- It would be strange, if the notion, the very inmost of mind, if even the Ego, or above all the concrete totality we call God were not rich enough to include so poor a category as Being, the very poorest and most abstract of all." (p. 109).

If this criticism goes off into the peculiar terminology of Hegel, that is so irritating to the uninitiated, he speaks in simpler language on page 103 of the Logic when he says, "What men call the proofs of God's existence are rightly understood, ways of describing/

the abstract spirit, in short, not the reason in abstracte^{o?}, but the actual complete being of man. Man is the measure of reason."

Again, Sensibility is the Mother of all knowledge. Thought is nothing more than a sensation which has been and is no more. There are thus different kinds of sensations. Thinking is only a sensation enlarged expanded to include the distant and the absent, a sensation of something which is not properly felt or perceived.

Arguing against the intellectualism of Hegel and with a curious reminder of Descartes, he writes, par 37, "The more recent philosophy sought something immediately certain. Consequently it rejected the 'thought' of Scholasticism which is without ground and foundation, it established philosophy upon self-consciousness i.e. it sets in the place of the Being which is only thought, in the place of God, the highest last Being of all scholastic philosophy, the thinking being, the Ich, the self-conscious spirit; for thinking lies infinitely nearer to the thinker, is more present more certain than what is thought. The existence of God cannot be doubted, so too in general that which I think; but indubitable is the fact that I exist, I who think, I who doubt. But the self-consciousness of modern philosophy is itself again only a being thought (conceived), mediated through abstraction, consequently doubttable. Indubitable, immediate, certain is only that which is the object of sense, of intuition, of perception."

And again in the next paragraph, 38, "True and divine is that only/

only which requires no proof, which is certain immediately through itself.... But only the sensible is sun-clear; only where sensibility begins do all doubt and division cease."

Bolin and Jodl, (pp 55,56, and pp 28-30 respectively) protest that Feuerbach is not a vulgar sensualist of the pre-Kantian school for he strives to preserve the right ^{? w ? r} and thought and the connectedness and meaning it gives). His interest is in the activity of scientific knowledge and the fact that its results are assured by sensible control of experiments. It is his ideal of science which leads to this emphasis upon the immediately certain which is given by the tests of sense-experience. Indeed in one of his notes, (v.Bolin, p 52) Feuerbach claims that he is the embodiment of modern science brought to its highest simplest and also philosophical expression. In paragraph 43 we are reminded that sensibility is not the immediate in the sense of the speculative philosophy as something lying on the open hand and devoid of thought. Men see things at first only as they appear, not as they are, and so the task of philosophy and of science in general is not to turn objects into thoughts, but to come nearer to reality and to present as visible that which to the common eye is invisible. This hardly tallies with the assertion that only the sensible is ~~S~~unclear and implies the activity of reason.

Jodl refers to paragraph 48 for a fresh and significant account of the relation of perception to thought. "The real is capable of being represented in thought not in complete numbers but only in broken parts...Thinking of the absolute kind, i.e., isolated from sensibility, does not pass beyond the identity of thought with itself....We are left with no other criterion of truth than that something does not contradict the thought, or idea consequently/

consequently only a formal subjective criterion which does not give any decision whether the truth conceived is also truth in reality. The criterion which does decide this is perception alone. Perception leaves things in their unhindered freedom, thought gives them laws but they are too often only despotic." In words which recall the famous phrase of Kant as to blind perceptions and empty conceptions, he says, "Perception for itself has no principles, thought in itself no life. The rule is the concern of thought, the exception from the rule the concern of perception. The circle is the symbol of speculative philosophy of the thought which supports itself only on itself, the ellipse on the contrary is the mark of the sensible philosophy, of the thought which bases itself on perception and therefore takes into account the anomalies which come before it."

This paragraph which I have not quoted in full Jodl interprets as an expression of the fact that it is impossible to rationalise reality wholly by means of thinking because reality is broken into individuals by perception.

One may remark on this whole statement, 1st, it may be granted, and even Hegel does so in reference to the Ontological argument, that there is an admitted difference between Reality and a system of concepts of Reality, but it has to be remembered that thought itself, and no one can lay more stress on self-consciousness when he wishes than Feuerbach, is also something real. It is ambiguous to say as he does, "The world is not given us through thinking, but through life intuition and sense." The point is what//

Chapter V. Section 4. Knowledge.

what is the relation between the two and what are the limits of the action of thought in the use of sense for the representations it forms of experiences which come to it in life but not through sense. Sense perception is only one part of experience and its definiteness or immediacy is helpful as a criterion of reality only when it enables us to express to ourselves other experiences which are also immediate. Religion does not surrender easily her claim to the reality of the spiritual and is not to be frightened off by being told it is mediated and therefore abstract.

Further, with regard to sense-perception and the difficulty of a completed system such as Hegel sought to present, there are other experiences, such as the sense of sin, the fact of evil, ~~the~~ the consciousness of moral freedom which warn us not to be presumptuous. Even the theologians have spoken of the ellipse rather than the circle as being the symbol of man's limitations. And few dispute that life and reality are richer than our thought.

But this hindrance to a completely rational system does not mean that we cannot have ruling principles which give coherence to the variety of experience and make us believe that reality is a system, i.e., a rational unity. Our human intelligence is indeed too short to measure and to hold all things together. The defect of Hegelianism may be admitted in that it attempted too much definiteness, though Hegel could be vague enough at times and Feuerbach in his "Anti-Hegel" scoffs at the idea that this philosophy presented to man the Holy Ghost in three volumes. (v. Note F. & Hegel)

At/

bring us closer to reality.

3 / that there is an argument justifiable under certain conditions from the sense of need to the reality of the object.

4 / but that metaphysics and not merely psychology must have its say in the matter.

1/ As soon as we enter upon this question, we become aware that we are dealing not with a question of the past but of the present, for we breathe the atmosphere of modern thinking and find ourselves using its characteristic speech.

Recent psychology has emphasised the dynamic and conative element in human life, e.g., in such a book as 'The Freudian Wish' by Edwin B. Holt, 1915. "The so-called Wish," says Holt, "is the unit of psychology replacing the older unit, commonly called 'sensation', which latter, it is to be noted, was a content of consciousness unit, whereas the 'wish' is a more dynamic affair." The whole book is most suggestive, both in its correspondences with and its differences from the views of Feuerbach.

Feuerbach would agree, e.g., that life as a whole is dynamic, though on the other hand his rationalistic doctrine of knowledge tends more to a fixed system of rigid law. He would agree that 'wish generally considered "includes all that would commonly be so classed, and also whatever would be considered impulse, tendency, desire, purpose, attitude and the like," but he would include, as Holt does not, the emotional component

thereof. He is not sufficiently a "Behaviourist" to agree with Holt in what the latter calls an exact definition, "that it is ^a ~~SOME~~ course of action which some mechanism of the body is set to carry out, whether it actually does do or not."(p3)

Suppressed wishes and conflicts which work mischief have for him as for Holt and Freud a peculiar interest, since they represent the source of aberration from which religion seeks to deliver men. Also his treatment of the subject may be considered as an attempt, which Holt outlines, to solve these difficulties by the method of 'Discrimination and Integration' i.e., by getting at the facts rather than by compromise or suppression, and this not merely in regard to details of personal ethics (e.g. whether one should go to the theatre when all previous teaching in the home argues against going), but in the larger matters of the reality of religion. "Let us find a new road," he would say, "and discover the true meaning of religion in anthropology."

Like the 'Freudian Wish', which itself gives us 'the Ethics from below' Feuerbach's theory is resentful of the 'Ethics from above', i.e. from 'authority', natural or supernatural. The Categorical Imperative is from within man.

But in one respect there is a marked difference. Holt, p92-3, brings the 'wish' into closest relation with the whole world of fact. This is his doctrine of cognition. Wishes are a function of environment, a reference or response to it. Thus, he says,
are/

are brought to an end dualistic philosophy and psycho-physical parallelism, which were a complete misapprehension from the outset. It is not that we have two contrasted worlds, the subjective and the objective; there is but one world, the objective and that which we have ~~xxx~~ hitherto not understood, have dubbed therefore the subjective, are the subtler workings of integrated objective mechanisms."

Despite some curious sentences in Grundsätze as to the dependence of thought on sensation, or thought being itself only sensation, Feuerbach holds to the intellectualism where self-consciousness is the chief characteristic of man over against the animals ~~xxxxxxxx~~. Even when he seeks to abolish dualism in his doctrine of 'Organismus', he unifies mind and body by keeping them both.

As for the use which Feuerbach himself makes of 'Wish', I have said he employs it in a very restricted form in reference to religion. He makes a sharp distinction between necessary and unnecessary wishes. The former are those which can be satisfied in accordance with Nature and Reason. The latter are so named because the barriers against which they cry out are barriers only to the imagination of man. Why should a man, e.g. object that he is tied down to space and time. The imagination certainly strives to pass beyond them. But reason points out that the limitations of space and time simply mean that man is bound up with earth. "Apart from earth I am a phantom. I am essentially a being of earth." Whatever calls for satisfaction/

ion contrary to Reason and Nature is mere 'Wish'.

" This is indeed the crime of Christianity that it has brought in the principle of unlimited, extravagant, fanatic, supernaturalistic subjectivity, a principle intrinsically opposed to that of science and culture." (W.C.pl33)

His very definition of the religious wish as 'unnecessary' and 'mere wish' is a petitio principii. Nor does he better the case by further descriptions of it as "A will without power," " A desire whose satisfaction is not in my power ". (W R p32)

" Wünschen " is called in old German, he goes on to say, "zaubern" (to bewitch or conjure), and to bless, in Luther's words, means properly to wish something good though we cannot give it. (V W R p359)

It is obvious that such a religious wish is at once linked up with the supernatural and therefore with emptiness. The case has already been decided against it. It is used in a very definite and restricted form.

One may be permitted to recall some of the sentences in which this restricted definition finds embodiment. Boldly he declares, "The fundamental dogmas of religion are realised wishes of the^{human} heart." (W.C. ch 15). "God is the Love that satisfies our wishes, our emotions, our wants.... He is himself the realised wish of the heart, the wish exalted to the certainty of its own fulfilment." (W.C. pl21). "The miraculous Redeemer is nothing else than the realised wish of feeling, to be free from the laws of morality. " (W.C.pl43). "Dreaming is^a double refraction of the rays of light, hence its indescribable charm..